Oak Grove Res., LLC v. Dir., 17-14468

920 F.3d 1283

OAK GROVE RESOURCES, LLC, National Union Fire Insurance/ AIG, Petitioners,

v.DIRECTOR, OWCP, United States Department of Labor, Respondents.

U.S. Steel Mining Company, LLC, U.S. Steel Corporation, Petitioners,

v.Cassandra M. Terry, O.B.O. and Widow of Luther Terry, Director, OWCP, United States Department of Labor, Respondents.

No. 17-14468

No. 17-15782

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 11, 2019

Kary Bryant Wolfe, Jones Walker, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Oak Grove Resources, LLC, National Union Fire Insurance/ AIG, U.S. Steel Mining Company, LLC, and U.S. Steel Corporation.

April S. Rogers, Jones Walker, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Oak Grove Resources, LLC, U.S. Steel Mining Company, LLC and U.S. Steel Corporation.

Steven Frank Casey, Jones Walker, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Oak Grove Resources, LLC.

Sarah Hurley, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC, for Respondents

Cynthia Liao, Maia Simone Fisher, Gary Stearman, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC, for Director, OWCP.

Michael Chance, District Director, Washington, DC, for Director, OWCP, United States Department of Labor, Benefits Review Board, and U.S. Department of Labor.

Maia Simone Fisher, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC, for Director, OWCP and United States Department of Labor, Benefits Review Board.

Nicholas C. Geale, U.S. Department of Labor Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC, for Director, OWCP and U.S. Department of Labor in 17-15782.

John Riley Jacobs, Joseph Thomas Walker, Maples Tucker & Jacobs, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Carrie Ferguson.

Cecelia Brown Freeman, Maples Tucker & Jacobs, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Cassandra Terry.

Petitions for Review of a Decision of the Benefits Review Board, Agency No. BRB 16-0570 BLA, Agency No. 17-0105

Before TJOFLAT and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,^* District Judge.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated Black Lung Benefits Act appeals present two questions—both of which are important to the parties, and one of which turns out to be pretty interesting. Starting with the important-but-relatively-uninteresting: In one of the cases, a mining company contends, for a smattering of reasons, that an ALJ’s decision that one of its former miners was entitled to benefits under the Act isn’t supported by substantial evidence. To be brief, we disagree. Ample evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, and none of the company’s challenges to the ALJ’s analysis withstands scrutiny.

Now, for the more interesting issue, which exists in both appeals: The Act provides two means by which a deceased miner’s survivors can claim benefits. First, the survivors can prove that the miner died due to a lung disease called pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 922(a), 932(c). Alternatively, they can proceed under the Act’s so-called "automatic entitlement" provision, 30 U.S.C. § 932(l ), which states that "[i]n no case shall the eligible survivors of a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits ... at the time of his or her death be required to file a new claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the claim of such miner." These cases call on us to take a closer look at the italicized portion of § 932(l ). Under one reading—urged by the mining-companies here—the phrase "at the time of his or her death" modifies the verb "determined," such that a miner’s survivors are entitled to benefits only if the pertinent government decisionmaker issued a formal "determin[ation]" of the miner’s eligibility before he or she died. Under an alternative reading—advanced by two surviving spouses, with the support of the United States—"at the time of his or her death" modifies the adjective "eligible," such that survivors’ entitlement to benefits depends on whether the miner was eligible before his or her death, not whether, by that time, the pertinent decisionmaker had formally determined the miner to be so.

We hold that the survivors and the government have the better of the interpretive argument. Not only does their interpretation follow most naturally from § 932(l ) ’s syntax and find support in the traditional "last antecedent" canon, it also—and quite unlike the companies’ reading—squares with common sense by avoiding arbitrary distinctions between identically situated claimants.

I

Before us are two consolidated cases— Oak Grove Resources, LLC, et al. v. Director, OWCP (" Oak Grove "), and U.S. Steel Mining Company, LLC, et al. v. Director, OWCP (" U.S. Steel "). We briefly review the facts of each case before turning to a preliminary question posed only in U.S. Steel .

A

Starting with Oak Grove : In July 2012, Lee Ferguson, a coal miner with more than three decades’ experience, sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq ., and its implementing regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 725.1 et seq. A District Director¹ denied Lee’s claim, and Lee appealed. Unfortunately, Lee died of mesenteric ischemia in November 2014, while his appeal was pending. His widow, Carrie Ferguson, filed a claim for survivor benefits in March 2015.

