Nutt v. D.C. Gov't

FRED L. NUTT, JR., Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-3220 (ABJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

August 11, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Fred L. Nutt, Jr., has brought this action against the District of Columbia Government (the "District"), the "District of Columbia Police Department,"¹ Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart"), Officer Charles A. Jenkins, Jr., in his individual and official capacity as a Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") Officer, and Defendant John Doe, in his individual and official capacity as an "assumed" member of the MPD.² See generally Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. In Count I, based on 42 U.S.C. section 1983, plaintiff alleges that defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and violated the Fourteenth Amendment when Officer Jenkins and defendant Doe allegedly restrained him while he was shopping with hisnephew in a store. Compl. ¶ 27.³ He also alleges in a second count that the MPD and Wal-Mart are liable for negligence in hiring, and failing to monitor, train, and supervise, their employees. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31. Defendants Wal-Mart and the District have each moved to dismiss claims against them in the complaint. See Wal-Mart's Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 4] ("Wal-Mart's Mot."); Wal-Mart's Mem. of Law in Supp. of Wal-Mart's Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 4-1] ("Wal-Mart's Mem."); District of Columbia's Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 12] ("District's Mot."); District of Columbia's Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of District's Mot. [Dkt. # 12-1] ("District's Mem."); and Pl.'s Resp. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 16] ("Pl.'s Opp."). While this opinion should not be read to condone the troubling alleged conduct of the security guards in any way, the defendants are correct that the complaint as written does not state an actionable claim, and their motions to dismiss will be granted.⁴

BACKGROUND

On or about March 19, 2017, at approximately 6:15 pm, plaintiff and his nephew had completed purchasing several items in a store when plaintiff's nephew remembered another item that he needed. Compl. ¶ 11. While the nephew retrieved the item from the back of the store, plaintiff, an elderly man, waited in an aisle in the middle of the store with a bag containing theitems the pair had already purchased. Compl. ¶ 12. A few minutes later, the nephew returned to his uncle with the purchased item and its receipt, which plaintiff placed in the bag containing the other purchased items. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17.

Plaintiff surmises that at least the latter portion of those events were observed, because as he and his nephew "neared the exit, [d]efendant Officer Jenkins aggressively grabbed [plaintiff] by the arm and insisted [that plaintiff and his nephew] walk with him to a private store back office room for a 'chat.'" Compl. ¶ 18. Officer Jenkins allegedly "held onto [p]laintiff and forced him along by the arm," while plaintiff asked at least four times what he was being asked to chat about. Compl. ¶ 19. At that point, defendant Doe, a "Walmart Security Officer . . . barged in without any introduction and with complete disregard for anything [p]laintiff was saying and yelled the worlds 'YOUR BAG' at [p]laintiff." Compl. ¶ 20. Throughout the encounter, plaintiff allegedly continued to ask questions about why defendants Jenkins and Doe were interested in his bag, which they purportedly responded to by "yelling loudly back." Compl. ¶ 21. Both officers refused to check the contents of the bag. Compl. ¶ 21. According to the complaint, once Officer Jenkins and defendant Doe noticed that the "very public incident of humiliating, frightening, and restraining" plaintiff and his nephew had attracted the interest of a "huge crowd of customers in the store," they checked the contents of plaintiff's bag, Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, which ended the incident. Compl. ¶ 24.

On October 25, 2019, plaintiff filed the complaint. See generally Compl. He alleges that "[a]s a result of the [d]efendants' negligence, [he] suffered from false allegations of theft, harassment, public humiliation and racial profiling." Compl. ¶ 25. He seeks compensatory and nominal damages, punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, as well as other appropriate relief. See Compl. at 6.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And "[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A pleading must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff 'the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'" Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe a complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor. Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the court need not accept inferencesdrawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. Id.; see also Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only "the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice." Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002), citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS

I. Count I will be dismissed for failure to state a claim because plaintiff has not pled any facts to support that either Wal-Mart or the District can be held liable for the alleged constitutional violations.

Count I has been brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The sole allegation supporting the constitutional claim states: "[p]laintiff would show unto the Court that the Defendants, will (sic) reckless disregard for Plaintiff's rights, took actions to deprive Plaintiff of his due process rights and equal protection rights, and conditions of laying hands on someone's person under the 14^th amendment." Compl. ¶ 27.

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides that a person acting "under color of" state law may be held liable for depriving a person of his constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁵ Wal-Mart moves to dismiss Count I because it is not a state actor and, therefore, it cannot be the subject of a section 1983 claim. Wal-Mart's Mem. at 4. This is a correct statement of the law, and the claims in Count I against the store will be dismissed with prejudice.⁶

The District seeks to dismiss Count I on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment, which plaintiff specifically invokes in the claim, does not apply to the District of Columbia or its officers and employees. District's Mem. at 5. Courts in this district have long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Jiggetts v. Cipullo, 285 F. Supp. 3d 156, 165 (D.D.C. 2018), citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) ("the Supreme Court made clear in Bolling v. Sharpe that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states, and not to the District of Columbia"); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 736 F. Supp.2d 254, 260 (D.D.C. 2010), citing Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 ("the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia or its officials/employees"). Therefore, to the extent Count I against the District is predicated, as stated, on the 14^th Amendment, it will be dismissed with prejudice.⁷

II. Count II will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Wal-Mart employed Officer Jenkins and that plaintiff notified the District of his tort claim, as required under District of Columbia law.

Count II asserts what appears to be a common law tort claim for negligence against the MPD and Wal-Mart for their failure to monitor, train, and supervise Officer Jenkins and the unnamed second officer. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31.⁸ Based on different theories, both Wal-Mart and the District correctly argue that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

"Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the acts of his employees committed within the scope of their employment." Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 231 (D...