Obeid v. Meridian Automotive Systems

Page 751

296 F.Supp.2d 751

Fath OBEID, Plaintiff, v. MERIDIAN AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, Defendant.

No. 03-CV-72134-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

December 15, 2003.

Ernest F. Friedman, James R. Murphy, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Louis C. Rabaut, Andrea J. Bernard, Brigette L. Halseth, Warner, Norcross & Judd, P.C., Southfield, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION TO REMAND"

CLELAND, District Judge.

Pending before the court is Plaintiff's October 17, 2003 "Motion to Remand." Plaintiff Fath Obeid initially filed this action in Michigan state court, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of three statutes: (1) Michigan's Workers' Disability Compensation Act ("WDCA"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.101 et seq.; the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act ("MPDCRA"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101.

On May 30, 2003, Defendant Meridian Automotive Systems removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Plaintiff's instant motion seeks remand arguing that the case is not removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) because it involves a civil action arising under Michigan's workers' compensation laws. The matter has been adequately briefed and the court concludes that no hearing on the motion is necessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny Plaintiff's motion.

I. PLAINTIFF'S FMLA & MPDCRA CLAIMS

28 U.S.C. § 1441 allows a defendant to remove an action from state to federal court when the federal district court has "original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under" federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). To determine the presence or absence of a federal question, courts must look to the "well-pleaded complaint rule." See Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998). The rule "provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). "The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against him in violation of the federal FMLA. Obviously, this claim arises under federal law and the court has original jurisdiction over such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, Defendant's removal of the FMLA claim is permitted under the relevant removal statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by ... defendants ..."); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) ("Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removed without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties ....").¹

Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the claim with original federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."). Claims form part of the same case or controversy when they "derive from a common nucleus of operative facts." Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1996); accord White v. County of Newberry, S.C., 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing that claims form part of same case or controversy if they "revolve around a central fact pattern").

Plaintiff's claims of retaliatory discharge under federal and state law "revolve around a central fact pattern." Id. All three counts of Plaintiff's complaint allege adverse action taken by Defendant regarding his medical condition and physical disability. All three counts appear to be premised on the same or similar incidents of alleged retaliation and thus, the court finds that they "derive from a common nucleus of operative facts." Ahearn, 100 F.3d at 454-55. Accordingly, removal of Plaintiff's state law claims is supported by supplemental jurisdiction. The remaining issue to be resolved is whether removal of Plaintiff's WDCA claim is prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c).

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1445

Plaintiff argues that removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), which provides, "[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States." Id. Plaintiff asserts that his retaliatory discharge claim arises under the Michigan Workers' Disability Compensation Act, and thus, is not removable under § 1445(c). The court disagrees for two reasons: (1) a retaliation claim based on Michigan's WDCA is removable notwithstanding § 1445(c); and (2) Plaintiff's motion to remand is not timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

A. Removal of Retaliation Claim Based on Michigan's WDCA

Count I of Plaintiff's complaint alleges retaliation in violation of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(11). The specific provision that Plaintiff relies on states:

A person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against an employee because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under this act or because of the exercise by the employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of a right afforded by this act.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(11). Although this language is within Michigan's workers' compensation scheme, the state of Michigan's definition of "workmen's compensation laws" does not control for purposes of the § 1445(c) limitation. To determine if Plaintiff's claim is one "arising under" the state's "workmen's compensation laws," the court must look to federal law. See Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483, 62 S.Ct. 1168, 86 L.Ed. 1611 (1942). Since § 1445(c) is a matter of federal law, the way a state categorizes a cause of action is not binding on federal courts. Instead, the federal court must be satisfied that, according to federal law, the cause of action actually arises under the state's workers' compensation laws.

There is a split of authority among the circuits regarding the issue in this case: whether a retaliatory discharge claim premised in part on a state's workers' compensation laws is a claim "arising under the workmen's compensation laws" of the state. Compare Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that retaliation claim did not arise under state's workers' compensation laws), with Reed v. The Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 (11th Cir.2000) (holding the retaliation claim did arise under state's workers' compensation laws), Suder v. Blue Circle, Inc., 116 F.3d 1351 (10th Cir.1997) (same), Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238 (8th Cir.1995) (same), and Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1991) (same). The disparate conclusions reached among the circuit courts can be best explained as a result of dealing with different state laws. Each state took a different approach to reach the same goal: prohibiting retaliatory discharge against employees that file for workers' compensation. Judge Smith, of the Northern District of Alabama, explained that a synthesizing principle emerges from the disparate holdings:

In spite of the discordant results sounded by the [federal courts], certain harmonizing themes can be discerned amid the cacophony. First, in those states where an action for retaliatory discharge was tailored by the judiciary, cut from the common law cloth of that jurisdiction, federal courts generally hold the tort does not "arise under" the workers' compensation laws of that state, and, accordingly 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) does not prohibit removal. On the other hand, where the legislature of a state created the remedy, and particularly when the enabling statute is located within the general workers' compensation provisions of that state's code, the majority of federal courts hold the action does "arise under" the worker's compensation laws of the state and may not be removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c).

Roberts v. Beaulieu of America, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (N.D.Ala.1996) (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit's decision in Spearman and the discussion of that decision amongst the circuits has led to the above distinction.

In Spearman, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee's retaliatory discharge claim did not arise under the workers' compensation laws of Illinois so as to preclude removal under § 1445(c). Spearman, 16 F.3d at 724-26. Although Illinois had a provision under its workers' compensation act covering retaliatory discharge, the court held that removal was appropriate.² In reaching its decision, the court discussed the legislative history behind § 1445(c), which was enacted in 1958. The court observed, "[L]iability without fault (and with limited recovery) for injuries in the course of employment was the standard definition [of workmen's compensation law] ... in 1958 and before." Id. at 724. "No case or definition from the 1950s and before-at least none that we could find-treats unlimited liability for an intentional tort as part of a workers' compensation program." Id. (emphasis in original). The court concluded that "[a] fault-based regime with common law damages...