Noakes v. Univ. of Cincinnati

1

JOHN NOAKES, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-284

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division

May 2, 2024

ORDER

Michael R. Barrett United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief filed by Plaintiff John Noakes, (Doc. 3) and the response by Defendants University of Cincinnati (“UC”); Alecia Trammer, Director of the Office of Equity, Inclusion, and Community Impact; Adrienne Lyles Title IX Coordinator; Bleuzette Marshall, Vice President for Equity, Inclusion, and Community Impact; and Ashleigh Wade Director of Student Conduct and Community Standards, (Doc. 38). After conducting expedited, limited discovery in anticipation of a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties appeared before the Court on February 15, 2024. (See Doc. 46). For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. Background

On March 30, 2022, the Assistant Director of Fraternity and Sorority Life at UC submitted an online report to the Office of Gender Equity & Inclusion (“OGEI”), indicating that a student, identified as Jane Roe, accused Noakes of sexually assaulting her at a fraternity party in September 2021. (Doc. 1, PageID 22). OGEI investigator Morgan Shaw conducted an intake meeting with Roe on April 6, 2022, but Roe did not submit a signed formal complaint to OGEI until July 26. (Id.). Shaw met with Roe again two days after that to discuss the complaint. (Id.).

On August 18, a Notice of Commencement of OGEI Investigation was sent to Noakes, informing him of the allegation “that on September 10, 2021 . . . [he] engaged in vaginal intercourse with [Roe] without [Roe's] consent.” (Doc. 30, PageID 1064). The letter informed Noakes that the alleged sexual assault was determined to fall within the scope of UC's Title IX Sexual Harassment Policy and provided an overview of the investigation process, as well as an outline of his rights and responsibilities. (Id., PageID 1064-65). Noakes responded on August 26, expressing his intention to cooperate with the investigation, but requesting additional information, including a copy of the original complaint. (Doc. 1, PageID 24). While Noakes and Shaw continued to correspond, Shaw conducted interviews with Roe and several other witnesses. (Id., PageID 27-36).

Eventually, on November 10, Shaw provided Noakes with a draft investigative report. (Id., PageID 36). Noakes responded on November 22, admitting that he and Roe “did engage in sexual intercourse,” but “vehemently disagree[ing] that the sexual intercourse was not consensual.” (Id., PageID 37). Noakes also stated that Roe “did not seem to be impaired nor under the influence of any drugs,” and expressed in a follow-up letter that he believed “the report was unreasonably delayed[,] which made it difficult for [him] to obtain witnesses and other evidence to support [his] version of the events.” (Id.).

On January 10, 2023, Noakes was informed that the matter was referred for a misconduct hearing. (Id., PageID 39). At the February 20 hearing, a panel consisting of employees from TNG Consulting reviewed Shaw's final report, heard testimony from witnesses, and examined both Noakes and Roe. (Id., PageID 40-43). Noakes received a letter from Trammer on March 23, explaining that the panel unanimously found him responsible for violating UC's Title IX Sexual Harassment Policy, “specifically related to the prohibition against Sexual Assault (Forcible Rape)”. (Id., PageID 132). The panel recommended that Noakes be expelled from UC. (Id., PageID 143).

Noakes timely appealed the result, arguing in particular that (1) the panel impermissibly reviewed “highly prejudicial” statements from witnesses who did not appear at the hearing and therefore could not be cross-examined; (2) he had not received sufficient and timely notice of the allegations against him; (3) the investigative process was unduly prolonged, resulting in prejudice; (4) the hearing panel committed multiple errors; and (5) the entire investigation and hearing process had been fundamentally unfair. (Id., PageID 145-53). However, on May 5, an appeals panel consisting of employees from InCompliance Consulting issued a thorough written opinion upholding the result of the hearing in its entirety. (Id., PageID 154-67).

Noakes subsequently brought the underlying suit, raising claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] Specifically, Noakes contends that “[c]lear irregularities in UC's response to the allegations of sexual misconduct permit a plausible inference of sex discrimination,” and Defendants violated his due process rights by (1) delaying the investigation and adjudication of the matter; (2) failing to provide adequate notice of the allegations; (3) using biased outside consultants as decisionmakers; and (4) generally conducting hearings that were fundamentally unfair.

(Doc. 1, PageID 54, 58-61). He argues that he “will suffer reputational and other harm both on and off campus” in the absence of injunctive relief. (Doc. 3, PageID 176).

II. Preliminary Injunction Standard

Preliminary injunctions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Poffenbarger v. Kendall, 588 F.Supp.3d 770, 782 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). A movant's burden is higher than that required to survive a motion to dismiss or even a motion for summary judgment. Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Doe v. Knox Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., No. 225317, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 22897, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022).

The Court looks to four factors when reviewing a motion for a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether there is a likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff's claim; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) whether others would be harmed by granting the injunction; and (4) whether the public good is served by issuing the injunction.” Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 223 F.Supp.3d 704, 709 (S.D. Ohio 2016). However, “where there is no likelihood of either success on the merits or irreparable harm, an injunction in unwarranted-regardless of the showing on the other factors.” Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer, 31 F.4th 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2022).

III. Analysis

Noakes points to Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati and two other cases from this district- Roe v. Adams-Gaston, No. 2:17-CV-945, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185697 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2018), and Nokes v. Miami Univ., No. 1:17-CV-482, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136880 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2017)-in which the Court granted preliminary injunctions prohibiting educational institutions from suspending or expelling students who alleged that their due process rights had been violated by school disciplinary proceedings. (Doc. 3, PageID 189). To that end, Noakes contends that a preliminary injunction is proper here because he satisfies each of the applicable criteria. Defendants counter that Noakes's procedural due process claim cannot succeed on the merits because he seeks only retrospective relief and was afforded adequate constitutional protections during the disciplinary process.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that “Eleventh Amendment immunity ‘bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments....'” Doe v. Miami Univ., 247 F.Supp.3d 875, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (quoting McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012)). Because UC is a public university in the State of Ohio, it qualifies as an arm of the state and is therefore immune from suit. See id. However, “[s]uits for injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials acting in their official capacities . . . are permitted in limited circumstances.” Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed.Appx. 437, 443-44 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1974)). Those limited circumstances include suits seeking prospective injunctive relief from state officials. Doe v. Miami Univ., 247 F.Supp.3d at 883.

Just as in Cummins, the relief Noakes seeks here would typically “be barred given its retroactive nature.” 662 Fed.Appx. at 444. Indeed, Defendants note that Noakes “does not plead for reinstatement and does not express a desire to re-enroll at UC,” and argue that “the request for relief is not prospective because it merely seeks to right a purported past wrong rather than correcting an ongoing violation of federal law.” (Doc. 38, PageID 1755-56). But the Sixth Circuit has been abundantly clear on this question:

Appellants are requesting an injunction against the individual defendants in their official capacity “prohibiting the imposition of, or reporting of, any disciplinary actions under the UC Code of Student Conduct.” If successful, this claim would not require the court to grant any retroactive or compensatory remedy. Rather, the individual defendants would merely be compelled to remove the negative notation from appellants' disciplinary records that resulted from the allegedly unconstitutional disciplinary process. This is nothing more than prospective remedial action.

Cummins, 662 Fed.Appx. at 444 (internal citations omitted).

Thus although UC may be immune from suit in...