Ocasio v. City of Canandaigua

513 F.Supp.3d 310

Alysa OCASIO, Andrew Ocasio and Jahaira Holder, as Administratrix of the Estate of Sandy Guardiola, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF CANANDAIGUA, a municipal entity; Canandaigua Police Chief Stephen Hedworth, in his individual and official capacities; Canandaigua Police Sergeant Scott Kadien, in his individual capacity; DOCCS Parole Chief Dawn Anderson, in her individual capacity; DOCCS Senior Parole Officer Thomas O'Connor, in his individual capacity; Grand Atlas Property Management, LLC, formerly known as Morgan Management, LLC, a domestic Limited Liability Company; Morgan Communities Management, LLC ("Morgan Communities"), a domestic Limited Liability Company; Pinnacle North I LLC ("Pinnacle"), a foreign Limited Liability Company; and John and Jane Doe #1 and #2, employees of Grand Atlas, Morgan Communities, and/or Pinnacle, Defendants.

18-CV-6712L

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed January 13, 2021

Jonathan C. Moore, Marc A. Cannan, Luna Droubi, Beldock, Levine and Hoffman, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs Alysa Ocasio, Andrew Ocasio.

Jonathan C. Moore, Luna Droubi, Beldock, Levine and Hoffman, New York, NY, for Plaintiff Jahaira Holder.

Daniel T. Cavarello, Sugarman Law Firm LLP, Buffalo, NY, Jenna W. Klucsik, Sugarman Law Firm, LLP, Syracuse, NY, for Defendants City of Canandaigua, Stephen Hedworth.

Shannon T. O'Connor, Alexander James Blood, John P. Coghlan, Goldberg Segalla, LLP, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant Scott Kadien.

J. Richard Benitez, Nys Attorney General's Office Department of Law, Rochester, NY, for Defendants Dawn Anderson, Thomas O'Connor, Beth Hart-Bader.

Christian C. Casini, Osborn, Reed & Burke, LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendants Grand Atlas Property Management, LLC, Morgan Communities Management, LLC, Pinnacle North I LLC.

DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID G. LARIMER, United States District Judge

On October 4, 2017, Sandy Guardiola ("Guardiola") was shot three times as she slept in her bed in Canandaigua, New York, by Canandaigua Police Sergeant Scott Kadien ("Kadien"). Guardiola, a long-time parole officer with the New York State Department of Corrections ("DOCCS"), was at home on medical leave, recovering from a motor vehicle accident that had occurred a month previously. Guardiola did not survive the shooting; she died shortly after arriving at the hospital. Kadien had entered Guardiola's home in response to a 9-1-1 call requesting a "welfare check" because Guardiola had been absent from work. Kadien, who apparently knew that Guardiola was a law enforcement officer, gained entry to the home, entered Guardiola's bedroom and within seconds fired the three fatal shots. Plaintiffs are the heirs and administratrix of Guardiola. They have commenced this action in Federal Court against several defendants, including Sergeant Kadien, the City of Canandaigua, its police chief, employees of DOCCS, as well as the owner and property manager of the apartment complex where Guardiola resided, Grand Atlas Property Management ("Grand Atlas").

Now pending before the Court are motions to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) by Sergeant Kadien (Dkt. #44), as well as a similar motion by defendant City of Canandaigua and its police chief (Dkt. #45).¹ For the reasons that follow, the motions by Kadien and the City defendants are granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the complaint (Dkt. #1), Guardiola was a parole officer employed by DOCCS. She had been assigned to the Rochester Office. She was on medical leave from September 4, 2017 through October 3, 2017 following a motor vehicle accident, during which time she was granted a voluntary transfer to the Binghamton DOCCS office.

On the morning of October 4, 2017, Guardiola called the Binghamton DOCCS office to see if she was expected to report for work that day. Having determined that she was not expected at work, she went to bed. The complaint notes that Guardiola habitually wore earplugs when she slept, and had been prescribed medication to help her sleep.

