Nnebe v. Daus

184 F.Supp.3d 54

Jonathan Nnebe, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Matthew Daus, et al., Defendants.

No. 06–cv–4991 (RJS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed April 28, 2016

Daniel L. Ackman, 222 Broadway, 19th Floor, New York, New York 10038; David T. Goldberg of Donahue & Goldberg, LLP, 99 Hudson Street, 8th Floor, New York, New York 10013; and Janice Mac Avoy and Michael A. Kleinman of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, One New York Plaza, New York, New York 10004, for Plaintiffs.

Mary O'Sullivan and Amy Weinblatt of the New York City Law Department, Office

of the Corporation Counsel, 100 Church Street, New York, New York 10007, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Richard J. Sullivan, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Jonathan Nnebe, Eduardo Avenaut, and Khairul Amin, together with the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Plaintiffs"), bring this putative class action against Defendants Matthew Daus, Charles Fraser, Joseph Eckstein, Elizabeth Bonina, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (the "TLC"), and the City of New York (the "City") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that the TLC's policy of summarily suspending a taxi driver's license upon notification of the driver being charged with a crime violates the United States Constitution, New York state law, and New York City municipal law. (Doc. No. 42.) Having held a bench trial in this action, and having issued findings of fact as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Doc. No. 323 (the "Findings of Fact")), the Court hereby issues its Conclusions of Law. Collectively, this Memorandum and Order and the Findings of Fact form the Court's bench opinion as to Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the notice provided by the TLC with respect to summary post-suspension hearings held prior to December 2006 violated the procedural component of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In all other respects, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prove their constitutional claims.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and long history of this case, which are set forth in detail in the Findings of Fact. Put briefly, the TLC summarily suspends the taxi licenses of taxi drivers who are arrested on criminal charges that the TLC considers serious. Ordinarily, a driver's license is suspended when he has been arrested for a certain crime found on a list maintained by the TLC. That list includes all felonies and certain misdemeanors related to violence, driving, or sexual misconduct.

Currently, the TLC derives its authority to summarily suspend taxi drivers' licenses from § 19–512.1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code, which authorizes the TLC to (1) suspend a license "prior to giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing" for "good cause shown relating to a direct and substantial threat to the public health or safety," and (2) "suspend or revoke" a license "after notice and an opportunity for a hearing." NYC Admin. Code § 19–512.1(a). The provision also requires the TLC to notify drivers of a summary suspension within five days and to hold a hearing within ten days of a driver's request for a hearing, "unless the [TLC] ... determines that such hearing would be prejudicial to an ongoing criminal or civil investigation." Id. Pursuant to its authority to implement provisions of the Code through rules and regulations, see id. § 19–503, the TLC has promulgated a rule delineating the circumstances under which a taxi driver's license may be suspended after that driver has been arrested (the "Rule"). The current version of the Rule is codified at Chapter 68 § 68–15 of the Rules of the City of New York. See R.C.N.Y. § 68–15(d) (Nov.2014).

As relevant, the current version of the Rule provides:

(d) Summary Suspension for Criminal Charges.

(1) The Chairperson [of the TLC] can summarily suspend a License based upon an arrest or citation if the Chairperson believes that the charges, if true, would demonstrate that continued licensure would constitute a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety. Such charges include but are not limited to the following:

(A) Any arrest for a crime which constitutes a felony;

(B) Or any arrest or citation for the following offenses:

[A list of eighteen categories of misdemeanor offenses.]

(2) The Chairperson need not commence revocation proceedings while the criminal charges are pending. However, the Respondent is entitled to request a Summary Suspension hearing.

(3) At the Summary Suspension hearing, the issue will be whether the charges underlying the Licensee's arrest, if true, demonstrate that the continuation of the License while awaiting a decision on the criminal charges would pose a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety.

