Orlando v. Dickens

Gilbert ORLANDO v. Millicent DICKENS

No. FSTCV175016368S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Stamford

January 26, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

POVODATOR, J.

Background and Legal Principles

This is a lawsuit brought by the self-represented plaintiff, arising from a situation characterized as involving identity theft. In that regard, this case has at least two probably unique aspects- there is no claim of any financial harm to the plaintiff, but instead of that form of near-universal claim of adverse consequences, this instance of claimed identity theft led, at least in part, to the deaths of two people. See, State v. Orlando, 163 Conn.App. 155, 134 A.3d 708 (2016).

The defendants in this case are Stamford Hospital, the facility where medical care was provided to a relative of the plaintiff’s using his identity without the plaintiff’s knowledge, and three additional defendants (including a former sister-in-law of the plaintiff) who are or were employed by the hospital at some claimed-to-be-relevant time. Currently before the court are two motions for summary judgment filed by all defendants, both motions asserting that the action is barred by the relevant statutes of limitation.^[1]

The court must read the complaint in a common-sense manner- broadly and realistically, Williams v. Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport, 327 Conn. 338, 372 (2017). There is an overlay arising from the status of the plaintiff as a self-represented party- this court is cognizant of the cautionary appellate statements relating to pleadings filed by self-represented parties:

" [C]onstruction of a self-represented party’s pleading should not focus on technical defects, but should afford the [appellant] a broad, realistic construction of the pleading under review." Macellaio v. Newington Police Department, 145 Conn.App. 426, 431, 75 A.3d 78 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation, omitted).

" Connecticut courts are solicitous of self-represented parties when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties. Our courts allow self-represented parties some latitude, but that latitude is constrained by our rules of practice; the purpose of which is to provide a just determination of every proceeding." Argentinis v Fortuna, 134 Conn.App. 538, 539, 39 A.3d 1207 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks, omitted).

(See, also, per curiam decision in Hill v Williams, 74 Conn.App. 654, 655, 813 A.2d 130 (2003).)

In connection with a motion for summary judgment, the court is charged with determining whether there are any outstanding material issues of fact relating to the issues claimed to be dispositive. The court’s function is not to resolve any such issues, but rather simply to recognize whether they exist. Here, the defendants are claiming that the complaint is barred by applicable statutes of limitation, and that there is no factual issue in that regard.

Procedurally the court notes that the motions for summary judgment were filed in June and July 2017; the motions eventually appeared on a calendar on October 16, 2017 at which time the court was asked to decide the motions " on the papers" (without argument). As of the writing of this memorandum of decision, the plaintiff has not filed any objection to either motion.

Notwithstanding the absence of any objection, the court still is required to determine whether the presentations of the defendants establish the absence of any material issue of fact- until a moving party carries its burden in that regard, the non-moving party has no burden of responding.

[W]e note that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant’s burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial.

(Internal quotation marks and citation, omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, 310 Conn. 304, 320 (2013).

Discussion

The defendants rely on the claimed expiration of the statutes of limitation relating to negligence and non-negligent torts General Statutes § § 52-577 and 52-584. The process of evaluating applicability of a statute of limitations necessarily involves a timeline- it generally starts with the underlying events running through the commencement of the litigation, and measures the elapsed time against the appropriate limitations period, to see whether the limitations period has been exceeded (subject to possible adjustments, e.g., delayed discovery of a negligence claim). Consistent with the somewhat unique nature of this case, identifying the relevant underlying events is not as simple as usually is the case.

The complaint alleges certain conduct occurring in 2016, and the defendants opine that that is something in the nature of a mistake (typographical error?), contending that the appropriate reference date is in 2006. Consistent with the court’s obligation to read a self-represented party’s pleadings in a realistic manner, it appears that at least in part, the plaintiff is reciting recent efforts to seek some form of official reaction to the identity theft. Thus, attached to the complaint are letters reflecting his efforts in 2012 and 2014 to obtain more information about, and/or an official response to, his claims. He also has attached medical records that do reflect that the underlying events occurred in 2006, but that is not necessarily determinative- there could have been a continuing course of conduct, or affirmative efforts to hide what had happened, so as to potentially extend the triggering of the running of a statute of limitations. Further, it is not just the actual identity theft that is the focus of the complaint, but rather also (instead?) it is the seeming lack of any form of repercussions from the identity theft when reported by the plaintiff.

In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the issue is not a review of the clarity or organization of a complaint, but rather whether the moving party (the defendants) can establish that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, based on essentially undisputed facts (no material issue of fact). Therefore, it is not controlling whether the complaint itself (perhaps mistakenly) refers to 2016- or 2014 or 2012- the issue is whether the cause of action accrued and could/should have been brought more than three years^[2] prior to the date it actually was brought.

In support of the motion, the defendants have submitted an affidavit from a representative of defendant Stamford Hospital, to which are attached a number of letters from the plaintiff, in 2012, relating to the identity theft that had occurred in 2006. In addition, counsel for the defendants submitted an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of a printout from a Judicial Branch website reflecting the criminal history of the plaintiff, and a newspaper article relating to the defense that had been asserted by the plaintiff in connection with that criminal prosecution. Absent any objection from the non-moving party (the plaintiff), the court would be permitted to consider hearsay content such as a newspaper article. However, the court " prefers" to rely on a more authoritative source for similar information, i.e. the Appellate Court decision in connection with an appeal of the conviction of the plaintiff for the two homicides:

The following procedural history and facts, which the panel reasonably could have found, are pertinent to our review. On June 14, 2010, the defendant went to the home of his former wife, Enid Dickens, where a dispute began between them. This dispute arose out of the fact that locks had been changed at the home the defendant had formerly occupied and his claim that Dickens had enabled her brother to steal his identity, who then used the defendant’s identity to pay for his medical bills. After this argument at the home became heated, and Dickens attempted to hit the defendant with a lamp, he pulled out a gun and shot both his wife and his mother-in-law, Rona Knight, causing their deaths.

State v. Orlando, 163 Conn.App. 155, 157, 134 A.3d 708, 710 (2016).

Thus, the court does not have to rely upon the lack of objection to a hearsay source such as a newspaper article- there is an " official" recitation of the background of the homicides, recounting the identity theft being known to the plaintiff as of June 14, 2010, and in the body of the decision identifying the plaintiff’s reaction to the identity theft as part of the planned/proffered defense in the criminal prosecution of extreme emotional disturbance; see, e.g., 163 Conn.App. 160 (a defense that was found to have been proven, id., 158-59).

Therefore, while the majority of evidence presented by the defendants establish the plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged identity theft at least as early as 2012, the plaintiff knew of the alleged identity theft no later than the middle of 2010, the time of the two homicides motivated, at least in part, by his knowledge of that identity theft.

Therefore while the plaintiff may have continued trying to seek some form of recourse long after his conviction, extending into the 2014 and perhaps even 2016 time frame, any cause of action that might have accrued had accrued no later than 2012, and probably no later than the homicides in 2010. The record reflects his complaints being made in 2012, so that even if it is the lack of response to his complaints that is the focus of his claims- rather than the actual acts constituting identity theft in 2006- more than four years elapsed between the conduct (lack of response to his claims) and the commencement of this proceeding. To the extent that there is no apparent authority for the proposition that a victim of identity theft has an enforceable right to insist...