Octaviani v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare

239 F.Supp.3d 398

Mari Estela PADRO OCTAVIANI, Plaintiff,

v.GLAXOSMITHKLINE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE, Defendants.

Civil No. 14–1900 (DRD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 6, 2017

Juan A. Lopez–Conway, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff

Ana B. Rosado–Frontanes, Anabel Rodriguez–Alonso, Schuster & Aguilo LLP, San Juan, PR, for Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ, United States District Judge

Mari Estela Padro Octaviani ("Plaintiff") brought an action against her employer GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare ("GSK"). Plaintiff alleges that she was unjustly dismissed by GSK pursuant to 29 P.R. Laws § 185a ("Law 80"). See Docket No. 6–1(certified translation of complaint). Plaintiff additionally asserts that she was terminated illegally because of her age and in retaliation for her submission of a statement. The statement was submitted at the request of her employer and contained her version of facts of the events that transcribed on December 28, 2013. See 29 P.R. Laws § 146 ("Law 100"); see also 29 P.R. Laws. § 194 ("Law 115"); see alsoDocket No. 6–1. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims she is entitled to payment of accumulated unpaid vacation days and a bonus. See 29 P.R. Laws § 185a. Pending before the Court is GSK's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Docket No. 39. The Court shall address only the unjust termination claim under Law 80 as Plaintiff has moved to dismiss all other claims with prejudice. See Docket No. 48, p. 20. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' motion is hereby GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

On September 11, 1989, Plaintiff began her tenure at GSK. Plaintiff worked at GSK for a period of 25 years in which she held various positions and received several promotions, which included increases in responsibilities and compensation. Plaintiff's highest annual salary was $104,800.00. On October 1, 2014, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff at the dismissal held the position of Brand Manager. See Docket No. 6–1.

Plaintiff was provided a company car, which was conditioned on Plaintiff attending the GSK Fleet Management North America Safe Driver Program ("Safe Driver Program") and complying with the Alcohol and Drug Use Policy. As part of the Safe Driver Program, all fleet drivers are obligated to inform their managers and human resources of any arrest, citation, pending litigation, or conviction related to alcohol. See Docket No. 42–3, p.53; see also Docket No. 40. Additionally, they are to immediately inform said personnel of a suspended, restricted, or revoked driver's license. See Id. Notifications are to be made prior to determination as to the outcome of innocence or guilt; hence, employees are expressly prohibited from taking a "wait and see" approach.

On December 28, 2013, Plaintiff was pulled over for speeding and cited for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). See Docket No. 31. The incident occurred outside of working hours while the Plaintiff was on vacation. See Docket No. 6–1. Plaintiff did not report the incident to her manager, fleet manager, nor human resources. See Docket No. 40.

While not material to the controversy at hand, it should be noted that Plaintiff and GSK disagree as to whether Plaintiff was convicted or cleared of the DUI charge. Both parties do however agree that a set of conditions were placed on Plaintiff as a result of the judicial process against her. The local court proceedings took place on February 13, 2014, followed by April 29, 2014, and April 30, 2014. A restricted provisional driver's license was granted for use from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. for a period of 45 days. See Docket No. 33–16, p. 576. Plaintiff again failed to inform her managers or human resources of her restricted license.

On September 17, 2014, GSK discovered the DUI when they obtained Plaintiff's motor vehicle record as part of the Safe Driver Program procedures. On September 22, 2014, the employer informed Plaintiff of their discovery of the DUI. At this point, which was nine months after the DUI citation, Plaintiff provided a letter that stated her version of the events. In her letter submitted to Evelyn Roberts, the GSK manager of North American fleet safety and Plaintiff's supervisor, Plaintiff finally explained that she had a restricted license as a result of the DUI arrest. Plaintiff made no mention whatsoever of her previous failure to report the DUI, the subsequent court proceedings, or the license restriction. See Docket No. 33–16, p. 576–577. Plaintiff acknowledged she was aware of and had read again the company rules in relation to company car usage including the Safe Driver Program, and had completed the "Driving Impaired— Not Worth the Risk" online fleet training. See Docket No. 33–16, p.577. On October 1, 2014, GSK terminated Plaintiff following an internal investigation that found she had committed multiple policy violations by failing to report: the DUI arrest (December 28, 2013), the resulting court proceedings (February 13, 2014, April 29, 2014, and April 30, 2014), and the license restriction for forty five days as required by company policy. See Docket. No 31; see also Docket No. 33–16. The instant case followed.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against GSK in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan Superior Court. See Docket No. 6–1. Plaintiff then alleged that she was unjustly dismissed in violation of Law 80 and is also entitled to payment of accumulated unpaid vacation days and a bonus under the aforementioned statute. Plaintiff additionally contends she was the victim of age discrimination in violation of Law 100, and subject to retaliation for the statement in violation of Law 115.

On December 15, 2014, GSK removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. See Docket. No. 1; see also 28 USC § 1332(a). No challenge was filed by any party to the Court having jurisdiction under diversity. On March 23, 2016, GSK filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that Plaintiff had been terminated with good cause. See Docket. No. 39. In response, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss all of her claims with prejudice except for the wrongful termination claim under Law 80. With respect to the sole remaining claim, Plaintiff maintains that GSK has failed to meet the evidentiary burden to prevail on summary judgement with its good cause argument. Furthermore, Plaintiff upholds that language present in the policy was ambiguous, that GSK was not prudent in their determination to terminate, and that GSK fostered a culture in which driving while intoxicated was acceptable. See Docket. No. 47.

III. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party." See Johnson v. Univ. of P.R. , 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) ; Prescott v. Higgins , 538 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co. , 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008) ); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The analysis with respect to whether or not a "genuine" issue exists is directly related to the burden of proof that a nonmovant would have in trial. "[T]he determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case." Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. (applying the summary judgment standard while taking into account a higher burden of proof for cases of defamation against a public figure). In order for a disputed fact to be considered "material" it must have the potential "to affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp. , 212 F.3d 657, 660–661 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ); and Prescott , 538 F.3d at 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth. , 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) ).

The objective of the summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." DeNovellis v. Shalala , 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing the Rule 56(e) advisory committee note to the 1963 Amendment). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome determinative fact on the record. Shalala , 124 F.3d at 306. Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably find in his favor. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). The nonmovant may not defeat a "properly focused motion for summary judgment by relying upon mere allegations," but rather through definite and competent evidence. Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo Rodriguez , 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The nonmovant's burden thus encompasses a showing of "at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’ " Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc. , 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) ; see also Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l. , 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that a nonmovant may shut down a summary judgment motion only upon a showing that a trial-worthy issue exists). As a result, the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, summary judgment is appropriate...