Ostapowicz v. Wisniewski

307 A.3d 276

222 Conn.App. 847

Halina OSTAPOWICZ

v.Jerzy WISNIEWSKI

(AC 45889)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 19, 2023

Officially Released December 19, 2023

Keith Yagaloff, South Windsor, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kevin B. F. Emerson; Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

Prescott, Cradle and Suarez, Js.^*

PRESCOTT, J.

₈₄₈This marital dissolution matter returns to us following our decision in Ostapowicz v. Wisniewski, 210 Conn. App. 401, 270 A.3d 145 (2022). In the prior appeal, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court only as to an order that the plaintiff, Halina ₈₄₉Ostapowicz, was solely responsible for the debt on the parties’ home equity line of credit and remanded the case to the trial court to resolve a purported inconsistency between that order and an order regarding attorney’s fees. Id., at 420, 270 A.3d 145. The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered on remand, claiming that the court exceeded the scope of this court’s, remand order in Ostapowicz. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history, as set forth in Ostapowicz, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant, Jerzy Wisniewski, were married on August 21, 2006. Id., at 402, 270 A.3d 145. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant on October 20, 2017, seeking a dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Id. On December 30, 2019, following trial, the court issued a memorandum of decision dissolving the marriage on the grounds of an irretrievable breakdown and entering certain financial orders. Id., at 403, 409, 270 A.3d 145. In its decision, "the court ordered, among other things, that the parties are responsible for their respective health insurance and unreimbursed medical expenses; neither party shall receive alimony; the defendant shall quitclaim the marital home to the plaintiff, who ‘shall be solely responsible for payment of the [home equity line of credit],’ taxes, insurance and maintenance; the plaintiff has no interest in the defendant’s family business; the parties shall retain their respective bank and retirement accounts and pay their respective debts; the defendant shall retain his rights in the family business; the parties shall retain their respective automobiles; and '[e]ach party shall be solely responsible for payment of their respective attorney’s fees incurred during the course of this case.’ ", (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 409, 270 A.3d 145.

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court, arguing, in part, that the trial court had abused its discretion in assigning to her the entire ₈₅₀outstanding debt on the parties’ home equity line of credit.¹ Id., at 418, 270 A.3d 145. Specifically, she argued that "the court’s order regarding the home equity line of, credit conflict[ed] with its order that the parties [were] responsible for the payment of their respective attorney’s fees." Id., at 419–20, 270 A.3d 145, In addressing this claim, this court set forth the following additional relevant facts. "In December, 2015, the parties obtained a home equity line of credit and used some of the funds, to pay off the plaintiff’s personal line of credit, totaling $24,271. The parties also drew on the line of credit for their respective attorney’s fees in this dissolution matter. The court specifically found that the defendant borrowed $10,000 under this line of credit to pay his own attorney’s fees in this matter but also ordered, among other things, that the 'plaintiff shall be solely responsible for payment of the [home equity line of credit],’ and that ‘[e]ach party shall be solely responsible for payment of their respective attorney’s fees incurred during the course of this case.' " (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 419, 270 A.3d 145.

This court agreed with the plaintiff that the court’s order regarding the home equity line of credit appeared to conflict with the court’s order that the parties be responsible for the payment of their respective attorney’s fees. Id., at 419–20, 270 A.3d 145. This court, therefore, "reverse[d] the judgment only with regard to the order that the plaintiff is solely responsible for the debt on the home equity line of credit and remand[ed] the case with direction to resolve the inconsistency." Id., at 420, 270 A.3d 145. This court’s rescript in Ostapowicz provided: "The judgment is reversed only as to the order regarding the home equity ₈₅₁line of credit and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects." Id.

On March 7, 2022, in response to the remand order, the trial court sent a proposed order to the parties clarifying that its intent when issuing the original order was that the parties would pay their respective attorney’s fees in excess of what had already been paid to their attorneys via the home equity line of credit and that it had not intended to require the defendant to pay that portion of the home equity line of credit attributed to the $10,000 already paid to his attorney. The plaintiff filed an objection to the court’s proposed order, in which she requested, inter alia, that the court order the defendant to be responsible for the $10,000 of attorney’s fees that he borrowed under the home equity line of credit. Thereafter, the matter was scheduled for a hearing, which took place on September 26, 2022.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order in which it stated that, when it "ordered the plaintiff to be solely responsible for the payment of the home equity line of credit … [it] was aware of and had taken into account the fact that the defendant had borrowed $10,000 under the [home equity line of credit] to pay his attorney's fees (and that the plaintiff had borrowed $19,289.50 under the [home equity line of credit] to pay her attorney's fees). These payments to the attorneys were made in advance of trial preparations and trial." The court further stated that, when it "ordered that each party would be solely responsible for the payment of their respective attorney's fees incurred during the course of the case, the intention was that the parties would pay their own attorney's fees above what had already been paid to their attorneys via the [home equity line of credit]. The intention was not to require the defendant to be responsible to pay that portion of the [home equity, line of credit] attributed to ₈₅₂the $10,000 already paid to his attorney. The intention was for the plaintiff to be solely responsible for the [home equity line of credit] payments." Accordingly, the court amended the attorney's fees provision of its memorandum of decision, ordering that " ‘[e]ach party shall be solely responsible for payment of their respective attorney's fees above those fees that were paid to their attorneys via the [home equity line of credit].’ " This appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court failed to comply with this court's remand order in Ostapowicz. According to the plaintiff, the remand order in Ostapowicz reversed solely the trial court's order as to the home equity line of credit and otherwise affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Instead of adjusting the order regarding the home equity line of credit as directed on remand, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly modified the order that the parties were responsible for their own attorney's fees by creating an exception for the defendant's attorney's fees paid through the home equity line of credit; in so doing, the plaintiff contends that the trial court shifted responsibility for $10,000 of the defendant's attorney's fees to the plaintiff. In response, the defendant contends that the trial court properly followed this court's remand order and resolved the purported inconsistency...