Ortiz v. Kenneth F.

JOSUE ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH F. CASE, FRANK A. SEDITA, III, FRANK J. CLARK,and THE ERIE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Defendants.

1:16-CV-00322 EAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 18, 2019

DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Josue Ortiz ("Plaintiff") has sued defendants the Erie County District Attorney's Office (the "ECDAO"), Kenneth F. Case ("Case"), Frank A. Sedita, III ("Sedita"), and Frank J. Clark ("Clark") (collectively "Defendants")¹ for violations of his civil rights related to his arrest and conviction for the murders of Nelson and Miguel Camacho, and his subsequent exoneration. (Dkt. 1). The matter has been referred to Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott for hearing and disposition of all non-dispositive motions or applications, supervision of discovery, and to hear and report upon dispositive motions for consideration by the district judge. (Dkt. 48).

Currently pending before the Court is Judge Scott's Report and Recommendation dated May 18, 2018 (Dkt. 56) (the "R&R"), regarding Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery (Dkt. 42), Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 45), and Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend (Dkt. 51). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R&R's recommendation that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend be denied. In light of this disposition, Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is denied as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual background underlying the instant action and the pending motions is set forth in detail in the R&R, familiarity with which is assumed for purposes of this Decision and Order. The Court has summarized the relevant facts in its analysis as necessary.

The instant action was filed on April 25, 2016. (Dkt. 1). Defendants filed their answer to the complaint on August 15, 2016. (Dkt. 7). On September 29, 2016, Judge Scott entered a Scheduling/Case Management Order providing, in relevant part, that motions to amend the pleadings were due by no later than October 28, 2016. (Dkt. 11 (the "Scheduling Order")). On December 13, 2017, Judge Scott entered a First Amended Scheduling/Case Management Order (Dkt. 40 (the "Amended Scheduling Order")) extending many of the deadlines set forth in the Scheduling Order but not the deadline for motions to amend the pleadings.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel discovery (Dkt. 42) on February 9, 2018. Within that motion, Plaintiff sought a further extension of various deadlines, including thedeadline for amendment of pleadings. (Dkt. 42-1 at 4). On February 12, 2018, Judge Scott issued a Text Order holding the deadlines set forth in the Amended Scheduling Order in abeyance pending resolution of the motion to compel. (Dkt. 43). Defendants filed a response on February 28, 2018 (Dkt. 44), and Plaintiff filed a reply on March 7, 2018 (Dkt. 47).

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on March 6, 2018. (Dkt. 45). Plaintiff filed his response and cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint on April 12, 2018. (Dkt. 51). Defendants filed a combined reply in further support of their motion for summary judgment and response in opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend on April 25, 2018. (Dkt. 54). Plaintiff filed his reply on April 30, 2018. (Dkt. 55).

Judge Scott issued the R&R on May 18, 2018. (Dkt. 56). The R&R recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend be denied. (Id. at 23-36). In light of these recommendations, the R&R further recommends that Plaintiff's motion to compel be denied. (Id. at 38).

Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R on June 1, 2018. (Dkt. 57). Defendants filed their response on June 25, 2018 (Dkt. 59), and Plaintiff filed his reply on July 9, 2018 (Dkt. 60). On February 11, 2019, the presiding district judge recused himself. (Dkt. 65). The matter was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), where a party makes specific objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district judge must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). "The Court reviews unobjected-to findings for clear error." Am. Ins. Co. v. City of Jamestown, 914 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). After conducting its review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

In this case, Plaintiff has objected to all of Judge Scott's recommendations. (Dkt. 57).² Defendants have not filed any objections to the R&R. The Court has reviewed Judge Scott's recommendations de novo and, for the reasons set forth below, adopts Judge Scott's recommendations that Defendants' motions for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend be denied. In light of the Court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants and denial of Plaintiff's request to amend, Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is denied as moot.

II. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Although the R&R first addressed Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint, the Court finds it more efficient in deciding Plaintiff's objections to first consider whether Defendants have demonstrated that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the claims set forth in the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendants have satisfied their burden and that their motion for summary judgment should be granted.

A. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).

"The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. . . ." Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 486 (2d Cir. 2014). "Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden ofproof at trial." Johnson v. Xerox Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011)). Specifically, the non-moving party "must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Brown, 654 F.3d at 358. Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

B. Claims Against the ECDAO

As an initial matter, all parties agree that the ECDAO is not an appropriate defendant in this matter. (See Dkt. 51-8 at 3 ("Plaintiff acknowledges that the summary judgment motion should be granted to the extent of dismissing the DA's Office because it is not a legal entity that can be sued.")). Accordingly, all claims against the ECDAO must be dismissed.

C. Claims Against the Individual Defendants in their Individual Capacities

With respect to the Individual Defendants, the Court agrees with Judge Scott that Plaintiff's claims against them in their individual capacities are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. All of the individual defendants in this case were prosecutors at thetime of their alleged wrongdoing, and prosecutors are absolutely immune to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that arise from the performance of their role as advocates. See Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2009). "Prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 liability is broadly defined, covering 'virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate.'" Hill v. City of N.Y., 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995) (alteration in original and quoting Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994)).

Notwithstanding the broad reach of absolute prosecutorial immunity, it does not extend to "those acts a prosecutor performs in administration or investigation not undertaken in preparation for judicial proceedings." Id. (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, absolute prosecutorial immunity does extend to "certain administrative activities," such as training assistant district attorneys, because those "administrative obligations . . . are . . . unlike administrative duties concerning, for example, workplace hiring, payroll administration, the maintenance of physical facilities," inasmuch as they "necessarily require legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion[.]" Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009); see also Warney, 587 F.3d at 124 ("[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity even when doing an administrative act if the act is done in the performance of an...