Ordoukhanian v. Sinclair

1

RAYMOND DEAN ORDOUKHANIAN, Plaintiff, v. BRIAN R. SINCLAIR, Defendant.

No. 4:21-CV-466JAR

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

December 13, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN A. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff, an inmate at Potosi Correctional Center (PCC), for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $121.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the complaint and the supplemental documents and motions^[1], the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of plaintiffs account indicates an average monthly deposit of $605.00. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $121.00.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a complaint must plead more than "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to, inter alia, draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.

Pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims alleged. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980) (even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law). Federal courts are not required to "assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint." Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15. In addition, giving a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

State Criminal Background

A criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff in Lincoln County, Missouri on May 29, 2014. State v. Ordoukhanian, No. 14L6-CR00475 (45^th Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County Court). The complaint charged plaintiff with statutory rape in the first degree, sexual intercourse with a person less than 14 years old. A warrant was issued for plaintiffs arrest on May 29, 2014, and plaintiff was taken into custody on May 30, 2014. Plaintiff was represented by defendant, Brian Sinclair, from the outset of his criminal proceedings.

Plaintiff was found guilty of statutory rape in the first degree, sexual intercourse with a person less than 14 years old after a two-day jury trial that began on August 14, 2017. State v. Ordoukhanian, No. 14L6-CR00475-01 (45^th Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County Court). Plaintiff was sentenced to life in prison on August 16, 2017. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal on December 26, 2018. State v. Ordoukhanian, No. ED 106056 (Mo.Ct.App. 2018).

Plaintiff filed a premature motion to vacate his sentence on November 14, 2017. Ordoukhanian v. State, No. 17L6-CC00144 (45^th Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County Circuit Court).

Counsel for plaintiff filed an amended motion to vacate on April 16, 2019, and the matter is currently pending review by the Circuit Court.^[2] Id.

The Complaint

Plaintiff is an inmate at the Potosi Correctional Center. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988^[3] against defendant Brian Sinclair, plaintiffs state court criminal defense attorney. Plaintiff claims that he is suing defendant Sinclair in his "individual and official" capacities.

Plaintiffs complaint is eighty-eight (88) pages, the majority of which is type-written and attached to the Court's complaint-form. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Sinclair violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The entirety of plaintiffs complaint contains claims that defendant Brian Sinclair, his defense counsel in his criminal action in state court, conspired with state officials to conceal and manipulate evidence during plaintiffs criminal trial. Although plaintiffs claims are large in breadth, his assertions are often difficult to discern. Nonetheless, plaintiffs conclusion in his complaint is that defendant Sinclair's collusion with prosecutors ultimately lead to his conviction for the offenses of which he was charged.

Plaintiff asserts, for example, that defendant Sinclair colluded with prosecutors to assist with witnesses perjuring themselves on the stand at his trial. Additionally, he claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a violation of his Miranda rights at trial when he failed to cross-examine the interrogating detective or file a motion to suppress. Plaintiff also complains that defendant Sinclair failed to have his wife, Monica Ordoukhanian, testify at trial on his behalf, or cross examine her as to motive. Plaintiff additionally asserts that defendant Sinclair "allowed" the State of Missouri to show the jury an edited child assessment video of the victim. Last, plaintiff claims that his attorney colluded with the State to conceal Detective McCarrick's illegal seizure of his iPhone and arrest, as well as assisted the State to fabricate a false child porn image.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in this action.

Discussion

A. Plaintiffs Claims Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a state prisoner could challenge the constitutionality of his criminal conviction in a suit for damages under § 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). The Court determined that the plaintiffs § 1983 action for damages was not cognizable. Id. at 483. In doing so, the Court noted that a § 1983 action was not the appropriate vehicle for challenging criminal judgments. Id. at 486.

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus... A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487-88. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages pursuant to § 1983, the Court must consider whether a judgment for the plaintiff would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Id. at 488. If it would, the Court must dismiss the complaint unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (concluding that state prisoner's "claim for declaratory relief and money damages based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983"); and Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8^th Cir. 1996) (discussing application of Heck rule in § 1983 cases).

In this action, plaintiff alleges that defendant Sinclair conspired with various state actors to conceal and manipulate evidence during plaintiffs criminal trial, which lead to plaintiffs conviction and prison sentence. Heck bars plaintiffs claims against defendant Sinclair because plaintiffs conviction and sentence has not been overturned or invalidated. As such, his claims against defendant are subject to dismissal...