R.C.N.Y. § 68–15(d) (Nov.2014).¹

Plaintiffs in this action are taxi drivers in New York City who have had their licenses suspended by the TLC on the basis of having been charged with a crime. In essence, Plaintiffs object to the TLC's decision to suspend their licenses without a pre-suspension hearing and without extending the scope of a post -suspension hearing to an individual assessment of whether continued licensure of the particular driver poses a risk to public safety. Specifically, each named Plaintiff is a taxi driver whose license was suspended in 2005 or 2006, after an arrest. Plaintiff Nnebe was charged with third-degree assault with intent to cause physical injury, Plaintiff Avenaut with third-degree assault with intent to cause physical injury, Plaintiff Amin with second-degree menacing with a weapon and third-degree assault with intent to cause physical injury, and Plaintiff Alexander Karmansky with first-degree criminal contempt and second-degree criminal trespass. See Nnebe v. Daus ("Nnebe II "), 644 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2011).² Plaintiffs were each summarily suspended upon arrest, and with the exception of Avenaut, who did not request a post-deprivation hearing, each received a post-suspension hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The outcome at each hearing was the same—that is, the ALJ recommended the continued suspension of the driver's license pending resolution of the criminal proceedings against the driver, and the TLC Chairperson (Daus) accepted the ALJ's recommendation. All four drivers eventually secured the reinstatement of their licenses when the charges against them were dropped or otherwise dismissed. In each driver's case, his license was suspended for approximately three to four months.

On September 30, 2009, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs' due process claims, finding that (1) the TLC's policy of suspending a license without first affording the driver a hearing did not violate procedural due process, (2) the agency's post-suspension hearing also did not violate procedural due process, (3) these summary suspension procedures did not violate Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights, and (4) Plaintiffs had fair and adequate notice that they faced suspension if arrested for certain crimes. Nnebe v. Daus ("Nnebe I "), 665 F.Supp.2d 311, 325–26, 330–33 (S.D.N.Y.2009). On March 25, 2011, the Second Circuit affirmed the Court's conclusion that no pre-suspension hearing was necessary to comply with the Due Process Clause, but vacated Nnebe I and remanded to the Court "to conduct additional fact-finding, in the manner it deems appropriate, to determine whether the post -suspension hearing the City affords does indeed provide an opportunity for a taxi driver to assert that, even if the criminal charges are true, continued licensure does not pose any safety concerns." Nnebe II, 644 F.3d at 163 (emphasis added). On July 8, 2011, the Second Circuit issued its mandate (Doc. No. 163), pursuant to which the Court directed the parties to submit additional declarations, affidavits, and supplemental memoranda of law regarding their cross-motions for summary judgment (see Doc. No. 190). The Court also held oral argument and allowed the parties to file post-argument submissions. (See Doc. No. 209.) Thereafter, the Court denied the parties' post-remand cross-motions for summary judgment in Nnebe v. Daus ("Nnebe III "), No. 06–cv–4991 (RJS), 2013 WL 4494452 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2013).

Between January 13 and 21, 2014, the Court held a bench trial on the issue identified by Nnebe II —that is, the standard actually applied at post-suspension hearings. The Court issued its Findings of Fact on August 7, 2014. In the Findings of Fact, the Court found that although ALJs—who constitute the first level of review for a driver contesting his or her suspension—have employed different standards at various times in the last decade, the TLC Chairperson, who is vested with the ultimate authority to determine whether a taxi driver's license suspension should continue, has consistently considered only whether (a) the suspended driver has been charged with a crime, (b) the charge is still pending, and (c) the underlying charges, if true, are sufficiently connected to public health or safety. (See Findings of Fact at 2, 12); see also R.C.N.Y. § 68–15(d)(3). The Court will refer to this substantive standard as the "arrest-plus-nexus" standard, and it is this standard that the TLC actually employs at post-suspension hearings.

In determining whether there is a sufficient nexus between the charged crime on the one hand, and public health or safety on the other, the TLC Chairperson considers only the statutory elements of the crime charged, and does not look to the particularized facts underlying the charges or any facts relating to the individual characteristics of the driver. (Findings of Fact at 12.) Indeed, as the Court found in the Findings of Fact, the TLC maintains a list of offenses—specifically, all felonies and certain misdemeanors—for which it will summarily suspend a driver upon arrest. In...