Olden v. Quality Care & Advocacy Grp.

BEATRICE OLDEN, Plaintiff, v. QUALITY CARE & ADVOCACY GROUP, INC. and SANDRA TAYLOR, Defendants.

No. CV 119-166

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division

September 14, 2021

ORDER

J RANDAL HALL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment.^[1] (Doc. 37.) Plaintiff brings her claim pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. (Compl., Doc. 1, at 1, 8-9.) Plaintiff seeks recovery of unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 10.) For the reasons below, Defendants' motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

Quality Care & Advocacy Group, Inc. ("Quality Care") provides mental health and substance abuse outpatient care and services. (A. McMillan Dep., Doc. 39, at 9.) Plaintiff is a registered nurse and began working for Quality Care around the end of September 2018. (Doc. 42-16, at 1.) During the time Plaintiff was employed at Quality Care, she was enrolled as a full-time nursing student at Georgia Southern University.^[3] (Olden Dep., Doc. 42-1, at 7, 9.) All of Plaintiff's classes were online, and she could complete her coursework at any time. (Id. at 10.) As part of Plaintiff's studies, she was also required to complete 90 hours of work per semester at a clinical site. (Id. at 10-11.)

Plaintiff's job duties at Quality Care included performing nursing and nutritional assessments and conducting individual and group counseling sessions for Quality Care's clients. (Id. at 21, 26.) Plaintiff conducted the assessments and held counseling sessions at Quality Care, in the community, or at clients' homes. (A. McMillan Dep., at 137-38; Olden Dep., at 22, 45.)

Quality Care provided Plaintiff with a list of clients, and Plaintiff was in charge of scheduling appointments with them. (Olden Dep., at 20, 119.) Typically, Plaintiff's assessments took 30 minutes to an hour and 45 minutes. (Id. at 22.) Despite this, Plaintiff always billed two hours for her assessments. (Id. at 32, 42, 57-58.) Plaintiff also spent time driving to clients' homes, reviewing medical records, and drafting and entering her notes. (Id. at 24, 108-09.) The Parties dispute how many "nonbillable" hours Plaintiff worked and the total number of hours Plaintiff worked each week.

Plaintiff resigned from Quality Care on June 9, 2019. (Doc. 42-4.) On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed the present suit against Quality Care and Sandra Taylor^[4]. (Compl.)

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) . Facts are "material" if they could "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive] law," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute is genuine "if the non[-]moving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor." Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). The Court must view factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must "draw all justifiable inferences in [the non-moving party's] favor." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation, internal quotation marks, and internal punctuation omitted). The Court may not weigh the evidence or determine credibility. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court the basis for its motion by reference to materials in the record. Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, as Plaintiff does here, the movant has two options as to how it can carry its initial burden. Id. at 1115-16. The movant may demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case, or provide affirmative evidence demonstrating the nonmovant's inability to prove its case at trial. Id.

If the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant must "demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Id. The non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carries its initial burden. For example, if the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). On the other hand, if the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1116-17. The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). Rather, the non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

In this action, the Clerk of Court provided all parties notice of the motion for summary judgment, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Doc. 41.) For that reason, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985), have been satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, the issues have been thoroughly briefed, and the motion is now ripe for consideration.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to compensate her for overtime work in violation of the FLSA. "The FLSA mandates that 'no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours . . . specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.'" Reich v. Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., State of Ala., 28 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). To prevail on a claim for overtime wages under the FLSA, Plaintiff has the burden of showing: "(1) [s]he is employed by the defendant, (2) the defendant engaged in interstate commerce, and (3) the defendant failed to pay h[er] . . . overtime wages." Freeman v. Key Largo Volunteer Fire & Rescue Dep't, Inc., 494 Fed.Appx. 940, 942 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1277 n.68 (11th Cir. 2008)). Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim because (1) Plaintiff is an independent contractor, not an employee under the FLSA, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to show she worked overtime hours without compensation.^[5](See Doc. 37-2.)

A. Employee or Independent Contractor

Pursuant to the FLSA, an "employee" is "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). An "employer" "includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." Id. § 203(d). Additionally, "employ" means "to suffer or permit to work." Id. § 203(g). "These definitions are intended to be 'comprehensive enough' to include 'working relationships, which prior to this Act, were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category.'" Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rutherford Food Corp, v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947)). However, "[t]hese 'broad' definitions do not . . . bring 'independent contractors' within the FLSA's ambit." Id. (citing Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 728-29).

"To determine whether an individual falls into the category of covered 'employee' or exempted 'independent contractor,' courts look to the 'economic reality' of the relationship between the alleged employee and alleged employer and whether that relationship demonstrates dependence."^[6] Id. (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)). "This inquiry is not governed by the 'label' put on the relationship by the parties or the contract controlling that relationship, but rather focuses on whether 'the work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of an employee.'" Id. (quoting Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 729). Courts use the following factors as a guide when applying the economic reality test:

(1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed;

(2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;

(3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers;

(4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;

(5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; [and]

(6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.

Id. at 1312. These factors "are aids-tools to be used to gauge the degree of dependence of alleged employees on the business with which they are connected." Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976).^[7] "No one of these considerations can become the final determinant, nor can the collective answers to all of the inquiries produce a resolution which submerges consideration of the dominant factor-economic dependence." Id. (citing Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975)).

1. Degree of Control

"The first...