Ortiz v. Torgenson

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DANIEL ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. SARAH TORGENSON, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:17-cv-328-TC

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division

April 30, 2024

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT]

Tena Campbell, United States District Court

In his amended complaint (ECF No. 105), Plaintiff Daniel Ortiz asserts violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court previously granted summary judgment to all defendants in this action (ECF No. 70), but that decision was vacated by the Tenth Circuit as it related to the retaliation claim against two defendants from the Utah Department of Corrections (UDOC): Sgt. Heather Anderson and Lt. Roger Peterson. (ECF No. 103.) On remand, the court appointed counsel for Mr. Ortiz (ECF No. 104) and the parties engaged in further discovery. This discovery included a variety of UDOC records, the deposition of Mr. Ortiz, and the depositions of the remaining defendants, Sgt. Anderson and Lt. Peterson. (See ECF Nos. 119, 139.)

Sgt Anderson and Lt. Peterson now move for summary judgment a second time, asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.^[1](ECF No. 120 at 30-33.^[2]) They contend they did not violate Mr. Ortiz's clearly established constitutional rights (id. at 30-57) “creat[ing] a presumption that [they] are immune from suit[.]” Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227 1235 (10th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Their argument shifts the burden to Mr. Ortiz to show otherwise. See Sawyers v Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2020).

Having thoroughly reviewed all the parties' arguments and evidence, the court concludes that the qualified immunity defense shields Sgt. Anderson and Lt. Peterson from further litigation in this matter.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On remand, the sole remaining issue in this matter is Mr. Ortiz's assertion that Sgt. Anderson and Lt. Peterson retaliated against him because he exercised his First Amendment right to free speech by filing grievances about his assault by other inmates on July 29, 2015. (ECF No. 105 at 2, 4, 6.)

Mr. Ortiz alleges that Sgt. Anderson retaliated against him by: 1) filing “a false disciplinary charge”; 2) telling him “that she did not want [him] in her housing unit”; 3) having him “moved to another unit [and] confiscating [his] property”; and 4) telling other inmates that he “was a ‘snitch' working for the guards.”^[3](Id. at 4, 8.) He alleges that Lt. Peterson retaliated against him by: 1) causing him a “loss of privileges and a move/transfer to another more restrictive housing”; and 2) “spread[ing] the rumor to inmates that [he] was a ‘snitch' for the guards, deliberately placing [him] in danger.” (Id. at 2.)

The Tenth Circuit framed the remaining issue as follows:

Ortiz says he received unusually harsh discipline [i.e., temporary-restriction-order (T.R.O.) lockdown and then transfer to special management unit (SMU)] for an out-of-bounds charge arising on October 10, 2015. Ortiz believes Anderson and Peterson imposed more severe discipline than they normally would have because they wanted to punish him for his grievances, and particularly for complaining about the July 29 incident.

Ortiz v. Torgenson, 857 Fed.Appx. 419, 428 (10th Cir. 2021).^[4] The Tenth Circuit then cautioned: “This assumes, of course, that Peterson or Anderson (or both) caused Ortiz to be placed in T.R.O. lockdown or sent to the SMU (or both).” Id. at 431 (citing Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding § 1983 plaintiff must show each defendant's liability for constitutional deprivation-i.e., show affirmative links between each defendant's actions and a constitutional violation)).

Arguing that further discovery has shown they were not responsible for any allegedly retaliatory charges, decisions, or injuries, Sgt. Anderson and Lt. Peterson seize upon the Tenth Circuit's statement and urge the court to conclude they are immune from further litigation regarding the retaliation claim. (ECF No. 120 at 9.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006).

“Once the moving party has identified a lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has the burden to cite to specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Those specific facts must be supported by particular parts of materials in the record; relying on mere pleadings is insufficient.” Id. (cleaned up). “Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings.” Self, 439 F.3d at 1230 (cleaned up). “When some contradictory evidence exists, the basic summary judgment question is whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant on the disputed issue.” Ortiz, 857 Fed.Appx. at 421; see Helvie v. Jenkins, 66 F.4th 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2023) (“In the ordinary case .. a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by establishing genuine issues of material fact that a jury must decide.”).

II. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). It means to shelter “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[,]” id. (cleaned up), giving “government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Two important interests are balanced by the doctrine of qualified immunity: “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. Questions of qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest feasible stage of litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).

When the qualified immunity defense is raised, a “plaintiff carries a two-part burden to show: (1) that the defendant's actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's unlawful conduct.” T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong.” Valdez v. Macdonald, 66 F.4th 796, 831 (10th Cir. 2023). And courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case[.]” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Where a defendant government official invokes a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, “[the Tenth Circuit] accepts as true the facts that the plaintiff can support with evidence and then asks whether the plaintiff has shown 1) that the defendant violated the plaintiff's federal rights, and 2) that the violation was clearly established at the time the incident at issue occurred.” Helvie, 66 F.4th at 1232; see Est. of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744, 756 (10th Cir. 2021) (stating that a plaintiff can overcome a defendant's assertion of qualified immunity only by showing “the defendant violated [the plaintiff's federal] .. rights, and .. that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity”).

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS FOR THIS ORDER ONLY

1. From June 2, 2015, to July 29, 2015, and from August 3, 2015, to October 15, 2015, Mr. Ortiz was housed in “Birch,” a general population unit at Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF). (UDOC Location History List Report, ECF No. 119-5 at 1; see Dep. Heather Anderson, ECF No. 119-21 at 10-11 (describing Birch unit).) From October 15, 2015, to October 30, 2015, Mr. Ortiz was housed in CUCF's Dogwood unit. (ECF No. 119-5 at 1.)

2. In 2015, Lt. Peterson was a CUCF lieutenant in Birch, who supervised sergeants and was supervised by a captain. (Dep. Roger Peterson, ECF No. 119-22 at 4, 8, 10; ECF No. 139 at 6.) Lt. Peterson felt frustrated when inmates filed grievances rather than coming to talk to him more informally about an issue. (ECF No. 119-22 at 20-21.) Lt. Peterson understood retaliation to mean: “To deny an inmate something that he's earned or he has a right to.” (Id. at 23.)

3. Sgt. Anderson was a housing sergeant, supervising officers in prisoner housing units. (ECF No. 119-21 at 12-13.) In August or September of 2015, she was transferred to Birch. (Id. at 36-37.) During the relevant time, Lt. Peterson was Sgt. Anderson's supervisor at Birch. (Id. at 25.) Anderson has “experienced frustration towards an inmate.” (Id. at 24.)

4. At the relevant time, “to keep members of different gangs separate,” CUCF used “an A/B .. system.” (ECF No. 119-22 at 28.) The two gangs involved were Nortenos and Surenos, the latter of which included Mr. Ortiz and his cellmate, Robert Cruz. (Decl. Robert Cruz, ECF No. 65-4 at ¶ 1.) One gang would be assigned A days and the other B days on which to leave their cells for programming and other reasons. (See id.; see also ECF No. 119-22 at 2830.)

5. July 29, 2015 assault. On July 29, 2015, Mr Ortiz was called to an offender management review (OMR) hearing attended by Lt. Peterson, even though it was Mr. Ortiz's off day-in other words, “a day that [Mr. Ortiz] would normally be in his...