Nugent v. State

338 So.3d 459

Fabio Nicholas NUGENT, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D21-2196

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 11, 2022

Brooke Elvington, Dunedin, for Appellant.

LaROSE, Judge.

Fabio Nicholas Nugent was convicted and sentenced for a murder and robbery committed when he was sixteen. He now appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

Background

In 2003, the State indicted Mr. Nugent for first-degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon. He pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and armed robbery with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of twenty-five years’ imprisonment followed by fifteen years’ probation for each offense.

Years later, Mr. Nugent filed his "Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Sentence(s) Imposed in This Case Based on Graham and Kelsey and Grant a Resentencing Hearing and/or Judicial Review." He raised two claims.

First, he contended that his sentences are illegal because they do not afford him a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ("A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."). Mr. Nugent contended that under Henry v. State , 175 So. 3d 675, 679-80 (Fla. 2015), an aggregate term of years that constitutes a life sentence for a nonhomicide juvenile defendant is unconstitutional.

Second, he argued that he is entitled to judicial review of his sentences under section 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2017). Relying on Kelsey v. State , 206 So. 3d 5, 8 (Fla. 2016), he asserted that all juvenile offenders whose sentences exceed twenty years’ imprisonment are entitled to judicial review.¹

The postconviction court summarily denied relief.

Analysis

We review de novo the postconviction court's denial of a motion challenging an allegedly illegal sentence. See Jimenez v. State , 265 So. 3d 462, 476 n.10 (Fla. 2018) ; see also Clough v. State , 136 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reviewing de novo "a trial court's legal conclusions made in ruling on [a] postconviction motion" (citing Nelson v. State , 43 So. 3d 20, 28 (Fla. 2010) )).

I. Claim One: Juvenile Resentencing

Mr. Nugent's sentences are not illegal. Consequently, he is not entitled to resentencing.

The Florida Supreme Court recently clarified some "[c]onfusing and [e]rroneous language" in its prior juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Pedroza v. State , 291 So. 3d 541, 546 (Fla. 2020). Pedroza established a simple rule: "[A] juvenile offender's sentence does not implicate Graham , and therefore Miller [v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ], unless it meets the threshold requirement of being a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence." Pedroza , 291 So. 3d at 548. Mr. Nugent's sentences are neither.

In Pedroza , the supreme court approved the Fourth District's decision upholding a juvenile offender's forty-year sentence for second-degree murder. Id. at 543, 549. The supreme court held that the sentence was not unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and that Mr. Pedroza was not entitled to resentencing. Id . at 548 ; see amend. VIII, U.S. Const. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").

In coming to this conclusion, the supreme court explained that the Eighth Amendment "is implicated when a juvenile nonhomicide offender's sentence does not afford any ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,’ " as applicable only to " ‘lengthy’ term-of-years sentences that approach or envelop the entirety of a defendant's ‘natural life.’ " Pedroza , 291 So. 3d at 546 (quoting Henry , 175 So. 3d at 679 ).

Moreover, Pedroza clarified that resentencing for juvenile offenders sentenced to more than twenty years’ imprisonment is limited to a "narrow class" of juvenile offenders whose sentences violated Graham and were resentenced before the adoption of chapter 2014-220. Id. at 546-48 (quoting Kelsey , 206 So. 3d at 10 ). Pedroza receded from and disapproved of several cases "to the extent they hold that resentencing is required for all juvenile offenders serving a sentence longer than twenty years without the opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 549.

Our cases hold the same. Recently, we "conclude[d] that [a juvenile offender's] thirty-year sentence [for aggravated battery with great bodily harm while using a deadly weapon] is not unconstitutional under the holding in Graham because it is not a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence." Melvis v. State , 305 So. 3d 763, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).

In State v. Morales , 299 So. 3d 528, 529-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), we reversed and remanded after the postconviction court granted the juvenile offender's postconviction motion and resentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment for kidnapping. We concluded that the juvenile offender's original thirty-year sentence was not illegal under Pedroza and directed the postconviction court to reinstate the original sentence. Id. ; see also Wainwright v. State , 296 So. 3d 952, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (affirming juvenile offender's sentences pursuant to Pedroza ); Williams v. State , 197 So. 3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Even if Williams is required to serve every day of his fifty-year sentence [for armed kidnapping of a minor under the age of thirteen; attempted robbery with a firearm; and aggravated assault with a firearm,] he would be released from prison at age sixty-eight. Williams will be afforded the opportunity for release, based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, during his natural life.").

Our sister districts, too, have applied Pedroza to a variety of term-of-years sentences and found no Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g. , Grace v. State , 324 So. 3d 552, 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) ("A jury found Grace guilty of four counts of robbery with a firearm while wearing a mask; two counts of attempted robbery while wearing a mask; and two counts of false imprisonment while wearing a mask. Grace was 17 years old when the offenses were committed. The court sentenced him to a total of 50 years in prison. Like Pedroza , Grace does not meet the threshold for resentencing because his sentence is not a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence."); Brown v. State , 315 So. 3d 795, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (affirming postconviction court's order denying juvenile offender's rule 3.800(a) motion challenging his sentence of forty years’ imprisonment because "this is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence"); Hall v. State , 319 So. 3d 691, 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (rejecting juvenile offender's as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of section 775.082(1)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2021), because "controlling precedent in Florida shows not only that these sections comply with the dictates of Miller and Graham , but that Hall's sentence [of fifty years’ imprisonment with a forty-year mandatory minimum for first-degree murder] does not even trigger Miller - Graham to begin with"); Kirkland v. State , 312 So. 3d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (affirming juvenile offender's forty-year prison sentence because, "[u]nder Pedroza , a forty-year sentence is not a life sentence or its functional equivalent"); McArthur v. State , 313 So. 3d 244, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (affirming juvenile offender's fifty-year sentence for second-degree murder "[b]ecause he did not receive ‘a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence’ " (quoting Pedroza , 291 So. 3d at 549 )); Jones v. State , 320 So. 3d 220, 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (affirming juvenile offender's "aggregate [sentence] of fifty years in prison"); Corbett v. State , 310 So. 3d 54, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) ("Under Pedroza , Appellant's 30-year prison sentence for a nonhomicide offense is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence, and Graham ... and Miller ... are not implicated."); Hart v. State , 313 So. 3d 155, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (affirming juvenile offender's "aggregate [sentence] of fifty years in prison"); Shivers v. State , 308 So. 3d 176, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (affirming juvenile offender's sentence of twenty-five-years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon while masked because the sentence "does not, by itself, violate Graham or Miller "); Levesque v. State , 300 So. 3d 813, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (analyzing Pedroza and concluding that sentence of fifty-years’ imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term for second-degree murder, committed when juvenile offender was seventeen years’ old, was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence); Moss v. State , 305 So. 3d 730, 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (affirming postconviction court's order denying juvenile offender's postconviction motion challenging his forty-year sentence for second-degree murder).

Mr. Nugent's sentences are not life sentences nor the functional equivalent. As the postconviction court observed, Mr. Nugent is slated for release from prison in January 2025; he will be about thirty-eight years old. He will be free of all supervision at age fifty-three.

We reject Mr. Nugent's challenge to the legality of his sentences. He is not entitled to resentencing.

II. Claim Two: Sentence Review

Mr. Nugent is not due a sentence review under section 921.1402. Our recent decision in State v. Michaud , 320 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), controls. There, the State sought certiorari review of the trial court's order granting Mr. Michaud's application for sentence review...