Nyaundi v. Triumph Foods, LLC

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JOSHUA NYAUNDI, Plaintiff, v. TRIUMPH FOODS, LLC, Defendant.

No. 5:22-CV-06005-DGK

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, ST. Joseph Division

May 25, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

GREG KAYS, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This case arises out of Plaintiff Joshua Nyaundi's employment with Defendant Triumph Foods, LLC (“Triumph”). Plaintiff alleges Triumph passed him over for a promotion subjected him to a hostile work environment, and then fired him because of his race and national origin in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 et seq. (“MHRA”) and federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Now before the Court is Triumph's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 55. Because Plaintiff cannot establish a submissible claim under either the MHRA or § 1981, the motion is GRANTED.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts are those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a genuine dispute over material facts is one “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving part[ies].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing a lack of a genuine dispute as to any material fact Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, and the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must nonetheless substantiate his allegations with “sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

Plaintiff's quoting Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. banc 2007) for the proposition that “[s]ummary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases, because such cases are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence” is unavailing. The Eighth Circuit has routinely rejected this standard. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (clarifying “[t]here is no ‘discrimination case exception' to the application of summary judgment” in a case brought under both § 1981 and state antidiscrimination law).

Undisputed Material Facts

To resolve the motion, the Court must first determine the material undisputed facts. The Court has limited the facts to those that are undisputed and material to the pending summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); L.R 56.1(a). The Court has excluded legal conclusions, argument presented as fact, and proposed facts not properly supported by the record or admissible evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); L.R. 56.1(a). Improperly controverted facts have also been excluded from the record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); L.R. 56.1(a).

Determining the material undisputed facts has been difficult given Plaintiff's briefing, which often fails to properly controvert facts, is self-contradictory, and occasionally misrepresents deposition testimony. For example, Plaintiff states many of Triumph's proposed facts are “controverted” because Triumph describes the key event in this case-a physical confrontation between Plaintiff and a subordinate during which Plaintiff grabbed the subordinate's collar-as an “altercation” or a “physical altercation.” Plaintiff denies being involved in a physical altercation, and instead claims he was “attacked without provocation.” See Pl.'s Opp. at 41, ECF No. 57. But in his Charge of Discrimination to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”), Plaintiff stated he was “forced into an altercation” and admits he grabbed his subordinate by the collar. See Charge of Discrimination, Ex. 1-12, ECF No. 56 (emphasis added). Although Plaintiff apparently wants to avoid the word “altercation” because of its connotation, being attacked is still being involved (albeit involuntarily) in a physical altercation. Based on Plaintiff's admission and the record, the Court will use the term “altercation,” but will refrain from using the term “physical altercation.” The exact terminology used, however, is ultimately immaterial because what matters is Plaintiff admits he touched his subordinate.

Plaintiff's controverting many of Triumph's proposed facts as “immaterial” or “unsupported” by the record has also been frustrating, because after controverting these facts, Plaintiff then includes those same and/or similar facts in his proposed facts. For instance, Plaintiff claims deficiencies in his annual performance evaluations are immaterial, see Pl.'s Opp. at 2-4, but then tries to admit positive information from those same evaluations in his proposed facts, see id. at 27-29. The Court has resolved this problem by including only those facts which are both undisputed and material to resolving the summary judgment motion.

Lastly, Plaintiff grossly misrepresents deposition testimony to the Court on multiple occasions. For instance, Plaintiff's proposed fact #62 states:

Defendant admits that when it cannot substantiate a complaint of a physical altercation and/or workplace violence, it does not terminate the employment of the alleged perpetrators(s).

Plaintiff's proposed fact #63 provides as illustration:

When an African-American employee made a complaint of workplace violence and the alleged perpetrator denied it, [Triumph] took no action because the claim of workplace violence could not be “substantiated”. There was no video of the event and the alleged perpetrator denied engaging in a physical altercation and/or workplace violence [(i.e., twisting her wrist)].

Id. at 35. The testimony cited, however, states that after thoroughly investigating that particular claim, Triumph could not substantiate the allegation because there were no witnesses, no video footage, the alleged perpetrator denied the claim, and Triumph discovered the alleged victim had injuries prior to working at Triumph. Mr. Boss Dep. at 80:4-12, ECF No. 56-2. Plaintiff egregiously omits parts of Mr. Boss's testimony (i.e., the absence of witnesses and discovering the employee already had injuries) to make his position seem more favorable. Due to this misrepresentation, and countless others, the Court spent significant time combing through the record to determine the material undisputed facts under Rule 56(c) and Local Rule 56.1(a).

These undisputed material facts are as follows:

Triumph operates a pork processing facility in St. Joseph, Missouri. On April 21, 2010, Triumph hired Plaintiff as a production employee. Plaintiff has black skin color, is of Kenyan nation origin, and has legally resided in the United States since 2010.

During his employment at Triumph, Plaintiff generally had positive performance evaluation reports. However, three of Plaintiff's last four performance evaluations noted concerns regarding his communication skills and interactions with others.

Generally, when a job position opens for supervisors, Triumph posts the opening through its ADP system, which would permit employees to see the posting and apply to it.

In 2018, Operations Manager Clay Swan promoted Plaintiff. In doing so, Plaintiff replaced a Hispanic employee who was terminated. At some point, Plaintiff was promoted again, replacing another Hispanic employee who was terminated. As best the Court can tell, these promotions were to the positions of “Trainer” and then “Production Supervisor.” Brent Lambright, a white male, was Plaintiff's direct supervisor.

At some later point in time, Plaintiff anticipated a promotion to General Foreman (or General Supervisor).^[1]Mr. Swan had conversations with Plaintiff about a promotion to General Foreman around May or June of 2020 and informed Plaintiff that he wanted to make him General Foreman. Pl.'s Opp. at 28. But Plaintiff admits Mr. Swan did not explicitly tell him that he would be promoted to General Foreman, only that it was “implied.” Id. at 24.

Mr. Swan ultimately took on a new role at Triumph and recommended Julio Sanchez- who is Hispanic and speaks Spanish-to fill his position. Triumph subsequently promoted Mr. Sanchez to Operations Manager.

As best the Court can tell, Jorge Lara was promoted to General Foreman in July 2019 and subsequently repositioned to Plaintiff's department (keeping his title as General Foreman) in September 2020. Plaintiff was not given the opportunity to apply for the position. Mr. Lara is a Hispanic individual that began employment at Triumph in 2006 and worked for many years as a Production Supervisor. Mr. Lara was Plaintiff's supervisor in this new role.

Plaintiff believes Julio Sanchez “blocked” his promotion to General Foreman because Mr. Lara and Mr. Sanchez are both Hispanic. Plaintiff acknowledged he does not know Mr. Lara's qualifications.

On November 7, 2020, Plaintiff had a meeting with Mr. Lambright and Mr. Swan about Mr. Lara's conduct. Plaintiff complained Mr. Lara pulled employees from Plaintiff's line without telling him on three separate occasions-something that Plaintiff had not previously experienced in nearly ten years of employment-and told Plaintiff he could not discipline other employees. According to Plaintiff, he reported discrimination during this meeting and then was “forced into an altercation”^[2](as...