Okoroanyanwu v. MV Transp., Inc., CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00584-AWI-SKO

KIZITO OKOROANYANWU, Plaintiff, v. MV TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00584-AWI-SKO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

July 30, 2020

FIRST SCREENING ORDER

(Doc. 4)

21-DAY DEADLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 23, 2020, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint against Defendants MV Transportation, Inc. ("MVT"), and MVT supervisors Mark Anaya and Scott German. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq., related to the termination of his employment with MV Transportation. (See id. at 4.) The original complaint seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted on April 28, 2020. (Docs. 2, 3.)

On May 19, 2020, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC") alleging the same claims but amending his request for relief, requesting (1) $35,000 for lost wages; (2) $100,000 for compensatory damages; and (3) $200,000 for punitive damages. (Doc. 4 at 48.)

Plaintiff's FAC is now the operative complaint and is before the Court for screening. The Court finds Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim, but may be able to correct the deficiencies in his pleading. Thus, Plaintiff is provided the pleading and legal standards for his claims and is granted leave to file a second amended complaint.

A. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints in cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

The Court's screening of the complaint is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what Plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

B. Pleading Requirements

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, since Plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court mustconstrue the allegations of his complaint liberally and must afford Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Further, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.") (internal citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that MVT hired him as an operations manager in 2018. (See Doc. 4 at 22.) Plaintiff states that on multiple occasions shortly after he began working for Defendants, they accused him of improperly assigning an outside contractor to drive vehicles owned by MVT, improperly telling MVT applicants "to obtain MVT hiring approval from an outside . . . contractor," failing to follow instructions regarding various tasks, and many other instances of improper and negligent conduct as an MVT employee. (See id. at 22-24.) Plaintiff denies being involved in any vehicle assignment or hiring decisions and denies committing any violations of MVT's policies. (See id.)

Plaintiff does not allege in his FAC when he was terminated, for what reason he was allegedly terminated, or any facts related to discrimination. In his Charge of Discrimination, submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on May 21, 2019 and attached to the FAC, Plaintiff states he was terminated on October 2, 2019, "because [he] put contractor information in the company's messaging system," but Plaintiff "believe[s] that [he] was discharged because of [his] Race, Black, and National Origin, Nigerian, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." (Id. at 5.)

B. Shotgun Pleading

A "[s]hotgun pleading occurs when one party pleads that multiple parties did an act, without identifying which party did what specifically; or when one party pleads multiple claims, and does not identify which specific facts are allocated to which claim." Hughey v. Drummond, No. 2:14-cv-00037-TLN-AC, 2014 WL 579365, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014) (citation omitted). This violates Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that "[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances," and Rule 8, which requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement" of entitlement to relief.

Here, as set forth below, Plaintiff may be able to allege cognizable claims, but the major deficiency with the FAC as currently pleaded is that it is an impermissible "shotgun" pleading. Plaintiff's FAC alleges various claims but does not clearly state which claim is alleged against which defendant, and which specific facts support each claim. Further, Plaintiff's complaint must be organized in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. As currently drafted, it is organized in a confusing manner, with certain pages from a form complaint, the Charge of Discrimination, multiple different letters and emails, and a section of "Facts" that purports to be a response to Defendants' letter regarding Plaintiff's allegations. (See Doc. 4.) Plaintiff also fails to include sufficient facts regarding his termination, other than that hewas terminated, and fails to include allegations in the body of the FAC regarding discrimination or his termination, and only includes some of those facts in the Charge of Discrimination attached to the FAC. (See id. at 8.)

This is not permissible because it does not give Defendants "fair notice" of the claims against which they must defend and the facts and legal theories that give rise to the claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In any second amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly state which claim is against which Defendant, the legal basis for the claim, and the facts that support and show that the specific defendant committed the violation asserted as the legal basis for the claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff also must draft his complaint as numbered paragraphs with each paragraph relating to a single set of circumstances, and must include all relevant facts in the body of the complaint, as opposed to in separate letters and documents attached to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10.

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Cognizable Claim Under Title VII

1. Title VII Discrimination

a. Disparate Treatment

Title VII states that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of her "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination or "disparate treatment"¹ under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarlysituated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination." Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603...