One Nat. Bank v. Pope

272 S.W.3d 98

372 Ark. 208

ONE NATIONAL BANK, as Administrator of the Estate of Lorrie Ann Kaz, Deceased, Appellant, v. Richard F. POPE, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, and Wesley United Methodist Church of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, Appellees.

No. 06-1497.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

January 24, 2008.

Eubanks, Baker, & Schulze, by: Darryl E. "Chip" Baker and J.G. "Gerry" Schulze, for appellant.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, LLP, by: Troy A. Price, for appellees.

PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice.

Appellant One National Bank, as Administrator of the Estate of Lorrie Ann Kaz, deceased, appeals from the judgment entered in its favor and against appellees Richard F. Pope, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, and Wesley United Methodist Church of Pine Bluff, Arkansas (collectively "American Manufacturers"). The Estate's sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting American Manufacturers's directed-verdict motion on the Estate's claim for loss-of-life damages under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b) (Repl.2005). American Manufacturers cross-appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law, which alleged that there was no evidence that Mr. Pope was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident in which Ms. Kaz was killed. We reverse and remand on direct appeal and affirm on cross-appeal.

This case stems from a motor-vehicle accident, which occurred on August 18, 2001, in Cleburne County, Arkansas, on State Highway 5. On that day, Richard F. Pope, then the minister of Wesley United Methodist Church in Pine Bluff, was returning to Pine Bluff following a fishing trip. The fishing trip took place at the home of one of the church's members and her husband, which was near the White River, and included several high-school-age boys, in the form of a church youth outing. One of the boys, Kevin Owens, was riding with Mr. Pope, when Mr. Pope's car crossed over the double-yellow line, hit Ms. Kaz's car, and caused the deaths of three persons, Ms. Kaz and two of her daughters, Dusti Lee Sherman and Julianne Dohrman.

On April 17, 2003, the estates of all three decedents filed a complaint against American Manufacturers, alleging that Mr. Pope "was negligent, which was the proximate cause of the damages and injuries sustained by [the Estate]."¹ The estates sought funeral expenses, loss-of-life damages, and mental-anguish damages, on behalf of the beneficiaries, as well as economic damages on behalf of Ms. Kaz's son, Donald Scott "D.J." Sherman. Each of the defendants answered, and, ultimately, the matter went to trial. During the course of the trial, American Manufacturers moved for a directed verdict on the claim for loss-of-life damages as to Ms. Kaz, and the circuit court granted its motion.

The matter proceeded, and at the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered its verdict on interrogatories. On September 21, 2006, the circuit court entered its judgment. The jury had found that there was negligence on the part of Mr. Pope, which was a proximate cause of damages, that Mr. Pope was not an independent contractor at the time of the accident, and that Mr. Pope was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Wesley United Methodist Church at the time of the accident. Accordingly, judgment was entered in the following manner:

AS TO THE ESTATE OF LORRIE ANN KAZ, the court enters judgment in favor of One National Bank as Administrator of the Estate in the amount of $1,440 in favor of the estate [for funeral expenses], $40,000 in favor of Amanda Boske [Ms. Kaz's surviving daughter, for mental anguish], and $100,000 in favor of D.J. Sherman [Ms. Kaz's surviving son, for mental anguish].

AS TO THE ESTATE OF DUSTI SHERMAN, the court enters judgment in favor of One National Bank as Administrator of the Estate in the amount of $1,001,585 in favor of the estate [for loss of life and funeral expenses], $20,000 in favor of Amanda Boske [Dusti's surviving sister, for mental anguish], and $150,000 in favor of D.J. Sherman [Dusti's surviving brother, for mental anguish].

AS TO THE ESTATE OF JULIANNE DOHRMAN, the court enters judgment in favor of One National Bank as Administrator of the Estate in the amount of $1,001,585 in favor of the estate [for loss of life and funeral expenses], $20,000 in favor of Amanda Boske [Julianne's surviving sister, for mental anguish], and $150,000 in favor of D.J. Sherman [Julianne's surviving brother, for mental anguish].

