Oliver v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist.

472 F.Supp.3d 367

Mari Leigh OLIVER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.KLEIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-17-3234

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

Signed July 15, 2020

Geoffrey Thomas Blackwell, American Atheists Inc., Washington, DC, Randall Lee Kallinen, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff LaShan Arceneaux.

Geoffrey Thomas Blackwell, American Atheists Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Jane Doe, Mari Leigh Oliver.

Thomas Phillip Brandt, Caroline Sileo, Francisco J. Valenzuela, Fanning Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin PC, Dallas, TX, Clay T. Grover, Rogers, Morris & Grover, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants Benjie Arnold, Stephen Naetzker, Angie Richard.

Clay T. Grover, Jonathan Griffin Brush, Rogers, Morris & Grover, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant Margaret Bollato.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING OLIVER'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SEVER AND ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT

Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge

As a student at Klein Oak High School, Mari Oliver refused to stand for or recite the Pledge of Allegiance because she disagreed with it philosophically. (Docket Entry No. 122-2, Oliver Dep. at 21:11–23:2). The Klein Independent School District pledge policy, tracking Texas law, states: "A [school] board shall require students, once during each school day, to recite the pledges of allegiance to the United States and Texas flags. On written request from a student's parent or guardian, a district shall excuse the student from reciting a pledge of allegiance." (Docket Entry No. 138-1 at 40; see TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.082(b) – (c) (2017)). Oliver and her mother, LaShan Arceneaux,¹ sued the District and several teachers and administrators, alleging that they violated Oliver's constitutional rights after receiving a written request to excuse her from the pledge.

After a hearing, this court granted summary judgment to all defendants except as to the free-speech claims against sociology teacher Benjie Arnold, and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Arnold and Richard. (Docket Entry No. 145). The plaintiffs had abandoned their free-exercise and equal-protection claims at oral argument before the court ruled. (Id. at 3).

The plaintiffs moved, under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b)(1), for reconsideration of the March 2020 grant of summary judgment to the defendants, other than Arnold, and the defendants responded. (Docket Entry Nos. 151, 155, 158). While this motion was pending, Arnold filed a notice of an appeal to the Fifth Circuit. (Docket Entry Nos. 149 and 150). Most of the other defendants—Klein Independent School District, Klein superintendent Bret Champion, assistant principal Kimberly Walters, teacher Jennifer Walton, and principals Lance Alexander, Brian Greeney, and Thomas Hensley—asked this court to sever the claims against them and enter final judgment under Rule 54, and the plaintiffs responded. (Docket Entry Nos. 146, 148, 154).

After a careful review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and grants the defendants’ Rule 54(b) motion to sever and enter final judgment. The reasons for these rulings are set out in detail below. The joint pretrial order deadline and docket call are suspended and will be reset after the Fifth Circuit resolves Arnold's appeal.

I. The Legal Standards

A. The Motion to Reconsider

1. Rule 59(e)

Under Rule 59, "the court may, on motion for a new trial, open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(2). Motions under Rule 59 are "properly invoked ‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’ " In re Transtexas Gas Corp. , 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co. , 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989) ). Parties must file a Rule 59 motion "no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).

2. Rule 60(b)(1)

Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief "from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). Mistakes can include an "obvious error of law, apparent on the record." In re Grimland, Inc. , 243 F.3d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 2001). Rule 60(b) balances "the principle of finality of a judgment with the interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of all the facts." Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi , 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981) ).

Granting a Rule 60(b) motion requires that "there exist extraordinary circumstances" justifying relief. Pryor v. U.S. Postal Service , 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985). Typically, a Rule 60(b) motion should not be used "to provide an avenue for challenges of mistakes of law that should ordinarily be raised by timely appeal." Id. at 286 ; see also , In re Pettle , 410 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 2005) ("We have consistently held that the ‘relief under Rule 60(b) is considered an extraordinary remedy ...’ " (quoting Carter v. Fenner , 136 F.3d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1998) )); Gary v. State of Louisiana , 622 F.2d 804, 805 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that a challenge to the legal standard applied should have been raised via a direct appeal); Halliburton Energy Servs. v. NL Indus. , 618 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that review under Rule 60(b) is narrower in scope than review on direct appeal). However, a Rule 60(b) motion can be granted to correct an "obvious error of law" when that error "involve[s] a fundamental misconception of the law or a conflict with a clear statutory mandate." In re Grimland, Inc. , 243 F.3d at 233. A decision on a Rule 60(b) motion is within the discretion of the district court and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hesling , 396 F.3d at 638 ; McCorvey v. Hill , 385 F.3d 846, 848 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We review the district court's denial of relief under Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion.").

B. A Motion to Sever under Rule 54(b)

Rule 54(b) states:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.

FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).

One function of Rule 54(b) is to mitigate "[t]he danger of hardship through delay of appeal until the whole action is concluded" in cases involving multiple parties and claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note to 1961 amendment; see also Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp. , 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[ Rule 54(b) ] reflects a balancing of two policies: avoiding the ‘danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal’ and ‘avoiding piecemeal appeals.’ " (quoting PYCA Indus. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist. , 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996) )).

In evaluating whether to grant a Rule 54(b) motion, a district court considers the "interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co. , 446 U.S. 1, 10, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980). The analysis involves two prongs: (1) whether there is a final judgment and (2) whether there is a just reason for delaying the moving parties’ exit from the case. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey , 351 U.S. 427, 436, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956). The first prong requires a "decision upon a ‘claim for relief’ " that is "a ‘final decision’ in the sense of an ultimate disposition of an individual claim" in a multi-claim case. Id. As to the second prong, determining whether there is a just reason for delay is a matter of judicial discretion, and the district court must balance "administrative interests as well as the equities involved" in a manner consistent with the federal policy against piecemeal appeals. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note to 1961 amendment; Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 351 U.S. at 438, 76 S.Ct. 895 ; see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. , 446 U.S. at 10–11, 100 S.Ct. 1460 ("[W]e are reluctant either to fix or sanction narrow guidelines for the district courts to follow."). In weighing whether there is a just reason for delay, the court evaluates the degree to which severing the claims or parties would impose multiplicative appellate court decisions. Curtiss-Wright Corp. , 446 U.S. at 10, 100 S.Ct. 1460.

District court decisions on whether to grant a Rule 54(b) motion receive substantial deference, and the Fifth Circuit "reverse[s] such orders only if [it] find[s] an abuse of discretion." Ackerman v. F.D.I.C. , 973 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. , 446 U.S. at 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460 ); see also H & W Indus., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp. , 860 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988) ("A district court decision to certify its judgment on some portion of a multiple claim as an appealable final judgment under Rule 54(b) is a discretionary act.").

II. Analysis

A. The Motion to Reconsider

The plaintiffs ask the court to reconsider the order granting summary judgment.

(Docket Entry No. 151). The plaintiffs rely on Rule 59(e) or, in the alternative, Rule 60(b)(1). The defendants respond that because Rule 59 "pertains only to motions to alter or amend final judgments," and because this court has not entered final judgment, the motion is premature. (Docket Entry No. 155 at 2).

The term "judgment" under Rule 54(a) "includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies" but does not extend to "recitals of pleadings, a master's report, or a record of prior proceedings." FED. R. CIV....