For reasons unknown,² around 4:30pm, Thomas O'Connor, a Senior Parole Officer in the Rochester DOCCS office from which Guardiola had been transferred, called 9-1-1 and requested a welfare check on Guardiola, allegedly on the basis that she had been "missing" from work for three weeks.

Sergeant Kadien was dispatched to Guardiola's apartment along with emergency services, including an ambulance which positioned itself across the street. At Kadien's request, building management staff escorted him to Guardiola's apartment and used their keys to unlock it. Kadien walked through the apartment past the kitchen and bathroom, and opened the closed door to Guardiola's bedroom, where she was sleeping. The complaint avers that as Kadien entered Guardiola's bedroom, Guardiola, who was lying on her stomach, awoke and reached in the direction of a pillow where she kept her service revolver which she typically kept there for protection, after receiving threats from parolees with serious mental issues.

The complaint contends that Kadien did not attempt to retreat or to announce that he was a police officer, but instead, shot Guardiola in the right arm, with the bullet passing through her arm and into her right ear and head. Guardiola's firearm then discharged in the opposite direction from Kadien and into a wall, whereupon Kadien shot Guardiola twice more, in the head and abdomen. The time that elapsed between Kadien's entry into the apartment and his fatal shooting of Guardiola is alleged to have been mere seconds.

When emergency responders arrived approximately ten minutes after the shooting, Guardiola was lying supine on her bed, handcuffed and bleeding profusely, but still breathing. She was transported to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead at 5:30pm after resuscitation attempts proved futile.

This action followed. The complaint asserts several causes of action including unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, interference with family relationships, assault and battery, premises liability, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, training and discipline, conscious pain and suffering, and wrongful death. (Dkt. #1).

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standard

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (c), courts "employ the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss." Montgomery v. NBC TV , 833 Fed.Appx. 361, 363, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35731 at *2 (2d Cir. 2020) (unpublished opinion)(quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist. , 801 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

The Court's task is thus to determine whether, "accept[ing] the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant," plaintiffs have stated a facially valid claim. Sheppard v. Beerman , 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994). In order to be found sufficient, a pleading must set forth sufficient facts to suggest that a cause of action is legally plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Ultimately, where a plaintiff has not "nudged their claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id.

II. First Cause of Action: Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Kadien and the DOCCS Defendants ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 )

A. Unlawful Entry

The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend IV. "It is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Welsh v. Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is thus a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[ ] that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Id. at 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091.

In order to overcome this presumption, the warrantless entry of a home must fall under a relevant exception, such as the "exigent circumstances" or "emergency aid" doctrine, which excuses a warrantless entry "if law enforcement has probable cause to believe that a person is ‘seriously injured or threatened with such injury.’ " Chamberlain v. City of White Plains , 960 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). Police seeking to apply the doctrine bear a heavy burden to demonstrate that "the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer, to believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action." Chamberlain , 960 F.3d 100 at 106 (quoting United States v. Klump , 536 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2008) ). The touchstone is urgency.

Kadien argues that any reasonable, experienced officer who received a similar welfare check request (that is, a request based on a 9-1-1 call from an individual's employer, stating that they had been absent from work for three weeks), would have probable cause to believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action. Therefore, he argues, the exigent circumstances exception so clearly applies that the Court may decide it as a matter of law on the instant motion to dismiss.

The Court disagrees. First, it is well-settled that a 9-1-1 call or a welfare check request does not, by itself, establish exigent circumstances: entitlement to the exception requires convincing "indicia of distress." Pennington v. City of Rochester , 2018 WL 3023383 at *4, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101499 at *10 (W.D.N.Y. 2018). Such indicia may include, for example, a witness's or victim's report of a serious injury or medical emergency, or an inability to locate a missing and vulnerable individual to confirm their well-being despite a reasonable investigation and other attempts to reach them.

Courts have found the exception applicable in matters where,...