Ottley-Cousin v. MMC Holdings, Inc.

CARLA OTTLEY-COUSIN, Plaintiff, v. MMC HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant.

16-CV-00577 (MKB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 6, 2019

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Carla Ottley-Cousin commenced the above-captioned action on February 3, 2016 against her former employer, Defendant MMC Holdings, Inc. ("MMC"), alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1981, retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"), and race discrimination, retaliation, and disability discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 et seq. ("NYCHRL"). (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant demoted her and then ultimately terminated her because of her race, disability, use of FMLA leave, and complaints of discrimination. (Id. ¶ 1.)

Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Def. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def. Mot."), Docket Entry No. 47; Mem. in Supp. of Def. Mot. ("Def. Mem."), Docket Entry No. 51.) By Order dated March 31, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment (the "March 2019 Decision"). (Mar. 2019 Decision, Docket Entry No. 61.) The Court granted Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's race discrimination and retaliation claims under section 1981, denied Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim, and reserved decision on Plaintiff's NYCHRL claims. (Id. at 2.) By this Memorandum and Order, the Court grants Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's NYCHRL claims and explains the reasons for the March 2019 Decision.

I. Background

a. Plaintiff's employment

Plaintiff, who identifies as African-American and Hispanic, was hired by Defendant in May of 2000. (Def. L. R. 56.1 Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def. 56.1") ¶¶ 1, 23, Docket Entry No. 48; Pl. Resp. to Def. 56.1 ("Pl. Resp. 56.1") ¶¶ 1, 23, Docket Entry No. 52.) Plaintiff was hired as a Customer Service Representative to work for Executive Physician Systems, Inc., a physician billing company and a subsidiary of Defendant. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 4-5, 23; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 4-5, 23.) In that role, Plaintiff "would answer the [tele]phone and speak with insurance companies, patients, and doctors' offices regarding the payment of medical bills." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 25; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 25.)

Beginning in approximately 2001, Plaintiff reported to an individual named Phyllis Matera. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 9.) As Plaintiff's supervisor, Matera evaluated Plaintiff's performance and "always" gave her good performance reviews. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33.) In 2003, at Matera's suggestion, Plaintiff was promoted to supervisor of the Customer Service Department. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 28, 45; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 28, 45.) In 2010, Matera herself was promoted, and Cindy Albertson replaced Matera as Plaintiff's supervisor. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 58-59; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 58-59.)

In January of 2014, Plaintiff met with Maryann Ferrari, the Executive Director of MMC. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 62; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 62.) During this meeting, Plaintiff told Ferrari thatMatera was "difficult to work with," but that Plaintiff was "able to get along with [her]," and complained that her new supervisor, Albertson, "speaks differently" to Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 63, 64; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 63, 64.) At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she told Ferrari that Albertson was "constantly belittling [Plaintiff] and speaking down to [her] in front of staff [and] in [Albertson's] office." (Dep. of Carla Ottley-Cousin ("Pl. Dep.") 380:22-25, annexed to Decl. of Walker G. Harman, Jr. ("Harman Decl.") as Ex. 3.2, Docket Entry No. 55-4.) Ferrari responded that Albertson is "a little bit harsh with people" and gave Plaintiff "pointers" on "how to deal with [Albertson]." (Id. at 381:15-382:22.) Plaintiff told Ferrari that Albertson was "much harsher with [Plaintiff]." (Id. at 382:24-25.)

After implementing some of Ferrari's "pointers," Plaintiff called Ferrari and "told her that things hadn't changed." (Id. at 385:19-22.) In response, Ferrari "said that she wanted to speak with David Vandergast," the Director of MMC, "so that they both could sit with [Plaintiff] and talk with [her]." (Id. at 385:22-386:4.) Plaintiff subsequently met with Ferrari and Vandergast and complained that Albertson "picked on" Plaintiff and "spoke[] to [her] differently" and that Matera "constantly [had] something to say to [Plaintiff]," even though she was no longer Plaintiff's supervisor. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 71; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 71.) For example, Plaintiff reported to Ferrari and Vandergast that "in the wintertime, [employees would] come in with winter boots . . . [and then change into business shoes]," and that Matera would reprimand Plaintiff for her improper footwear before she had a chance to change into business shoes. (Pl. Dep. 407:5-408:6.)

