Ortiz-Medina v. Bradley

DANIEL J. ORTIZ-MEDINA, Plaintiff v. E. BRADLEY, et al., Defendants

No. 1:19-cv-2133

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

January 22, 2020

(Judge Rambo)

MEMORANDUM

On December 17, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Daniel Ortiz-Medina ("Plaintiff"), who is currently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky ("FMC Lexington"), initiated the above-captioned action by filing a complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Defendants E. Bradley ("Bradley"), the Warden of USP Canaan, and FNU Bodge ("Bodge"), an S.I.S. Officer at USP Canaan. (Doc. No. 1.) He also filed a handwritten motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.) In an administrative Order dated December 17, 2019, the Court directed Plaintiff either to pay the requisite filing fee or submit a complete motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 5.) The Court received Plaintiff's completed motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on January 13, 2020. (Doc. No. 6.) Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"),¹ the Court will perform its mandatory screening of the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motions to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the complaint with leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at USP Canaan on December 10, 2018 and "immediately requested protection" because he feared for his life and safety as a "drop-out gang member." (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff was told to complete some paperwork detailing why he needed to be placed in protective custody, which he did. (Id.) Plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") pending an S.I.S. investigation. (Id.) He alleges that the investigation was started by S.I.S. Rosehance but was then passed to Defendant Bodge. (Id.)

When Plaintiff's cellmate in the SHU was released to general population, Plaintiff asked him to pass on a letter to members of the G-27 and Black Hand gangs, asking them if it was safe for Plaintiff to come out of protective custody. (Id.) Plaintiff asked this because, he alleges, Defendant Bodge told him that he "was going to rot in [the SHU] if [he] did not debrief." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff responded that hehad not been a gang member since 2001 and therefore had no information "about any gang." (Id.)

On March 21, 2019, Defendant Bodge brought Plaintiff a memorandum asking him to indicate whether or not he would debrief. (Id.) Plaintiff signed "where it stated that [he] wouldn't debrief." (Id.) Defendant Bodge then told Plaintiff that the G-27 and Black Hand members told her that Plaintiff "couldn't come out to the general population because [he] was no good [and] that they would have to kill [him]." (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Bodge "ignored their statements [and] continued focused and obsessed in making [him] debrief which never happened." (Id.) Plaintiff grieved the issue, and Defendant Bradley responded "that there was nothing he could be able to do because he had to go through whatever the S.I.S. investigation decided." (Id.)

Plaintiff remained in the SHU for seven (7) months until he was transferred to USP McCreary and then FMC Lexington. (Id. at 5-6.) He maintains that while in the SHU, he was not given his property, including his legal property. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff claims that his inability to access his legal property affected various motions that were pending in his criminal case in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico as well as a civil lawsuit that was dismissed without prejudice by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions also caused him emotional and mental distress inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340, and that they "left Plaintiff without communication with family members, friends, courts, lawyers, etc." (Id. at 6-7.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts that his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were violated. (Id. at 6.) As relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Screening and Dismissal of Prisoner Complaints

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal district courts must "review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If a complaint "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," the Court must dismiss the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). District courts have a similar screening obligation with respect to actions filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis and prisoners challenging prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) ("[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) ("The Court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a prisoner confinedin any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.").

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. See Mitchell v. Horn, 381 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). When deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No. 15-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) ("The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, "a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, thecomplaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the court accepts as true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the court must not accept legal conclusions as true, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

Based on this standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court must take when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). In addition, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district court must be mindful that a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standardsthan formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

B. Bivens Claims

A Bivens civil rights action asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is evaluated using the same standards applicable to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. See Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F. Supp. 1486, 1492 (M.D. Pa. 1992). To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of federal law. See Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1199 (M.D. Pa. 1992).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Complaint

1. Claims Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions caused him emotional and mental distress in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340, which criminalizes torture. Criminal statutes, however, "do not generally provide a private cause of action nor basis for civil liability." Wartluft v. Milton Hershey Sch. and Sch. Trust, 400 F. Supp. 3d 91, 109 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting Concert v. Luzerne Cty. Children & Youth Servs., No. 3:08-cv-1340, 2008 WL 4753709, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008)); see also Kervin v. City of New Orleans, No. 06-3231, 2006 WL 2849861, at *3 (concluding that § 2340 provides no private cause of action because § 2340(B) "explicitly providesthat nothing in the chapter 'shall . . . be construed...