Oduro v. Kijakazi

ANTHONY KOJO ODURO, JR., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ^[1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-00078

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

April 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., United States Magistrate Judge

In this matter, the plaintiff, Anthony Kojo Oduro, Jr., seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 I Background

On October 9, 2018, Oduro protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, both asserting a disability onset date of October 6 2018. His applications were initially denied by state agency reviewers on November 6, 2018. The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing.

A hearing was held on October 30, 2019, before an administrative law judge, Theodore Burock (the “ALJ”). In addition to the plaintiff himself, the ALJ received testimony from an impartial vocational expert Patricia Scutt. The plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing.

On April 22, 2020, the ALJ denied Oduro's applications for benefits in a written decision. The ALJ followed the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process in determining that Oduro was not disabled under the Social Security Act. See generally Myers v. Berryhill, 373 F.Supp.3d 528, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (describing the five-step sequential evaluation process). At step one, the ALJ found that Oduro had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ found that Oduro had the severe impairments of: hip impairment; shoulder impairment; obesity; mild bipolar disorder; and impulse control disorder.

At step three, the ALJ found that Oduro did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. In doing so, the ALJ considered Oduro's limitations in four broad functional areas as a result of his mental disorders, finding moderate limitations in three functional areas- (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information, (2) interacting with others, and (3) adapting or managing oneself-and mild limitations in the fourth area-concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c), 416.920a(c) (explaining functional limitation rating process for mental impairments); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1, § 12.00(E) (explaining the four areas of mental functioning); id. § 12.00(F) (explaining process for using paragraph B criteria to evaluate mental impairments).

Between steps three and four of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ assessed Oduro's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See generally Myers, 373 F.Supp.3d at 534 n.4 (defining RFC). After evaluating the relevant evidence of record, the ALJ found that Oduro had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), ^[2] with the following limitations:

[H]e could sit for 4 hours, stand for 3 hours, and walk for 2 hours at one time; and sit for 6 hours, stand for 5 hours, and walk for 4 hours total in an 8-hour workday. The claimant could continuously use his non-dominant left upper extremit[y] for all functions, frequently use his dominant right upper extremity for all functions, and frequently use his bilateral lower extremities for operation of foot controls. He could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel[, ] crouch[, ] and crawl, but could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant could not be exposed to unprotected heights, but could occasionally be exposed to moving mechanical parts, operating motor vehicles, humidity, wetness, cold, heat, and vibration, and continuously exposed to dust, odors, and pulmonary irritants. He could perform routine, repetitive tasks, as required by unskilled labor, occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors, but could not have any public interaction.

(Tr. 19-20.)

In making these factual findings regarding Oduro's RFC, the ALJ considered his symptoms and the extent to which they could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (revised Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ also considered and articulated how persuasive he found the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c.

At step four, based on this RFC and on testimony by the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Oduro was unable to perform his past relevant work as actually and generally performed.

At step five, the ALJ concluded that Oduro was capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Based on his age, education, work experience, and RFC, and based on testimony by the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Oduro was capable of performing the requirements of representative occupations such as bottle label inspector (DOT # 920.687-042), garment bagger (DOT # 920.687-018), and hand bander (DOT # 920.687-026). Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded that Oduro was not disabled for Social Security purposes.

The plaintiff sought further administrative review of his claims by the Appeals Council, but his request was denied on November 16, 2020, making the ALJ's April 2020 decision the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial review by this court.

The plaintiff timely filed his complaint in this court on January 13, 2021. The Commissioner has filed an answer to the complaint, together with a certified copy of the administrative record. Both parties have filed their briefs, and this matter is now ripe for decision.

II. Discussion

Under the Social Security Act, the question before this court is not whether the claimant is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that he or she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(sentence five); id. § 1383(c)(3); Myers, 373 F.Supp.3d at 533 (describing standard of judicial review for social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income administrative decisions).

Oduro asserts on appeal that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because: (1) the ALJ erred in failing to consider the plaintiff's applications under the seven-step “medical improvement” standard applicable to a reinstatement of benefits proceeding, rather than the usual five-step sequential evaluation process, because he previously had been awarded supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits, which were terminated when he received a litigation settlement that caused him to exceed the applicable countable resources limit; (2) the ALJ erred in determining that an alleged intellectual disability / learning disability was a non-medically determinable impairment at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process, and in failing to consider this impairment in later steps; (3) the ALJ erred in finding various other impairments “not severe” at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process, despite compelling evidence to the contrary; (4) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate prior administrative findings, including the medical opinions of a non-examining state agency medical consultant; (5) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion of the plaintiff's treating mental health counselor; (6) the ALJ erred in failing to order a consultative mental examination; and (7) the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the plaintiff's non-exertional reaching impairment under Social Security Ruling 83-13.^[3] A. Seven-Step “Medical Improvement” Standard

At his hearing before the ALJ, Oduro's attorney noted that Oduro had previously received SSI benefits, which had been discontinued when he received a $100, 000 personal injury settlement, causing him to exceed the applicable countable resources limit for SSI program eligibility. (Tr. 38.) In subsequent correspondence addressed to the ALJ, Oduro's attorney advised that Oduro had received a distribution of $100, 000 from the litigation settlement when he turned twenty-one, ^[4] which caused the suspension or termination of his SSI benefits. (Tr. 276-77, 278-79.) Oduro and his parents, however, no longer had any documentation of the settlement or any other information. (Id.) There is no evidence in the administrative record concerning this previous award of SSI benefits. By the time he had protectively filed the instant applications for disability benefits in November 2018, these assets had been exhausted.^[5]

Oduro contends that the ALJ erred in considering his application for benefits anew, applying the usual five-step sequential evaluation process. Instead, Oduro contends that the ALJ should have applied the more favorable seven-step “medical improvement” standard typically applicable to proceedings for reinstatement of suspended SSI benefits, set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.994.^[6] (Doc. 19, at 19-21.)

Under the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations, an unmarried individual does not qualify for SSI benefits if his or her countable resources exceed $2, 000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)(B), (3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(a), (c). After a claimant is found to...