Owen v. Rutherford Supply Corp.

MARTHA OWEN, Plaintiff, v. RUTHERFORD SUPPLY CORP., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:19cv225-HEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

July 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Disposition of Post-Trial Motions and Related Matters)

The Plaintiff in this case, Martha Owen, was a long-term employee of Rutherford Supply Corporation ("Defendant"). She alleges in her Complaint that she was discharged from her employment after voicing concern about sexual harassment and hostility in the workplace, culminating in the immediate lawsuit.

Following a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff Martha Owen on three of four counts in her Complaint, awarding her damages of $350,000.00.¹ Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), compensatory and punitive damages awarded in actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (as amended) ("Title VII") are limited.

Because there are statutory limitations on damages in Title VII cases, following the trial in February 2020, this Court directed both sides in this dispute to file post-trial memoranda detailing their respective positions on the applicability of the damages cap in Title VII actions, as well as Plaintiff's eligibility for back pay and front pay.² Both parties have responded thereto (ECF Nos. 74, 78), and the Court heard oral argument on July 7, 2020. For the reasons detailed herein, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion for Application of the Statutory Damages Cap (ECF No. 73), and will grant Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees in part (ECF No. 77).

The evidence revealed that Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 2006, serving as a sales representative. (Trial Tr. 5:4-5; 6:8-9.) Plaintiff testified that, beginning on an unascertained date during Plaintiff's employment, Terry Woolridge ("Woolridge"), Defendant's Warehouse Manager, made routine and repeated unwanted sexual advances toward Plaintiff and other female employees. (Trial Tr. 22:2-23:14; 31:14 - 32:17; 32:21-23; 107:9-108:10; 109:6-110:17; 221:2-22; 246:11-22; 247:7-252:8.) Plaintiff further testified that she reported these incidents to her supervisors on three occasions. (Trial Tr. 12:4-7; 23:9-14; 55:9-14; 62:20-63:4.) Following these reports, Woolridge began ignoring Plaintiff—refusing to work with her or acknowledge her. (Trial Tr. 36:20-37:8; 253:17-25.)

During this period, Plaintiff's performance at work declined, in part because of Woolridge's refusal to timely process her deliveries to her clients. (Trial Tr. 272:18-273:18; 284:16-286:12.) Plaintiff's sales results suffered as she became "disengaged." (Trial Tr. 189:14-190:6; 354:2-23; 355:23-356:22; 363:24-364:15; 399:19-400:9; 417:15-418:5.) Despite this, Plaintiff remained in the top half of Defendant's sales in the Richmond area. (Trial Tr. 24:22-26:9.) On December 11, 2018, Plaintiff was terminated, and this suit followed. (Trial Tr. 80:6-7.) Of Plaintiff's four claims, the jury returned a verdict in her favor on three of them—her claims for sexually hostile work environment, retaliation, and assault and battery.

I. The statutory damages cap applies to Plaintiff's Title VII action.

Defendant contends that, as a result of the statutory damages cap, the maximum amount that Plaintiff may be awarded on her sexually hostile work environment and retaliation claims is $50,000, and that the jury award must be reduced accordingly. (Def.'s Post-Trial Mem. at 2, ECF No. 74.) As Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that the statutory damages cap applies to her action—not to each of her claims under Title VII individually—this Court will apply the statutory damages cap accordingly.³ Under§ 1981a(b)(3)(A), the sum of a plaintiff's compensatory and punitive damages must be capped at $50,000 where the defendant had more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Because there appears to be no dispute that this is the correct classification of Defendant's number of employees, this rule must be applied to Plaintiff's jury award on her claims under Title VII. Therefore, her award on these claims—an amount of $325,000 in the aggregate—must be reduced to $50,000.⁴ Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is granted.

