Okafor v. State (In re State)

225 So.3d 93

Ex parte State of Alabama

(In re: Christopher OKAFOR

v.STATE of Alabama)

1150559.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 16, 2016

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew L. Brasher, deputy atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.

Hycall Brooks III, Hueytown, for respondent.

STUART, Justice.

This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the Madison Circuit Court's summary judgment for the State. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

According to the materials submitted to the trial court, while serving a subpoena on Christopher Okafor at the residence of Shanna Hereford, law-enforcement officers noticed a strong smell of marijuana and entered the residence. When an officer asked Okafor if there was marijuana in the residence, Okafor responded that there was. When the law-enforcement officers requested that Okafor sign a consent form to permit a search the residence, Okafor informed the law-enforcement officers that he did not live at the residence and that he could not sign a consent form to search the residence. Okafor, however, led the law-enforcement officers to the marijuana, which was located in a white plastic bag in the closet of a downstairs bedroom. A subsequent search of the bedroom resulted in the seizure of not only the marijuana, but also $16,500 in cash. Okafor denied any knowledge or ownership of the currency.

On February 8, 2013, the State, pursuant to § 20–2–93, Ala. Code 1975, filed a complaint against Okafor seeking to condemn the $16,500 seized from Hereford's residence. Okafor filed an answer in which he stated that he was the lawful owner of the currency, that the currency was not subject to condemnation, and that the law-enforcement officers had seized the currency during an unlawful search. The State moved for a summary judgment. In opposition to the State's summary-judgment motion, Okafor, among other arguments, contended that the law-enforcement officers did not have probable cause or consent to enter Hereford's residence and that any consent that they may have gotten for the search of the residence was not given knowingly, intelligently, and/or freely. In support of his contentions, Okafor submitted an affidavit from Hereford, in which she stated that she did not give the law-enforcement officers consent to enter or to search her house because, she said, her written consent to search her house was not freely given because the officers stated that they would not leave her house until it was searched.

After conducting a hearing on the State's summary-judgment motion, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the State, declaring that the currency was contraband and ordering the forfeiture of the currency to the State. Okafor appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals.

Before the Court of Civil Appeals, Okafor argued that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the State because, he said, the search of Hereford's residence and the seizure of the currency violated the Fourth Amendment. The State responded, arguing that Okafor did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search and seizure. The Court of Civil Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Okafor v. State, 225 So.3d 72 (Ala.Civ.App.2016). The Court of Civil Appeals held that Okafor presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact with regard to the legality of the search of Hereford's residence and the legality of the seizure of the currency. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to "whether [Okafor] could have reasonably believed that he was in ‘custody’ at the time he was questioned about the presence of marijuana in the house and whether his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated." 225 So.3d at 83. The evidence the Court of Civil Appeals cited to support its conclusion that genuine issues of material fact existed was contained in an affidavit from Hereford, in which she alleged that four law-enforcement officers entered the house yelling, carrying weapons, and using physical force; that the entry was without a warrant; that the law-enforcement officers informed her that they were not going to leave until they searched the house; and that the officers constrained her freedom and that of Okafor when questioning them. Judge Donaldson disagreed with the majority's conclusion that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to the legality of the search because, he concluded, although the evidence before the trial court demonstrated that Hereford had standing to challenge the legality of the search and seizure, Okafor did not present any evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish that he had standing to challenge the search and seizure.

The State petitioned this Court for certiorari review, arguing, among other grounds, that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to the legality of the search and seizure because, it contended, Okafor did not have standing to challenge the legality of the search of the house where the currency was found. The State maintained in its petition that the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals that Okafor had standing to challenge the search of Hereford's house and the seizure of the currency found therein conflicted with Ex parte Collier, 413 So.2d 403, 404 (Ala.1982) (recognizing that a defendant must have an expectation of privacy or a proprietary interest in the property searched to challenge a search).

Standard of Review

"In reviewing a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals on a petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court ‘accords no presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals.’ Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala.1996)."

Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So.2d 303, 308 (Ala.2005). The standard of review for a summary judgment is as follows:

"We review the trial court's grant or denial of a summary-judgment motion de novo, and we use the same standard used by the trial court to determine whether the evidence presented to the trial court presents a genuine issue of material fact. Bockman v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So.2d 789 (Ala.2006). Once the summary-judgment movant shows there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must then present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Id.‘We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.’ 943 So.2d at 795. We review questions of law de novo. Davis v. Hanson Aggregates Southeast, Inc., 952 So.2d 330 (Ala.2006)."

Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So.2d 342, 346 (Ala.2006).

Discussion

The State contends that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that Okafor presented substantial evidence to satisfy his burden of proof in challenging the State's summary-judgment motion. Specifically, the State argues that the Court of Civil Appeals' holding, which allows Okafor to challenge the legality of the search of Hereford's residence and the seizure of the currency, is erroneous because, it says, Okafor does not have standing to challenge the search of Hereford's house.

In Ex parte Collier, supra, this Court held that a defendant must have an expectation of privacy or a proprietary interest in the property searched to have standing to challenge the search of the property.

The Court of Criminal Appeals elaborated on a defendant's standing to challenge a search in Jones v. State, 946 So.2d 903, 919–20 (Ala.Crim.App.2006), stating:

"The appellant also argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence law enforcement officers seized from the Jones and the Lazenby residences and from the Mercedes [automobile] pursuant to unlawful searches. Specifically, he contends that he had an expectation of privacy in the residences and the vehicle; that officers did not obtain warrants to search the residences and the vehicle; and that he did not consent to the searches....

"....

"We must first determine whether the appellant has standing to challenge the search and seizure with regard to the Jones residence ....

" ‘An appellant wishing to establish standing to challenge the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment must demonstrate that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Cochran v. State, 500 So.2d 1161 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 500 So.2d 1179 (Ala.1985), on remand, 500 So.2d 1188 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), aff'd, 500 So.2d 1064 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 1965, 95 L.Ed.2d 537 (1987).... "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). "For a search to violate the rights of a specific defendant, that defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched, and the burden is squarely on the defendant asserting the violation to establish that such an expectation existed." Kaercher v. State, 554 So.2d 1143, 1148 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 554 So.2d 1152 (Ala.1989).’" Harris v. State, 594 So.2d 725, 727 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).

" ‘ "No one circumstance is talismanic to the Rakas inquiry. ‘While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of ... [the] inquiry.’ United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.

...