NSA Auto Transp. v. Contract Freighters, Inc.

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NSA AUTO TRANSPORT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CONTRACT FREIGHTERS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:22CV671 (RCY)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

April 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Roderick C. Young, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue to the District of Oregon, Portland Division (ECF Nos. 2 and 5). The Motions have been fully briefed, and the Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions and argument would not aid the decisional process. For reasons stated below, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue (henceforth “Motion to Dismiss”) but grant the alternative Motion to Transfer Venue to the District of Oregon, Portland Division (henceforth, “Motion to Transfer”).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff NSA Auto Transport, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “NSA”) is a Virginia limited liability company and, based on the citizenship of its sole member and owner, M. Naseem Rahimi, a citizen of Virginia. (Am. Not. Removal ¶ 6, ECF No. 11.) NSA operates a long-haul trucking business. Defendant Contract Freighters, Inc. (“Defendant” or “CFI”) is also in the trucking industry and is incorporated in Missouri with its principal place of business in Joplin, Missouri. (Mem. Supp. Def. Mot. Dismiss 1, ECF No. 6.)

On June 4, 2022, a vehicle owned by Defendant and operated by an agent of Defendant struck Plaintiff's vehicle at Love's Truck Stop Store #449 located at 400 N.W. Frontage Rd., Troutdale, OR 97060. (Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-3; Mem. Supp. Def. Mot. Dismiss 2.) Defendant's vehicle involved in the incident was driven by Robert Tacner. (Tacner Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 6-2.) Plaintiff's truck was being operated by Ahmed Jafari, who was asleep in the rear compartment of the parked vehicle at the time of the incident. (Ahmed Jafari Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 7-3.) Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for negligence and is seeking compensatory damages of $500,000. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-10.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed its Complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond on August 30, 2022^[1] alleging negligence and served Defendant on September 19, 2022 (ECF No. 1-3). Defendant filed an Answer on October 11, 2022 (ECF No. 1-4). In that Answer and in a separate motion submitted on the same day, Defendant objected to venue, stating that Richmond, Virginia is not a proper venue for the accident and moved to dismiss the action for lack of proper venue. (Id. ¶ 18; see also ECF Nos. 3 and 6). On October 19, 2022, Defendant removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441(a). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7-9.) Also on October 19, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, Motion for Transfer of Venue (ECF No. 2) and a Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 3) on October 19, 2022. Defendant then appears to have mistakenly re-filed an identical Motion (ECF No. 5) and Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 6), again on October 19, 2022. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Transfer (ECF No. 7) on November 2, 2022. Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 9) on November 8, 2022. The Court issued an Order (ECF No. 10) on January 20, 2023, directing Defendant to file an Amended Notice of Removal with the necessary information for the Court to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship exists. Defendant filed the Amended Notice of Removal (ECF No. 11) on January 24, 2023. Having determined that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are satisfied, the Court now turns to a substantive review of Defendant's Motions.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

In order to survive a motion to dismiss for improper venue without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of venue. Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 405 (4th Cir. 2004). A court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings when ruling on a motion for improper venue. Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2006). Whether venue is proper is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as modified by the Eastern District of Virginia's Local Rule 3(C). Local Rule 3(C) states that “28 U.S.C. § 1391 et seq. shall be construed as if the terms ‘judicial district' and ‘district' were replaced with the term ‘division.'” E.D. Va. Loc. R. 3(C). As such, § 1391(b) should be read as:

A civil action may be brought in - (1) a [division] where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a [division] in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a [division] in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no [division] in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); E.D. Va. Loc. R. 3(C).

When evaluating “whether events or omissions are sufficiently substantial to support venue,” the court should not exclusively focus “on those matters that are in dispute or that directly led to the filing of the action.” Mitrano, 377 F.3d at 405 (citation omitted). The court should instead “review ‘the entire sequence of events underlying the claim.'” Id. (quoting Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001)). For venue purposes, defendant corporations are found to reside “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). As such, to determine whether a judicial district has personal jurisdiction over corporations, the court must look at the corporation's contacts with that district, specifically analyzing “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” LG Elec. Inc. v. Advance Creative Comput. Corp., 131 F.Supp.2d 804, 810 (E.D.Va. 2001); Blankenship v. Napolitano, 451 F.Supp.3d 596, 613 (S.D. W.Va. 2020) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “if venue is found to be improper, the district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”

B. Motion to Transfer

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a civil action may be transferred to another district or division if “(1) the claims might have been brought in the transferee forum, and (2) [the] interest of justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses justify transfer to that forum.” Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 928 F.Supp.2d 863, 867 (E.D. Va. 2013) (quoting Koh v. Microtek Intern., Inc., 250 F.Supp.2d 627, 630 (E.D. Va. 2003)). Once it is established that the action could have been brought in the transferee forum, the second part of the analysis involves a balancing test, focused on: (1) plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) witness convenience and access; and (4) the interest of justice. Id. (quoting Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F.Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. Va. 2011)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

The Court finds that venue is improper in the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, because none of the three § 1391(b) avenues for venue apply: Defendant is not a resident of the district or even the state in which this Court is located; the substantial part of events or omissions giving rise to the present claims did not occur in this division or district; and finally, Defendant is not subject to this court's personal jurisdiction. The first and third inquiries run together in this case, as, for purposes of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, Defendant is a resident of any judicial district where it is subject to that “court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Whether the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division has personal jurisdiction over Defendant involves an inquiry into whether Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia because Defendant maintains a registered agent in Richmond, Virginia and is authorized to do business in Virginia. (Mem. Opp'n Def. Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 7.) Furthermore, Plaintiff points to the fact that Heartland Express, which recently acquired CFI, owns and operates a facility in Chester, Virginia. Id. However, “jurisdiction over a parent corporation [does not] automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 n. 13 (1984). The Supreme Court has also previously stated that “a corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 n. 20 (2014).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that there is neither general personal jurisdiction nor specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Virginia. Specifically, Defendant is incorporated in the state of Missouri and its principal place of business is located in Joplin, Missouri. (Fowler Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No 6-1.) Plaintiff has neither shown that Defendant had “continuous and systematic activities” in Virginia nor that Defendant “purposely...