Olsson v. Beyer

PAUL OLSSON, Plaintiff, v. WAYNE BEYER, et al., Defendants.

No. 17 CV 3028

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

April 27, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Manish S. Shah, United States District Judge

Paul Olsson has been found unfit to stand trial in a state criminal prosecution and committed to the Elgin Mental Health Center. In this case, one of several he has filed or tried to file over the years, he sued fourteen Elgin employees and former employees, as well as three employees and former employees of the Illinois Department of Human Services. He alleges that defendants denied him access to the courts and retaliated against him for filing lawsuits and helping others file lawsuits. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). I construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Olsson, the nonmoving party. Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020). But the moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element” of his case for which he has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

II. Local Rule 56.1 and Evidentiary Issues

Local Rule 56.1 “aims to make summary-judgment decisionmaking manageable for courts.” Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGlo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 415 (7th Cir. 2019). The rule requires the moving party to file a statement of facts that demonstrates its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014); N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(a)(3). The nonmoving party must file a response to that statement and may provide a separate statement of additional facts. Petty, 754 F.3d at 420; N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(b)(3). Both statements of facts and statements of additional facts must consist of concise numbered paragraphs, supported by citations to specific pages in the evidentiary record. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(d)(1)-(2). Evidence supporting or opposing summary judgment must be admissible if offered at trial, although depositions and other written testimony can substitute for live testimony. Widmar v. Sun Chemical Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014).

Any fact not properly controverted is admitted. N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(e)(3); Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). If the responding party disagrees with the other party's fact, it must cite specific parts of the record disputing the fact and “concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.” N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(e)(3). Facts that a party raises in a Local Rule 56.1 response that do not controvert the asserted fact, and that are not included in the party's statement of additional facts, are stricken. N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(e)(2). So 2 are facts that are supported only by inadmissible evidence, provided the opposing party objects on that basis. Widmar, 772 F.3d at 460. I also disregard legal arguments in the statement of facts. See N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(d)(4).

Olsson did not abide by Local Rule 56.1 in his response to defendants' statement of facts. In his denials of some of defendants' facts, Olsson consistently cites to his own statement of additional facts, instead of directly to the exhibits that he says contradict defendants' facts. See [197] ¶¶ 10, 11, 26, 68, 87, 88, 90, 96, 111, 112, 113, 114, 120, 123, 124, 127, 145, 174, 176.^[1] In one instance, plaintiff cites to the entirety of his statement of additional facts (he seems to have accidentally left out the paragraph number, despite including a paragraph symbol). [197] ¶ 124. In another instance, plaintiff provides no citation at all. [197] ¶ 146. Although plaintiff's consistent citations to his additional statement of facts-as opposed to the record directly-violate Local Rule 56.1, I consider them when the additional statement of facts itself offers appropriate direct record citations.

Olsson also responds to some of defendants' assertions by saying they are “incomplete.” See [197] ¶¶ 87, 90, 111, 112, 113, 145. But saying something is incomplete is not denying it, so those facts are admitted unless evidence directly contradicting them is in plaintiff's statement of additional facts.

Defendants support some assertions by citing to affidavits, interrogatory responses, or deposition testimony. Plaintiff says some of these statements are inadmissible hearsay. See, e.g., [197] ¶¶ 27, 147. But at the summary-judgment stage, these documents are treated as live testimony. Widmar, 772 F.3d at 460. Still, some of the affidavits, interrogatories, and depositions contain hearsay. See, e.g., [197] ¶ 147. When plaintiff objected to those statements, I disregard any inadmissible hearsay.