The following November, the ALJ handling Lee’s appeal overturned the District Director’s decision and held that Lee’s employer, Oak Grove, was liable for benefits from the date that Lee had initially filed his claim. Before us, Oak Grove does not contest Lee’s own eligibility for benefits—only whether, under the Act, those benefits are properly payable to Carrie as Lee’s surviving spouse.

In February 2016, the same District Director who had denied Lee’s claim issued a decision in Carrie’s favor. In so doing, the District Director relied on 30 U.S.C. § 932(l ) —which, as already noted, provides that "[i]n no case shall the eligible survivors of a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits ... at the time of his or her death be required to file a new claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the claim of such miner."

Challenging the District Director’s decision before an ALJ, Oak Grove argued that Carrie was not entitled to benefits under § 932(l ) because Lee had not been "determined to be eligible to receive benefits ... at the time of his ... death" in November 2014. Rather, Oak Grove observed, the District Director had determined Lee’s eligibility in February 2016, more than a year after his death. Factually, Oak Grove was quite right—Lee hadn’t been formally determined to be eligible before he died. As a matter of law, though, the ALJ concluded that the timing of the District Director’s determination vis-à-vis Lee’s death was inconsequential; all that mattered was that Lee was in fact eligible for benefits at the time he died. The Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision in a published opinion. See Ferguson v. Oak Grove Res., LLC , No. 16-0570 BLA, 2017 WL 3953435 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 2017).

B

Turning to U.S. Steel : Luther Terry applied unsuccessfully for benefits under the Act in 2006 and 2011. Luther succeeded in his third attempt in 2014, but he didn’t survive to collect. A veteran miner and lifelong smoker, Luther died of cardiopulmonary arrest the year before, in 2013. Luther’s widow, Cassandra Terry, filed a claim for benefits shortly after his death, and a District Director found that she was eligible, citing § 932(l ) ’s automatic-entitlement provision. Luther’s employer, U.S. Steel, requested a hearing before an ALJ to contest that conclusion on the same basis as in Oak Grove —namely, that Luther had died before he was formally "determined" to be eligible for benefits. The ALJ affirmed the District Director on the same ground as in Oak Grove —what mattered was that before he died, Luther was eligible for benefits, not whether he had been determined to be so. And as in Oak Grove , the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. See Terry v. U.S. Steel Corp ., Nos. 17-0105 BLA and Nos. 17-0107 BLA, 2017 WL 5898736 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 2017).

But U.S. Steel is different from Oak Grove in one key respect. Unlike Oak Grove, U.S. Steel has not conceded that Luther was eligible for benefits in the first place. Accordingly, before turning to Cassandra’s entitlement to survivor benefits under § 932(l ), we must first address the preliminary question of Luther’s own eligibility. Although something of a detour, the fact- and labor-intensive nature of the eligibility inquiry usefully underscores what’s at stake in our subsequent analysis of § 932(l ). That provision is dubbed an "automatic entitlement" because, where applicable, it allows a miner’s survivors to avoid the morass into which we now descend.

II

The Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that a miner’s death or disability is attributable to pneumoconiosis² —and thus compensable—if the miner can show, as relevant here, that he or she "was employed for fifteen years or more in one or more underground coal mines" and that the "evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment." 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). U.S. Steel doesn’t dispute that it bears the burden of rebutting this presumption with respect to Luther Terry.

Section 921(c)(4) and its implementing regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 718.305, detail two means by which U.S. Steel can discharge its burden. First, it can "establish[ ]" that Luther "does not, or did not, have" "[c]linical" or "[l]egal" pneumoconiosis. Id. § 718.305(d)(1)(i).³ For ease of reference, we’ll call this the empirical method of rebuttal. Second, U.S. Steel can rebut the presumption by "[e]stablishing" that "no part of the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis." 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1)(ii). We’ll call this the causal method. In order to "establish[ ]" non-liability via either method, the employer must affirmatively disprove the miner’s presumptive entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States Steel Corp. v. Gray , 588 F.2d 1022, 1028 (5th Cir. 1979).⁴

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