Northmont City Schs. Dist.

1

Stephanie Booker, Plaintiff, v. Board of Education of the Toledo City School District, Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-1233

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division

February 16, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY J. HELMICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

Defendant Board of Education of the Toledo City School District (“TPS”) moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted by Plaintiff Stephanie Booker. (Doc. No. 10). Booker filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. No. 12). TPS filed a reply. (Doc. No. 14).

After Booker filed her opposition, TPS filed a “Motion to Strike Affidavit of Stephanie Booker” directed at a post-deposition affidavit attached to Booker's brief opposing summary judgment. (Doc. No. 13). Booker opposed this motion as well. (Doc. No. 15).

II. Background

Stephanie Booker has worked as a Campus Protection Officer (“CPO”) for the Toledo public school system since 2002, and she has been employed by TPS in other roles since 1983. She is a member of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”).

As a CPO, Booker is responsible for maintaining the safety and security of her assigned school, including by: patrolling the grounds; breaking up fights; restraining unruly students; preparing incident reports; and assisting the school principal with developing and implementing security and safety procedures. While CPOs sometimes remain with one school for consecutive school years, TPS can, and does, reassign them from year to year based on the needs of the district. (Doc. No. 10-3 at 4, 419-420; Doc. No. 10-4 at 3; Doc. No. 10-2 at 16).

CPOs like Booker are generally guaranteed employment, including pay and benefits, during the nine-and-a-half month school year. (Doc. No. 10-3 at 3, 179; Doc. No. 10-2 at 25-26). But during the summer, when school is out, CPOs must bid for temporary, forty-hour-a-week “Miscellaneous Laborer” positions, which are awarded based on seniority. (Doc. No. 10-3 at 173; Doc. No. 10-2 at 59). Unlike for the work CPOs perform during the school year, CPOs cannot use any kind of paid leave, including paid sick leave, when working as a Miscellaneous Laborer over the summer. (Doc. No. 10-3 at 174; Doc. No. 10-2 at 60).

Booker has plantar fasciitis. (Doc. No. 10-2 at 23). In 2018, Booker developed carpal tunnel syndrome and trigger finger syndrome in her left hand. (Doc. No. 10-4 at 6). She underwent surgery later that year to address her hand conditions and was unable to bid for summer work as a result. (Doc. No. 10-2 at 58-59). In 2019, she again developed carpal tunnel syndrome and trigger finger syndrome-this time on her right hand. (Doc. No. 10-4 at 6). She underwent surgery to address those conditions on May 20, 2019, and she requested sick time for the surgery and her subsequent recovery. (Doc. No. 10-2 at 15-16). Booker received sick pay from May 20 through May 28, 2019, the last day of that school year. (Id. at 16). Because of the timing of her surgery, Booker was again unable to work during the summer. (Id. at 59).

Booker did not receive sick pay for the time she spent recovering from her surgery after the end of the 2018-2019 school year, through August 17, 2019. (Doc. No. 10-2 at 59). Although Booker acknowledged that CPOs “don't get paid for sick time” when working over the summer as Miscellaneous Laborers, she maintains she should have continued to receive sick pay the entire time she recovered from her second surgery, including the summer months. (Id. at 60; Doc. No. 12 at 8- 9). TPS maintains that CPOs may not use any sick leave during the summer months because they are not required to work during that time. (Doc. No. 10-3 at 3; Doc. No. 10 at 4).

In early 2020, after the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, Toledo schools temporarily shut down. CPOs were considered essential personnel. Because students did not attend school inperson during that time, TPS temporarily required CPOs to work 1-2 days a week, in rotation, helping distribute food and school materials to students. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 2-3; Doc. No. 10-2 at 30). Booker testified that TPS called her on each of her rotation days and asked if she was coming to work, but because of the pandemic, she declined. (Id. at 30). Booker testified that she was forced to use 15 sick days during this period. (Id. at 18). She also testified that two other CPOs, Rick Turner and Rosalind Knighten, did not have to use sick time during the temporary COVID-19 shutdown-though she also acknowledged that Turner and Knighten did report to work on their scheduled rotation days. (Id. at 19).

In addition, Booker endured disparaging remarks about, and references to, her age from some of her coworkers and other TPS employees. Other CPOs suggested she should retire, asked her questions about AARP, asked her how old she was, and pointedly referred to the length of her tenure with TPS. (Doc. No. 10-2 at 20-21). As of July 13, 2023, Booker still worked for TPS as a CPO. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 3).

Booker sued TPS in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas on April 11, 2022, and she filed an Amended Complaint on June 23, 2022. (Doc. No. 1-1; Doc No. 1-3). TPS removed the case to this court on July 13, 2022.^[1] (Doc. No. 1).

III. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the [record] . . .,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the non-movant's claim. Id. at 323-25.

Once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient “simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Williams v. Belknap, 154 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987)). But “‘at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.'” Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). Therefore, “[t]he Court is not required or permitted . . . to judge the evidence or make findings of fact.” Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d at 1071.

The purpose of summary judgment “is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried.” Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 928, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1999). Ultimately, I must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; see also Atchley v. RK Co., 224 F.3d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 2000).

IV. Analysis

Booker brings four claims against TPS: (1) disability discrimination under Ohio law, (2) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (3) age discrimination under Ohio law, and (4) age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. No. 1-3). TPS seeks summary judgment on all of Booker's claims. (Doc. No. 10).

A. Booker's Affidavit

As a preliminary matter, I must address TPS's second motion, styled “Motion to Strike Affidavit of Stephanie Booker,” asking me to disregard the affidavit Booker attached to her opposition. (Doc. No. 13). TPS argues that the affidavit asserts facts not supported by material evidence under Rule 56(c)(2) because those sworn statements variously: (1) contradict Booker's sworn deposition testimony, (2) refer to events of which Booker has no personal knowledge, (3) contain inadmissible hearsay, and (4) contain new allegations not presented in her Amended Complaint. (See id. at 3-4). Booker argues her affidavit “complies with the requirements for evidence to be considered under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. No. 15 at 1-2).

To show that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed,” a party may cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, including . . . affidavits.” Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c)(1). But a court may not consider a post-deposition affidavit on summary judgment if it “directly contradicts the nonmoving party's prior sworn testimony.” Francis v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 601 F.Supp.3d 258, 262 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC...