Ortiz v. Ben Strong Trucking, Inc.

CARLA ORTIZ, Individually, and on behalf of her daughter J.L., a minor. v. BEN STRONG TRUCKING, INC.

Civil Action No. 18-3230

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

March 11, 2021

MEMORANDUM

This tort action arises out of a June 18, 2018 traffic accident on Interstate 95 in Harford County, Maryland, in which John Oliver Terry, Jr., the driver of a tractor trailer operated by defendant Ben Strong Trucking, crashed into the back of plaintiff Ortiz's car, resulting in physical injuries to Ortiz and permanently debilitating injuries to J.L, her minor daughter. There are four motions pending in this case. The first is the plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment against defendants Terry, Ben Strong Trucking, Inc. ("Ben Strong"), Cowan Systems, Inc. ("CSI"), Cowan Systems Transportation, LLC ("CST") and Cowan Systems, LLC ("Cowan Systems"). (ECF 58). The second is a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants CSI and CST. (ECF 79). In the third and fourth motions, defendants CSI, CST, and Cowan Systems ("the Cowan defendants") seek leave to file an amended answer to include cross-claims against co-defendants Ben Strong and Terry. (ECFs 53, 55). The motions have been fully briefed and no oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the following reasons, the court will deny both of the motions for summary judgment in their entirety and grant both of the motions for leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff filed this action on October 17, 2018. The complaint alleges negligence as to all named defendants, including Terry, Ben Strong, and the Cowan defendants, and negligent hiring as to all defendants other than Terry, on the theory that at the time of the accident, defendant Terry was an agent or employee of Ben Strong and a statutory employee of either Cowan Systems, CSI, or CST.¹ At the time of the accident, Terry was transporting a shipment requested by GAF Materials to be delivered to Southborough, Massachusetts. (ECF 1, Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17). The plaintiff alleges GAF Materials had a contract with CSI or another Cowan defendant to act as the motor carrier for the shipment, and that one or multiple of the Cowan defendants assigned Ben Strong to deliver the shipment. (Id. ¶¶ 45-50).

Following the plaintiff's complaint, Ben Strong's insurer, Amguard Insurance, filed a complaint of interpleader naming all parties to this action, in addition to several others, as defendants. (Civil Action No. CCB-18-3885, ECF 1). The court consolidated this case with the interpleader action in June 2020. (ECF 61). Also in June 2020, the Cowan defendants' motions for leave to file amended answers and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment were filed. Thereafter, CSI and CST moved for summary judgment. Discovery in this matter is ongoing. (See ECF 106, Scheduling Order).

I. Motions for Summary Judgment

a. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphases added). "A dispute is genuine if 'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). "A fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Accordingly, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted), and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citations omitted); see also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015). At the same time, the court must "prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)).

b. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

The plaintiff argues that because defendant Terry pled guilty to a charge of criminal negligence, his negligence is not in dispute and summary judgment should be granted against him and his employer, Ben Strong, and thus also against the Cowan defendants as their "statutory employers" or apparent principals. (ECF 58-3, Pl.'s Mot. at 9). The court will firstaddress the propriety of summary judgment as to Terry and Ben Strong's negligence and then turn to whether the Cowan defendants are liable for any negligent acts of Terry and Ben Strong as a matter of law.

i. Terry and Ben Strong's Negligence

The plaintiff seeks to establish Terry and Ben Strong's negligence solely on the evidence of Terry's guilty plea; she provides no other evidence to support her motion. Terry pled guilty in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Maryland to one count of criminally negligent manslaughter and one count of second-degree assault for his involvement in the June 18, 2018, accident. (ECF 58-9, Pl. Ex. 4, Terry Guilty Plea Tr. 15:23-16:4). Under Maryland law, a guilty plea in a criminal case "does not conclusively establish liability" in a subsequent civil case. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 403 (1975); see also Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 93-94 (2004). Terry's guilty plea may be admissible as evidence in this case, see Chartis Prop. Cas. Co. v. Huguely, 243 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626-27 (D. Md. 2017); Surran v. Kuntz, No. CV L-06-1380, 2008 WL 11363275, at *4 (D. Md. June 3, 2008), but Terry and Ben Strong must be "given an opportunity to explain [Terry's] plea[,]" Brohawn, 276 Md. at 404. Ben Strong and Terry argue Terry's plea was motivated by a desire to avoid the risk of even greater criminal liability. Terry was facing six criminal charges, and four of these, including some felony charges, were dropped when he pled guilty. See State v. Terry, Case No. C-12-CR-19-000015 (Harford Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jul. 8, 2019), http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch. The court views this explanation "in light of the record as a whole" to determine whether it is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Surran, 2008 WL 11363275, at *4.² In Surran, for example, adefendant's attempts in a civil case to claim he was innocent of his conviction for second-degree assault could not overcome the plaintiff's summary judgment motion where the record included undisputed evidence that established the elements of the plaintiff's claims, including physical evidence of her injuries and the defendant's own statements. Id. But the record as to negligence in this case consists solely of the transcript of Terry's guilty plea, in which he admits only that the State of Maryland had sufficient evidence to prove his guilt as to the charge of criminally negligent manslaughter.³ While his admission is probative evidence of his negligence in this case, he disputes its significance, and the plaintiff has not offered any other evidence regarding the accident that shows Terry's guilty plea is beyond such dispute. Based on the present record, the credibility of Ben Strong and Terry's explanation of the circumstances that led Terry to accept the State's plea offer must be evaluated by the trier of fact. Accordingly, the court will deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to Ben Strong and Terry's negligence.

ii. Liability of the Cowan Defendants for Negligent Acts of Terry and Ben Strong

The plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether the Cowan defendants are liable for any negligent acts committed by Terry or Ben Strong. The plaintiff asserts two theories to establish liability. First, the plaintiff argues that under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ("FMCSRs") and the Moving Ahead for Progress in the Twenty-First Century Act ("MAP-21 Act"), P.L. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (July 6, 2012), the Cowan defendants were statutory employers of Ben Strong and Terry with respect to the shipment involved in the accident, and, thus, they can be held liable for Ben Strong and Terry's negligent acts. Second, the plaintiff contends that even assuming no statutory employer-employee relationship exists, shehas established that Ben Strong and Terry were the apparent agents of the Cowan defendants with respect to the shipment.

1. Statutory Employer

The regulatory definition of an employee under the FMCSRs includes independent contractors hired by motor carriers to transport freight. See 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (defining "employee" as "an individual, other than an employer, who is employed by an employer and who in the course of his or her employment directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety," including "an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle"); Schramm v. Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548 (D. Md. 2004). The plaintiff's theory of liability thus rests on showing that the Cowan defendants were the "motor carrier" for the shipment at issue. The Cowan defendants argue that they acted not as a "motor carrier" but as a "broker" for the shipment, by arranging for Ben Strong to transport the shipment for its frequent client, GAF. The plaintiff presents two arguments why the Cowan defendants were a motor carrier and not a broker for the shipment.

First, the plaintiff points to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA") records showing that Cowan Systems, LLC is "not authorized" to act as a broker. (ECF 58-12, Pl. Ex.7, SAFER Company Snapshots, at 1). Cowan Systems is required to register and be...