Plaintiff did not indicate at either meeting that she believed she was being picked on because of her race.

b. Plaintiff's first FMLA leave

On September 22, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a request for FMLA leave to care for her son, and was granted leave from October 3, 2014 to October 17, 2014. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 73-75; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 73-75.) On or about October 17, 2014, Plaintiff contacted Defendant's Human Resources Department and requested additional time off. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 77; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 77.) Defendant subsequently extended Plaintiff's FMLA leave until December 17, 2014. (Decl. of Carla Ottley-Cousin ("Pl. Decl.") ¶ 49, Docket Entry No. 54; Def. 56.1 ¶ 78; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 78.) However, Plaintiff did not return to work on December 17, 2014. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 79; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 79.)

Plaintiff testified that at some point during her leave, she spoke with Susan Zhou, who worked in Defendant's Human Resources Department. (Pl. Dep. 563:10-13.) Zhou told Plaintiff that she could not return to work unless she was "cleared" by a doctor and that Zhou "needed a note from [a] doctor." (Id. at 563:10-13.) In January of 2015, Zhou called Plaintiff and "told [her] that the three-month period would be up [soon]," and that Zhou "needed the release letter from the doctor or [Plaintiff] wouldn't be able to come back." (Id. at 566:9-13.) Zhou also instructed Plaintiff to "let [Albertson] know that [Plaintiff would] be coming back to work." (Id. at 566:15-21.) When Plaintiff called Albertson as instructed, Albertson said, "[f]rom what I understand, you no longer work for this company." (Id. at 567:15-20.) Plaintiff then spoke with Ferrari and told her that Albertson "told [Plaintiff] that she was terminated." (Id. at 571:23-572:8.) Ferrari responded that "no one had told her anything about that," and that Albertson "did not want [Plaintiff] back because [she] did not reach out to [Albertson] and tell her that [she] was sick." (Id. at 572:9-13, 573:7-11.)

c. Elimination of Plaintiff's position and Plaintiff's reassignment

On October 28, 2014, Ferrari emailed Albertson and Vandergast informing them that Plaintiff had "submitted paperwork for disability for a month period." (Oct. 2014 Email, annexed to Harman Decl. as Ex. 14, Docket Entry No. 55-16.) Ferrari told them to seek a temporary employee to replace Plaintiff. (Id.) Ferrari then wrote to Albertson, "[y]ou do have a temp[orary] [employee] in place for this, correct? If not, get one." (Id.) Albertson responded, "[n]ow it is a disability? For one month . . . what happened to the two then three months . . . unreal." (Id.)

On January 21, 2015, Albertson wrote an email to another employee stating that Plaintiff "should have been back on January 3," 2015, and that the Customer Service Department "ha[d] been running like clock-work and . . . [Albertson] really [did not] want [Plaintiff] back." (Jan. 2015 Email, annexed to Harman Decl. as Ex. 15, Docket Entry No. 55-17.) In addition, Albertson wrote, "I don't know what can be done, but my recommendation is that [Plaintiff] is let go for abandonment of her position." (Id.)

In a sworn declaration, Ferrari states that during Plaintiff's leave, the Customer Service Department "was functioning without a supervisor," and Albertson and Vandergast told Ferrari that "the [s]upervisor position was no longer needed." (Decl. of Maryann Ferrari ("Ferrari Decl.") ¶¶ 10-11, Docket Entry No. 50.) Vandergast conferred with Ferrari, "and they decided that the [s]upervisor position was unnecessary and could be eliminated due to budgetary reasons." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 84; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 84.) The parties do not state when Defendant decided to eliminate Plaintiff's former position.

Ferrari "did not want [Plaintiff] to be terminated," so she reassigned Plaintiff to the Accounts Receivable Department as an analyst. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 85-86; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 85-86.)Plaintiff's salary and hours remained the same, even though Plaintiff's salary was higher than that ordinarily paid to analysts. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 87-88, 96-97; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 87-88, 96-97.) Plaintiff's direct supervisor in her new department was Gail Cortez, who in turn reported to Matera. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 94-95; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 94-95.)

d. Plaintiff's return to work after FMLA leave

On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff returned to work in her new role as an analyst. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 91; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 91.) As an analyst, "Plaintiff's new duties were, among other things, to be responsible for collecting balances on accounts from third party carriers, including insurance carriers." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 93; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 93.) Plaintiff underwent training in her new department. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 99; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 99.) In Plaintiff's former position, she had supervisory authority over a staff of approximately three people, but in her new position as an analyst, Plaintiff had no supervisory authority. (Pl. L. R. 56.1 Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pl. 56.1") ¶¶ 1-2, Docket Entry ...