II. Plaintiff is entitled to back pay in the amount of $133,017.28, which is not subject to the statutory damages cap.

Back pay is explicitly excluded from compensatory damages under § 1981a; thus, if Plaintiff is entitled to back pay, any amount she is awarded will not be subject to the statutory cap. § 1981a(b)(2). To establish that she is entitled back pay, a plaintiff-employee must introduce evidence in support of her claim that she was unable to find comparable work. Edwards v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norton, 658 F.2d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1981) ("An improperly dismissed employee may not remain idle and recover lost wages from the date of discharge."). Once she has done so, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to demonstrate that she did not exert reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. Id. at 956. The duty to mitigate is not without limits, however. Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 838 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[A] plaintiff need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position." (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (internal quotations omitted))).⁵

Back pay is generally to be awarded to successful Title VII plaintiffs, see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 651 (4th Cir. 2002), and a finding of discriminatory discharge is presumptive proof that back pay is owed. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420 n.12 (1975). "[G]iven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421. Where a court declines to award back pay, it must articulateits reasons for doing so. Id. at 421 n.14; id. at 422 ("[T]he mere absence of bad faith" is "not a sufficient reason for denying back pay.").

Plaintiff seeks close to $100,000 in back pay.⁶ (Pl.'s Post-Trial Mem. at 10 ("[T]he back pay Ms. Owen should receive in this matter is $94,945.27."), ECF No. 78.) Defendant contends, however, that Plaintiff's failure to accept jobs for which she was given offers precludes an award for back pay. (Def.'s Resp. Opp. at 10, ECF No. 84.) It appears to this Court that the offers to which Defendant refers involved working on a farm in Amelia County and taking care of a friend's mom. (Trial Tr. 82:18-83:2.) Plaintiff not only testified that these positions were part-time, but she also gave this testimony in response to defense counsel's inquiry about whether she had sought positions other than sales. (Id.) Because Plaintiff is not required to accept a demotion or look beyond her field in order to sufficiently mitigate her damages, the Court believes this testimony is not dispositive.

The remaining evidence at trial, as well as that adduced at the post-trial evidentiary hearing, supports a finding that Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. She testified at trial, and at the evidentiary hearing, that she sought and had difficulty obtaining comparable employment—explaining that she applied to "about 20 or21" positions without success.⁷ (Trial Tr. 43:12-21; Hearing Tr. 37:6-10; Hearing Tr. 39:15-18; Hearing Tr. 40:16-18.) These jobs spanned the sales industry, from jobs in food services and wine sales to jobs in pharmaceutical sales and solar film sales. (Hearing Tr. 37:11-15.) Plaintiff explained that she searched online for open positions and also spoke with friends in the industry, seeking assistance with her job search. (Hearing Tr. 39:5-8; 41:3-5.) Although she did not use an employment agency to further her search—nor did she contact any of Defendant's competitors, see Hearing Tr. 39:1-4—Plaintiff was not required to make a herculean effort to mitigate her damages. See Miller, 250 F.3d at 838. Rather, Plaintiff had only to use reasonable diligence. See Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231. Accordingly, based upon the evidence, the Court finds Plaintiff utilized reasonable diligence in mitigating her damages. The Court further finds that an award of back pay is appropriate in this case as back pay is generally awarded to successful Title VII plaintiffs, see Dennis, 290 F.3d at 651, and the jury's finding on Plaintiff's retaliation claim counsels in favor of such an award, see Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 420 n.12.

The period by which back pay is calculated begins on the date the unlawful employment action occurred and ends on the date judgment is entered. Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), anaward of back pay should be made in an amount equal to the sum of wages and benefits that a plaintiff would have earned absent the discriminatory conduct, less any money that the plaintiff did earn during that time period. In finalizing the award, a court should apply pre-judgment interest pursuant to Virginia law. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1031 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

Applying the above formula, Plaintiff is entitled to $133,017.28 in back pay, plus pre-judgment interest. Although Plaintiff's pay was earned solely through commissions, the total amount of wages Plaintiff likely would have earned had she continued to work—based upon her gross pay as reflected in 2018 W-2—would have amounted to $133,017.28.⁸ See Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 449 (4th Cir. 1981) (awarding a saleswoman plaintiff reasonable compensations for sales commissions as a component of a back pay award); see also, e.g., White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1090 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating...