Olguin v. FCA U.S. LLC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES (Doc. 53) ORDER TERMINATING THE BILL OF COSTS AS MOOT (DOC. 51)

Jose Olguin asserted in this action that his Chrysler Pacifica-which was manufactured and/or distributed by FCA U.S. LLC-was defective and required multiple repairs. He sought to hold FCA liable for violations of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and fraudulent inducement- concealment. (Doc. 1.) The parties settled the underlying claims, and Olguin now seeks an award of attorney fees and costs. (Doc. 53.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part, in the modified amount of $35,374.50.

I. Background and Allegations

Olguin alleges that he and his deceased wife “entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2018 Chrysler Pacifica vehicle ., which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant FCA.” (Doc. 1 at 3-4 ¶ 11; see also Doc. 13 at 6.) Olguin asserts “[t]he warranty contained various warranties, including but not limited to the bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty,

[and] emission warranty.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 12.)

Olguin asserts that he “is a reasonable consumer who interacted with sales representatives, considered FCA's advertisement, and/or other marketing materials concerning the FCA Vehicles prior to purchasing the [Chrysler Pacifica].” (Doc. 1 at 8, ¶ 37.) Olguin alleges he used the purchased vehicle “primarily for family or household purposes.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 13.) He asserts that “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to the Vehicle's transmission; engine; defects causing stalling, among other defects and non-conformities.” (Id., ¶ 16.) Specifically, Olguin alleges the vehicle was “manufactured with FCA's defective 9HP transmission and Powertrain Control Module. (Id. at 6-7, ¶ 31.)

According to Olguin, his vehicle required repairs on three occasions between 2019 and 2021. (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶¶ 18-21.) Specifically, he reports that in December 2019, “with approximately 13,766 miles on odometer, the Subject Vehicle was presented .. due to various concerns including jerking.” (Id., ¶ 19.) In June 2020, the vehicle was submitted for repairs “due to various concerns including jerking and acceleration issues,” with approximately 22,480 miles on the odometer. (Id., ¶ 20.) Finally, in January 2021, “with approximately 33,434 miles on the odometer,” the vehicle was submitted for repairs due to “ongoing jerking and acceleration issues.” (Id., ¶ 21.) Olguin asserts each time, “Defendant's authorized repair facility performed warranty repairs.” (Id., ¶¶ 19-21.) However, Olguin alleges he “continued to experience symptoms of the Subject Vehicle's defects despite Defendant's representations that the Subject Vehicle was repaired.” (Id., ¶ 22.)

Olguin asserts FCA knew, prior to his purchase of the vehicle, that “2018 Chrysler Pacifica vehicles equipped with a 9HP transmission are defective along with the Powertrain Control Module (PCM), including Plaintiff's 2018 Chrysler Pacifica, contained one or more defect(s) to the transmission and/or PCM which may result in stalling, shutting off, and/or loss of power.” (Doc. 1 at 7, ¶ 32.) He contends this “Stalling Defect” “is a safety concern because it severely affects the driver's ability to control the car's speed, acceleration, and deceleration.” (Id., ¶ 33.) According to Olguin, “FCA was well aware and knew that the PCM installed in the Vehicle was defective....” (Id., ¶ 34.) He alleges:

FCA acquired its knowledge of the Stalling Defect prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such

as Plaintiff, including but not limited to pre-production and post-production testing data; early consumer complaints about the Stalling Defect made directly to FCA and its network of dealers; aggregate warranty data compiled from FCA's network of dealers; testing conducted by FCA in response to these complaints; as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by FCA from FCA's network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information.

(Id., ¶ 35.) Olguin asserts FCA “concealed and failed to disclose the defective nature of the Vehicle and its Stalling Defect to its sales representatives and [Olguin] at the time of sale and thereafter.” (Id. at 8, ¶ 36.) Olguin alleges that he “would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle, or would have paid less for it, had [he] known of the Stalling Defect.” (Id., ¶ 41.)

Based upon the foregoing, Olguin filed a complaint in which he sought to hold FCA liable for violations of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and fraudulent inducement- concealment. (See Doc. 1 at 10-22.) Olguin's prayer for relief included, but was not limited to: general, special, actual and punitive damages; “[r]evocation of acceptance of the Subject Vehicle, rescission, reimbursement and/or restitution of all monies expended;” diminution in value; civil penalties totaling twice the actual damages; and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. (Id. at 23.)

Olguin notified the Court that he “accepted Defendant FCA U.S. LLC's Offer of Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 in the amount of $121,889.04.” (Doc. 45 at 2.) The Court entered judgment and closed the case on January 4, 2024. (Doc. 46.) Pursuant to the terms of the executed “Offer of Judgment,” the parties agreed that if they were “unable to resolve attorney's fees and costs, Plaintiff may seek reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys' fees pursuant to a properly noticed motion...” (Doc. 45 at 5, ¶ 3.)

The parties also stipulated to several extensions of time to file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, which the Court approved. (Docs. 47, 48, 49, and 50.) On June 3, 2024, Olguin filed the pending motion, seeking fees and costs pursuant to the Song- Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and California Civil Code § 1794(d). (Doc. 53.) Based upon a stipulation of the parties, the Court continued the deadline for FCA to file any opposition. (Doc. 57.) After the parties filed a second stipulation to further extend the deadline, the Court ordered FCA to file any opposition by July 15, 2024, and informed the parties: “[a]bsent a much more detailed, compelling

showing of good cause, no further extensions will be granted.” (Doc. 59 at 1-2.) FCA did not file any opposition, and the time to do so has expired. Thus, the motion remains unopposed.

II. Awards for Fees, Costs, and Expenses

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Song-Beverly Act provide that a prevailing consumer / buyer may be awarded attorneys' fees, costs and expenses related to a civil action. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d); Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). Specifically, the Magnuson-Moss Act states a prevailing consumer:

may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate.

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). Likewise, California's Song-Beverly Act provides that buyers who prevail in an action “shall be allowed by the court to recover . costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d).

When the parties are unable to “settle the amount of a fee,” as here, “the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 424, 437 (1983). Thus, the burden of proof is on fee applicants to show a fee is reasonable. Id.; see also Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007). In general, “[t]he starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the ‘lodestar' figure, which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008); Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 489 (2016) (a lodestar involves “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate”).

Courts are given discretion when calculating a fee award. Hensley, 416 U.S. at 437. However, the Supreme Court explained “it remains important ... for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Id. Thus, the Court should provide sufficient information on how it arrived at the total of compensable hours for which fees were awarded to allow

for meaningful appellate review. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 485 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Courts need not attempt to portray the discretionary analyses that leads to their numerical conclusions as elaborate mathematical equations, but they must provide sufficient insight into their exercises of discretion to enable [the appellate court] to discharge our reviewing function”).

III. Request for Judicial Notice

Olguin requests the Court take judicial notice of 19 orders issued by various courts in California. (Doc. 53-3 at 2-5.) In addition, he...