Office & Prof'l Emps. Int'l Union v. PHI, Inc., CIVIL ACTION 09-2228

OFFICE & PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIOand OFFICE & PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 108

v.PHI, INC.

CIVIL ACTION 09-2228

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE DIVISION

Date: September 24, 2012

JUDGE DOHERTY

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HILL

MEMORANDUM RULING

Pending before this Court is the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 55] filed by PHI, Inc. ("PHI") in the above-referenced lawsuit, which has become known as the "Green Book Lawsuit" among the parties and this Court, In its motion, PHI seeks dismissal of the "Unions' claims in the Green Book" lawsuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). The Unions oppose the motion [Doc. 57], and PHI has filed a Motion for Leave to File a Reply Brief [Doc. 58], which is herein GRANTED.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts of the instant case are rooted in the facts of previous cases filed in this Court between the same parties. The parties are hereby referred to the extensive rulings filed by this Court in those cases for a full description of the long and tortured history of the parties' litigation before this Court.¹

The instant lawsuit is the final lawsuit between the patties currently pending before thisCourt. In the instant case, the Unions, after years of rejecting the Green Book as binding the parties, now attempt to adopt the Green Book as the binding CB A between the parties, only to have PHI now refuse to acknowledge the Green Book as now applicable to the parties as their' CBA. In this lawsuit, the Unions argue PHI's refusals to acknowledge the Green Book as the binding CBA between the parties and to pay certain retention bonuses allegedly due under that CBA, violate various provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §151 et seq. ("RLA"). As their requested relief, the Unions seek (1) a declaration from this Court that the Unions and PHI are parties to a CBA effective July 2, 2009 through July 1, 2013; (2) a declaration that the Green Book is the CBA between the parties; (3) a mandatory injunction ordering PHI to sign and date the 2009-13 CBA; (4) a mandatory injunction ordering PHI to pay its pilots the retention bonus required by Article 21 of that CBA, with interest retroactive to July 2, 2009; and (5) sanctions in the form of attorney's fees and costs.

PHI now seeks dismissal of the Unions' "claims."

II. Law and Analysis

A. Dismissal of "All Claims"

PHI seeks dismissal of, presumably, all of the "claims " alleged by the Unions in the instant lawsuit, however, perhaps, incorrectly argues in its motion that "the Unions seek only equitable and injunctive relief in the Green Book suit." (Doc. 55, p. 2) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding PHI's argument, a review of the Unions' complaint shows in addition to then request for injunctive and equitable relief, the Unions also seek "as a sanction, in equity or otherwise, their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in connection with this litigation." The parties' designation of claims is relevant, because although PHI argues for dismissal of all claims for lack of subject matterjurisdiction, PHI does not address the Unions' claim for sanctions or costs in its briefing, however, neither have the Unions clarified the actual nature of the "sanctions" or basis for costs, which they seek. With the foregoing in mind, this Court addresses PHI's arguments in its motion.

B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

PHI seeks dismissal of the Unions' "claims" (identified as claims for injunctive and/or equitable relief only) under, inter alia, Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.² The Unions argue PHI is not entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), because to be timely, a motion filed under this rule must be filed before responsive pleadings. In the instant case, PHI filed its answer on January 26, 2010, more than two years ago.

Notwithstanding the filing of the instant motion after PHI's answer was filed, Rule 12(h)(3) states "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." See also Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 218 n. 2 (5th Or. 1996) ("Our review is not altered by the fact that the defendants did not move for dismissal based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction because any federal court may raise the issue sua sponte at any time); Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating it is the duty of the court to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte). This Court relied upon the foregoing rule and its interpreting jurisprudence in dismissing the majority of the Unions' claims in the Bad Faith Bargaining and Return to Work Lawsuits, both of which were dismissed after answers were filed. Considering the foregoing, this Court concludes, notwithstanding the filing of an answer in this case, it is, nonetheless, not inappropriate for this Court to consider PHI's argument on theissue of subject matter jurisdiction at this time.

That the questions raised in the instant motion present a question of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction cannot plausibly be disputed, although the Unions, for the first time in the protracted litigation between the parties, attempt to do so. A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir.2000); Robinson v. TCI/US W. Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900,904 (5th Cir. 1997). In considering a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the district court is "free to weigh the evidence and resolve factual disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear the case." See, e.g., Robinson v. TCI/US W. Communications, Inc., Ill F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2005) ("A court may base its disposition of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.").

In the instant case, the statute upon which PHI relies in seeking dismissal - the Norris LaGuardia Act - states:

No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.

29 U.S.C. §101 (emphasis added). Because this Court concludes, as it has at other stages of the litigation between the parties (which, again, has spawned several lawsuits), that the instant case, also, arises out of the same major labor dispute as the dispute giving rise to the Bad Faith Bargaining Lawsuit and the Return to Work lawsuit, both of which were dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction, this Court concludes a dismissal of the Unions' claims for injunctive and/or equitable relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate.³

B. Claims for injunctive and/or equitable relief

As a general matter, the Unions allege PHI violated the following provisions of the RLA when they failed to acknowledge the Green Book as the binding CBA between PHI and the Unions and failed to pay the allegedly-due retention bonus required by Article 21 of the allegedly applicable CBA: 45 U.S.C. 151(a)(1) and (4); 152, First; 152, Second; 152, Seventh; and 156.⁴ The Court,now, addresses the Unions' specific requests for relief.

1. The Unions' request for mandatory injunctive relief

In the instant case, the Unions seek the following mandatory injunctive relief:

• a mandatory injunction ordering PHI to sign and date the 2009-13 CBA; and

• a mandatory injunction ordering PHI to pay its pilots the retention bonus required by Article 21 of that CBA, with interest retroactive to July 2, 2009

PHI argues the Unions' requests for mandatory injunctive relief are barred by the Norris LaGuardia Act ("NLGA") because the Unions rejected the NMPJ's proffer of arbitration, thus, arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and by the principles of equity should the Court have subject matter jurisdiction, because the Unions have unclean hands.

a. Availability of injunctive relief under the NLGA

The Court addresses the NLGA argument first. Section 1 of the NLGA states:

No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.

29 U.S.C. §101 (emphasis added).

Section 8 of the NLGA states:

No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.

29 U.S.C. §108.

In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge, No. 27, v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R. ("Toledo"), 321 U.S. 50, 58-59, 64 S.Ct. 413, 418 (1944), the United States Supreme Court discussed the interrelation of the RLA and the NLGA and was one of the first courts to reconcile the Acts' purposes, In Toledo, the Court stated:

The policy of the Railway Labor Act was to encourage use of the nonjudicial processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration for the

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