Noel v. Oakbend Med. Ctr.

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BRIAN DUANE NOEL, Appellant v. OAKBEND MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee

No. 01-21-00206-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, First District

August 2, 2022

On Appeal from the 458th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 19-DCV-265821.

Panel consists of Radack Chief Justice and Goodman and Hightower Justices.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gordon Goodman Justice.

Pro se appellant Brian Duane Noel appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his claim for failing to file an expert report. Noel filed a claim against Oakbend Medical Center for the negligent treatment of his father. Noel contends that the trial court erred in treating his claim as a health care liability claim, which required an expert report, in failing to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and in failing to rule on his discovery motions. We affirm the trial court's dismissal order.

BACKGROUND

Noel's father, Richard David Collins, was admitted to Oakbend after he fell and hit the back of his head. While at Oakbend Collins developed bedsores, and, although he was temporarily released from Oakbend to return home, he was readmitted to Oakbend after the bedsores became infected. Collins was again released from Oakbend, but he died shortly afterwards.

Noel proceeding pro se, filed a claim against Oakbend, alleging negligence and seeking monetary damages. Oakbend moved to dismiss Noel's claim with prejudice for failing to comply with Section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires a claimant to file an expert report in all health care liability claims. The trial court granted Oakbend's motion, dismissed Noel's claim with prejudice, and ordered that Noel pay Oakbend's attorney's fees. Noel now appeals.

DISCUSSION

In two points of error, Noel contends that the trial court erred by (1) incorrectly applying the law to the facts of his case and dismissing his claim on that basis; and (2) failing to rule on his discovery motions.

A. Health care liability claim

Noel argues on appeal that the trial court erred by treating his claim as a health care liability claim under Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, when in fact his claim was for common law negligence under Chapter 101 of that code. He also argues that, even if Chapter 74 applied to his claims, the trial court should have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which would have relieved him of the requirement to file an expert report because bedsores are within common knowledge. He argues the trial court's misapplication of the law resulted in the dismissal of his claim, violating the due-course-of-law guarantee in Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution. We construe this point of error as a challenge to the trial court's dismissal of his claim under Chapter 74 for failing to file an expert report.^[1]

1. Standard of review and applicable law

Chapter 74 requires a claimant who asserts a "health care liability claim" against a "physician or health care provider" to serve on each defendant an expert report describing the applicable standard of care, how the defendant's actions failed to meet that standard, and the causal relationship between that failure and the damages claimed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a), (r)(6). A trial court, on the defendant's motion, must dismiss a health care liability claim and award attorney's fees to the defendant if the claimant does not timely serve the expert report. Id. § 74.351(b).

Whether a claim is a health care liability claim is a question of law that we review de novo. See Ross v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500-01 (Tex. 2015). A claim is a health care liability claim if it satisfies three elements:

(1) a physician or health care provider is a defendant;

(2) the claim at issue concerns treatment, lack of treatment, or a departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care; and

(3) the defendant's act or omission complained of proximately caused the injury to the claimant.

See Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 179-80 (Tex. 2012) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(13)). A "health care provider" means any entity licensed by the state to provide health care, including a hospital. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(11), (12). In determining whether a claim is a health care liability claim, we focus on the "facts underlying the claim," not "artfully-phrased language" in the plaintiff's pleadings. Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 2012).

We review a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss a health care liability claim for an abuse of discretion. Gray v. CHCA Bayshore L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2001)). A trial court "abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles." Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539 (Tex. 2010). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) ("[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion.").

2. Analysis

Noel argues that the trial court erred by applying Chapter 74 to his claim, which required him to file an expert report, and then disregarding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Noel argues that his claim was for general negligence, not medical malpractice, and so Chapter 74 should not have applied to his claim. Finally, he argues that the trial court violated the open-courts and due-course-of-law provisions of the Texas Constitution by dismissing his claim. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied Chapter 74 to Noel's claim because the facts he alleged stated a claim for health care liability, res ipsa loquitur did not relieve Noel of the expert-report requirement, and the trial court did not violate Noel's constitutional rights by dismissing his claim for failing to comply with the statutory expert-report requirement.

a. Whether Noel's claim was a health care liability claim

Noel concedes that, on its face, his claim might appear to be a health care liability claim under Chapter 74, but he argues that the trial court erred in applying Chapter 74 because there was no physician-patient relationship and because he instead brought his claim under Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution.

The alleged facts underlying Noel's claim are simply stated: Collins, Noel's father, developed bedsores while at Oakbend due to the negligence of its employees. The bedsores were left untreated and became infected, which led to Collins's death.

With these facts, Noel has alleged all three elements of a health care liability claim: Oakbend is a hospital and therefore a health care provider, as defined by Chapter 74. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(11), (12). Noel's claim concerns the development of and lack of treatment of his father's bedsores. And Noel alleges that this lack of treatment caused his father's injury and death. Thus, Noel has stated the three basic elements of a health care liability claim within the meaning of Chapter 74. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(13); Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 179-80.

Noel argues that his claim does not involve a physician-patient relationship, and so Chapter 74 should not apply. In his live pleading, he asserts that he does not allege a physician-patient relationship or malpractice by any doctor, and he attempts to withdraw "any and all claims that directly or indirectly implicate" Chapter 74.

Even though Noel's claim is not against a specific physician, it meets the criteria of a health care liability claim under Chapter 74, as explained above, because it is against a health care provider, and health care liability claims by definition include claims against health care providers. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(13).

Noel relies on this statement by the Supreme Court interpreting the definition of a health care liability claim: "Because a claim under the health care prong of [S]ection 74.001(a)(13) incorporates the definition of 'health care,' such a claim must involve a patient-physician relationship." Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 181. In the Williams case, the Supreme Court considered whether a claim brought by a non-patient employee against his employing hospital fell under the "health care" prong or "safety" prong of a health care liability claim. See id. at 180-81 (discussing definition of "health care liability claim" as departure from accepted standards of medical care, health care, or safety). The Court did not, as Noel seems to argue, state that if there is no physician-patient relationship between the claimant and the defendant, then Chapter 74 does not apply to the claim. In fact, the claim at issue in Williams was not between a patient and physician, yet the Supreme Court still held that it was a health care liability claim within the meaning of Chapter 74. See id. at 193 (concluding employee's claim was properly characterized as health care liability claim and dismissing claim for failure to file expert report).

The Supreme Court explained that a claim under the "health care" prong of a health care liability claim must involve a physician-patient relationship but did not say that a health care liability claim must be limited to claims between a patient and physician. See id. at 181. The definition of "health care" in Chapter 74 supports this conclusion. Chapter 74 defines "health care" as:

any act

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