Indeed, defendants' statement of facts suffers from hearsay. Specifically, defendants cite to hearsay that would have been admissible as records of a regularly conducted activity or as recorded recollections had defendants included a qualified witness's statement authenticating the documents, as required by Federal Rules of Evidence 803(5) and 803(6)(D). See [197] ¶¶ 120 (citing [187-34], email from Victoria Ingram); 139 (citing [189-12], email from Ghouse Mohiuddin); 148 (citing [187-41], letter from administrator to plaintiff's lawyer). For the exhibits that are part of plaintiff's clinical chart (those Bates Stamped EMHC000075-005107, EMHC005109-005179, EMHC005232-005238), defendants submitted a qualified witness's statement only when they filed their reply brief-that is, only after filing their statement of facts. See [204] at 8-9, n.1.^[2] The statement was filed late, but I consider it because defendants have shown that the exhibits could be admitted at trial. See Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016).^[3]III. Background

Paul Olsson is a civil detainee at Elgin Mental Health Center, where he has lived since 2010 after being found unfit to stand trial on charges of predatory sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. [197] ¶¶ 1, 2. Olsson was first admitted to the center in 2007. [197] ¶ 4. Between then and 2010, he was discharged and admitted to the center three times. [197] ¶¶ 4-6. Throughout his time there, Olsson has lived in four different housing units. [197] ¶ 7. He was originally assigned to the F Unit, then transferred to the Hartman Unit in 2010. [197] ¶¶ 41, 61. In 2015, Olsson was transferred to the all-male M Unit. [197] ¶ 78. He was transferred back to Hartman Unit in 2017. [197] ¶ 62. (After this lawsuit was filed, he was transferred to a fourth unit, a fact not relevant here. [197] ¶ 62.) During his time at the center, Olsson has taken distance-learning classes, including paralegal classes. [205] ¶ 42.

A. Olsson's Assistance with Another Resident's Legal Cases and Olsson's Housing Transfer

From 2010 to 2015, Olsson lived in Hartman Unit, where he was assigned a psychiatrist named Richard Malis. [197] ¶¶ 62, 63. Plaintiff didn't care for Dr. Malis, [197] ¶ 64, and from 2010 to January 2015, repeatedly asked center staff, including defendants Jeffrey Pharis (Acting Forensic Program Director or Forensic Program Director from 2012 to 2016, [197] ¶ 36) and Daniel Hardy (Medical Director until June 2017, [197] ¶ 24), to be assigned to a different psychiatrist. [205] ¶ 2. All of his requests were met with either no response or an “I'll get back to you.” [205] ¶ 2. In 2011, plaintiff met with Pharis and Malis about a grievance and complaint he filed. [205] ¶ 3. In that meeting, plaintiff said that his treatment team's relationship with him was “adversarial in nature and [plaintiff] tries his best to keep things peaceful.” [205] ¶ 4. In response, Malis asked plaintiff, “if he wants things to be peaceful, why doesn't he consider how many people against whom he has filed lawsuits.” [205] ¶ 4. On more than one occasion, Malis tried to convince him to stop filing lawsuits and helping other residents file lawsuits. [205] ¶ 1.^[4] In January 2015, plaintiff met with Hardy about plaintiff's request for a new psychiatrist. [197] ¶¶ 64-65 (citing [187-5] and [189-5]).^[5] Hardy told him he could be assigned to a different psychiatrist only if he changed housing units. [197] ¶ 65.^[6] Plaintiff said he wanted to remain on Hartman Unit but continued to refuse to work with Dr. Malis. [197] ¶ 66.^[7] In April 2015, Dr. Ulsa Kartan replaced Malis as plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, [205] ¶ 5, but because Malis remained part of the Hartman treatment team, he continued to see Olsson daily. [197] ¶ 81.

While Olsson resided on Hartman Unit, three female residents accused him of inappropriate sexual behavior. [197] ¶ 67. Plaintiff admits that the women accused him of inappropriate sexual behavior, [197] ¶ 67, but says the accusations are false, [205] ¶ 6. Based on those allegations, Dr. Malis recommended that plaintiff be transferred to the all-male M Unit. [197] ¶ 68.

During his time on Hartman, Olsson also came to know another resident named Abby Grason. [197] ¶ 69. Between 2013 and 2015, he helped Grason prepare and submit grievances about her medical treatment at the center. [197] ¶ 70. Specifically, in February 2015, he began helping Grason with a medical-treatment lawsuit she wanted to file against defendants Pharis (the program director), Hardy (the medical director), Malis (one of plaintiff's psychiatrists) Wayne Beyer (Consumer Support Specialist, [197] ¶ 8), Debbie Giardina (social...