On October 5, 2006, American Manufacturers filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, motion for new trial. In it, it alleged that the three estates failed to present sufficient evidence at trial that Mr. Pope was acting within the scope of his employment with the church at the time of the accident.² The three estates responded, and on October 17, 2006, the circuit court entered its order denying the motion, finding that there was substantial evidence that Mr. Pope was acting in the course and scope of his employment with the church at the time of the accident.³ The Estate filed a timely notice of appeal, and American Manufacturers timely filed its notice of cross-appeal. We turn then to the instant appeal.

The Estate argues that the issue presented by this case is simple: what evidence is required to submit the loss-of-life element of damage to a jury? It avers that section 16-62-101(b) only requires proof that a living person died from the wrongful acts of another to trigger the element of damage and that any additional evidence a deceased person's estate presents is simply to provide a jury a sound basis for increasing its evaluation. In the instant case, the Estate maintains, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence presented that Lorrie Kaz loved life and placed a value on her own life, and, therefore, the circuit court erred in failing to submit the Estate's claim for loss-of-life damages to the jury. American Manufacturers counters that without some evidence of how a particular decedent saw his or her life, a jury is left to conjecture and speculation. It submits that it is "the quality of life, not the fact of life, that paves the way to recovery" of loss-of-life damages.

In deciding whether the grant of a motion for directed verdict was appropriate, appellate courts review whether there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court's decision. See Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 232 S.W.3d 433 (2006). A motion for directed verdict should be granted only if there is no substantial evidence to support a jury verdict. See id. Stated another way, a motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury's verdict for the party to be set aside. See id. Where the evidence is such that fair-minded persons might reach different conclusions, then a jury question is presented, and the directed verdict should be reversed. See id.

Arkansas's survival statute specifically provides that a decedent's estate may recover damages for the decedent's loss of life:

(b) In addition to all other elements of damages provided by law, a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss of life as an independent element of damages.

Ark.Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b) (Repl.2005). In Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 156 S.W.3d 242 (2004), we found the language of section 16-62-101(b) to be clear and unambiguous and held that it was not necessary for a decedent to live for a period of time between injury and death in order to recover such damages. We further distinguished between loss-of-enjoyment-of-life damages and loss-of-life damages, noting that the former contemplates "damages for loss of the enjoyment of life that are pre-death," while the latter loss-of-life damages "only begin accruing at the point when life is lost, at death[.]" 356 Ark. at 491-92, 156 S.W.3d at 247-48. In addition, we established that "[l]oss-of-life damages seek to compensate a decedent for the loss of the value that the decedent would have placed on his or her own life." Id. at 492, 156 S.W.3d at 248. In this case, we are confronted with the question of what proof an estate must present in order to seek an award of loss-of-life damages. The issue is one of first impression for this court.

While we have not specifically addressed this question, we did, in Durham, cite to and discuss Connecticut's provision for "just damages:"

"Just damages" include (1) the value of the decedent's lost earning capacity less deductions for her necessary living expenses and taking into consideration that a present cash payment will be made, (2) compensation for the destruction of her capacity to carry on and enjoy life's activities in a way she would have done had she lived, and (3) compensation for pain and suffering.

Id. at 490, 156 S.W.3d. at 247 (quoting Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 657, 368 A.2d 172, 183 (1976) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added)). See also Howard W. Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages § 34:1B (5th ed.2004). We observed that such damages "were damages for the loss of the decedent's life, which, in turn, led to the destruction of her ability to carry on life's activities." 356 Ark. at 491, 156 S.W.3d at 247.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas has also examined loss-of-life damages pursuant to section 16-62-101(b). In McMullin v. United States, 515 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Ark.2007), the District Court observed, in reviewing our Durham decision, that our distinction between damages for loss of enjoyment of life and loss-of-life damages could not "be interpreted as expressing any view on the parameters of evidence that may be relevant to establish those different claims." 515 F.Supp.2d at 926. It further found that there was "nothing in the opinion that would negate an argument that the same type of evidence might...