Nogales v. Madden

JOSE NOGALES, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden, Respondent.

Case No. 3:20-cv-01110-WQH-NLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 3, 2021

ORDER:

1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Jose Nogales ("Nogales" or "Petitioner") is a state prisoner, currently in custody at Centinela State Prison. He is proceeding pro se with an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition" or "Pet."). (See Pet., ECF No. 4.) The Court has read and considered the Amended Petition, [ECF No. 4], the Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer [ECF Nos. 13, 13-1], the Traverse [ECF No. 18], the lodgments and other documents filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the Petition and DENIES a Certificate of Appealability.

/ / /

/ / /

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, Nogales was accused of driving to a rival gang's territory and killing two people by shooting at them from a car while they stood in the front yard of their house. (Lodgment No. 1, ECF No. 14-1 at 4-5.) He was convicted by jury trial of two counts of second degree murder, a violation of California Penal Code § 187(a), and one count of shooting into an inhabited dwelling, a violation of California Penal Code § 246. (Id. at 7-8.) The jury also found true several gang and gun enhancements as charged. (Id. at 8.) Following a bench trial, Nogales was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, a violation of California Penal Code § 12021(e) and associated gang allegations. (Id.) He was sentenced to eight years plus 80 years-to-life in state prison. (Lodgment No. 1, ECF No. 14-1 at 8.) Nogales was 14 years old at the time he committed the crimes and was prosecuted as an adult. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 14-9 at 1.)¹

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile violated the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. In response, California passed California Penal Code § 3051 which provides for a parole hearing for certain youth offenders during the 15th, 20th or 25th year of imprisonment. Cal. Penal Code § 3051 (West 2020).

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following his jury trial, Nogales appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 1, ECF No. 14-1.) The state appellate court upheld his conviction and modified his sentence with regard to the court fees assessed. (Id. at 48-49.) Nogales filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 2, ECF No. 14-2.)

Nogales then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, which was given case no. 3:11-cv-02146-IEG-BLM. (See Nogales v. McDonald, So. Dist. Cal. case no. 3:11-cv-02146-IEG-BLM.) On May 10, 2012 the Court denied the petition, (Id. at ECF No. 18), and on December 16, 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's denial. (Nogales v. McDonald, 624 Fed. App'x 608 (9th Cir. 2015).

On January 18, 2014, Nogales filed a habeas corpus petition San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 3, ECF No. 14-3.) The superior court denied the petition on the merits. (Lodgment No. 4, ECF No. 14-4.) Five years later, on February 27, 2019, Nogales filed another habeas corpus petition in San Diego Superior Court in which he raised the Eighth Amendment claim he raises in the current petition and other claims. (Lodgment Nos. 5-6, ECF Nos. 14-5-14-6.) The superior court denied the petition and told Nogales to file a motion for hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261 (2016) in order to make a record for any future youth offender hearing. (Lodgment No. 7, ECF No. 14-7.)

Nogales next filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal on August 23, 2019 in which he again raised his Eighth Amendment claim. (Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 14-8.) The state appellate court denied the petition on the merits. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 14-9.) Nogales then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on September 30, 2019, seeking review of the court of appeal's denial asserting his Eighth Amendment claim. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 14-10.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition, stating "The petition for review is denied. Petitioner's claim under Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 is denied as moot under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. (See Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker (1991) 501 U.S. 797, 803.)" (Pet., ECF No. 4 at 41.)

On October 21, 2019, he filed another state habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal asserting the claims he raises in his current federal Petition. (Lodgment No. 11, ECF No. 14-11.) The state appellate court denied the petition on procedural grounds and on the merits. He filed his final state petition for writ of habeas in the California Supreme Court on March 11, 2020, in which he raised the equal protection claim he raises in his current federal petition. (Lodgment No. 12, ECF No. 14-12.) TheCalifornia Supreme Court denied the petition as untimely, successive and repetitive, citing In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769, and In re Miller (1941) 147 Cal.2d 734, 735. (Pet., ECF No. 4 at 46.)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner's habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court's determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the "unreasonable application" clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court's application of clearly established federal law must be "objectively unreasonable." See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). The Court

/ / /may also grant relief if the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court "looks through" to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the higher court's denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. If the dispositive state court order does not "furnish a basis for its reasoning," federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means "the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

B. Discussion

Nogales raises two grounds in his Petition. First, he contends that the state courts' refusal to resentence him pursuant to Miller violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and his federal due process rights. (Pet., ECF No. 4 at 13.) Second, he claims that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. (Id.) Respondent argues the Petition is successive and untimely. (Answer, ECF No. 13-1 at 11-15.) In the alternative, Respondent argues Nogales's first ground for relief does not state a cognizable federal claim and that, even if it did, the state court's resolution of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 15-16.) As to Nogales's second claim, Respondent contends the state court's resolution of the claim was also neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 16-19.)

1. Whether the Petition is Successive

Respondent contends Nogales's Petition is successive because he challenged the same conviction in San Diego Superior Court case no. SCD208418 in Nogales v.McDonald, So. Dist. Cal. case no. 3:11-cv-02147-BTM-BLM. In that case, the Court denied Nogales's petition on the merits and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court's denial. (Answer, ECF No. 13-1 at 11-12.) Nogales contends the Petition in this case is not successive because his sentence has been modified...