Norfolk Dep't of Hum. Serv. v. Goldberg

81 Va. App. 667

904 S.E.2d 668

NORFOLK DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

v.Joshua GOLDBERG

Record No. 1382-23-1

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Norfolk.

August 20, 2024

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK, Robert B. Rigney, Judge

Christopher W. Palermo-Re (Office of the Norfolk City Attorney, on brief), for appellant.

No brief or argument for appellee.

Present: Judges Fulton, Lorish and White

OPINION BY JUDGE LISA M. LORISH

The Norfolk Department of Human Services ("the Department") appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk allowing Joshua Goldberg to access documents related to an unfounded report of child sexual assault against him under Code § 63.2-1514(D) (the "bad faith disclosure exception"). The Department argues that Goldberg should not be able to access the report because the bad faith disclosure exception only covers a report made directly to the Department by a bad faith actor. Here, the purported bad faith actor made the complaint to a mandatory reporter who then relayed the allegations to the Department. We agree with the circuit court that the statute permits the disclosure of the records, and so we affirm.

BACKGROUND¹

Joshua Goldberg ("Goldberg") is married to Dr. Ali Goldberg ("Ali"), and the couple has two young children. A report was made to the Department that Goldberg was sexually abusing their daughter, L.G.² The Department investigated and implemented a safety plan that required Ali to supervise all contact between her husband and L.G. L.G. also had to undergo a forensic interview as part of the investigation. Because Goldberg is a member of the U.S. Navy, the Naval Criminal Investigative Services also investigated the report. The Department determined that the accusation against Goldberg was unfounded and closed the investigation.

Goldberg and his wife suspected that Ali’s mother, Linda MacKrell, made the report based on MacKrell’s long history of interfering with how they raised their children and prior false allegations against Goldberg. They also suspected her because the report contained information Goldberg believed was only known to MacKrell.

Acting on these suspicions, Goldberg petitioned the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to release the records of the Department’s investigation to him under the bad faith disclosure exception in Code § 63.2-1514(D). The petition outlined the above facts and alleged that Goldberg "believes that the complaint was made by Linda MacKrell, made anonymously by Linda MacKrell, or made by a family member of Linda MacKrell based on false information provided to them by Linda MacKrell." It also alleged that the complaint was made "in bad faith and maliciously in order to end the relationship between Mr. Goldberg and his Wife to create a situation where [Ali] would need Ms. MacKrell’s assistance with the children and thus be allowed to be integrated in their lives." The petition asked the court to review the documents in camera and determine whether Goldberg satisfied the bad faith disclosure exception.

The court issued a writ of certiorari asking the Department to provide the documents related to the unfounded report of abuse against Goldberg and ordered a hearing on the matter. The Department opposed the petition, making the same argument it now makes on appeal—that the report was made without bad faith by a mandatory reporter and therefore did not qualify under the statute. According to the Department, the allegedly malicious report or complaint must be conveyed to the Department directly by someone acting in bad faith to be eligible for release under Code § 63.2-1514(D); where a malicious or bad faith allegation is made to a mandatory reporter who then innocently communicates that information to the Department, the statute does not permit disclosure. The Department also contended that Goldberg had not met his burden of showing that there existed a "reasonable question of fact as to whether the report or complaint was made in bad faith or with malicious intent."

At the hearing, Goldberg and his wife testified about why they believed that MacKrell was the originator of the report and why she would have made the allegation maliciously or in bad faith. Goldberg asserted that MacKrell had never supported his marriage to her daughter and that before the investigation, "MacKrell had been limited in her interactions with the family due to prior false allegations" against him and the children’s nannies, as well as "general interference with" the Goldbergs’ parenting. He opined that MacKrell made the report "in order to limit [his] access to his children and make herself needed to care for the children." He added that some of the information reported could only have been known to MacKrell. He also assured the court that he would take no action to threaten the life or safety of MacKrell and that he has no history of violence in general or with respect to MacKrell specifically.

Ali testified that she too believed that her mother had made the report. She said that, in the past, her mother had "attempted to pay one of their children’s nannies to unexpectedly quit providing childcare" and that her mother does not get along with Goldberg. She also testified that her brother had sent her videos that MacKrell had taken of L.G. in which she tried to make L.G. behave "in a way that would support the allegations" made to the Department and that the behavior in the video was abnormal for her daughter. She also said that her brother had "alluded to the idea that their mother had made the complaint."

After hearing this evidence, the circuit court determined that Goldberg had satisfied the requirements of the bad faith disclosure exception and issued a letter opinion explaining its decision to allow Goldberg to access the requested records. The court, while acknowledging the Department’s arguments, focused on the legislative intent of the statute, "to provide the records of ill-founded abuse or neglect charges to individuals who have been targeted maliciously or in bad faith." Finding that Goldberg was in the exact situation that the statute was designed to address, the court ruled that Code § 63.2-1514(D) applied and that Goldberg had satisfied the requirements to obtain relief under the statute.

The Department moved to stay the verdict until this appeal could be completed. The court ordered another hearing to consider arguments on the motion to stay and, following the hearing and consideration of the parties’ briefs, suspended the execution of its final order allowing Goldberg access to the documents until after this appeal was resolved. The Department signed the order as seen and objected to, outlining the same arguments that it makes in the instant appeal. The Department timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

[1–5] The Department argues that the circuit court erred in interpreting Code § 63.2-1514(D). A question of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law that we consider de novo. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174 (2007). When this Court is asked to interpret a statute, our task "is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, as expressed by the language used in the statute." Verizon Va. LLC v. State Corp. Comm’n, 302 Va. 467, 477, 894 S.E.2d 318 (2023) (quoting Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425, 722 S.E.2d 626 (2012)). "When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by its plain meaning." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 336, 341, 837 S.E.2d 674 (2020) (quoting Conyers, 273 Va. at 104, 639 S.E.2d 174). Accordingly, we "apply[ ] the plain meaning of the words unless they are ambiguous or [doing so] would lead to an absurd result." Eley v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 158, 164, 826 S.E.2d 321 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 754, 759, 685 S.E.2d 655 (2009)). Language is ambiguous if "the text can be understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously [or] … the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness or definiteness." Blake v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 375, 381, 764 S.E.2d 105 (2014) (first alteration in original) (quoting Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 n.8, 623 S.E.2d 922 (2006)). If a court finds that the language of a statute is ambiguous, then it may consider factors other than the text itself, "such as the purpose, reason, and spirit of the law" in determining the statute’s meaning. Eley, 70 Va. App. at 164, 826 S.E.2d 321.

A. Reports of child abuse generally are kept confidential, but there is a narrow exception to enable a civil remedy for the victim of a bad faith actor.

In general, "[t]he records, information and statistical registries of the Department, local departments and of all child-welfare agencies concerning social services to or on behalf of individuals [are] confidential information." Code § 63.2-104.

Therefore, under ordinary circumstances, a person accused of child abuse and neglect cannot gain access to either the content of the report against them or the identity of the reporter. If the Department investigates a report and finds it unfounded, however, the bad faith disclosure exception provides a limited exception to this rule when the "subject of [the] unfounded report or complaint made pursuant to this chapter" believes the complaint or report was made "in bad faith or with malicious intent," and they can meet certain other statutory requirements. Code § 63.2-1514(D). In such a case, the bad faith disclosure exception requires the subject of the unfounded report to petition the circuit court where the report was made and "set forth the reasons such person believes that such report or complaint was made in bad faith or with malicious intent." Id. The circuit court then "shall request" that the local department provide the court with records of the investigation to be viewed in camera. Id. The petitioner may also...