Oklahoma Supreme Court Invalidates State’s Noneconomic Damages Cap
By Hope Forsyth and John Russell
May 10, 2019
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently invalidated the state’s statutory noneconomic damages
caps for claimed bodily injuries in
Beason v. I.E. Miller Servs.
, 2019 OK 28, --- P.3d ---. Oklahoma
now has no cap or limit on these damages, which compensate plaintiffs for harms such as mental
distress and pain and suffering.
First effective in 2009 and amended in 2011, the statute at issue limited noneconomic damages
recovery by gradations. 23 O.S. § 61.2. As a general rule, plaintiffs were limited to $350,000 in
these damages. If, however, the judge and jury found severe wrongdoing by clear and
convincing evidence, such as that defendant(s) acted in reckless disregard for the rights of others,
grossly negligently, fraudulently, intentionally, or with malice, no cap applied.
The
Beason
decision rested on two elements of the Oklahoma Constitution:
1. Under the state Constitution, the Oklahoma Legislature cannot enact laws that
unreasonably require different treatment for part of a class of similar people. Okla. Const.
Art. 5, § 46.
2. The Oklahoma Constitution also requires recovery for injuries resulting in death shall not
be subject to any statutory limitation. Okla. Const. Art. 23, § 7. In accord with this, and
by statute, the personal representative of a person who died due to an injury-causing
event may recover uncapped damages for the “mental pain and anguish” the person
suffered before his or her death. 12 O.S. § 1053.
These two constitutional provisions are key to the
Beason
decision, as constitutional provisions
control over legislatively-enacted statutes or judge-made common law. Since the Constitution
prohibits special laws that unreasonably require different treatment for similar people, and since
the Constitution also explicitly rejects limitations on damages for injuries causing death, the
Court reasoned, “[i]f a decedent can recover without limitation for pain and suffering during the
time between the harm-causing event and his or her death, no good reason exists to treat a
person who survives the harm-causing event different with respect to recovery for the very same
