Owens v. Connections Cmty. Support Programs, Inc.

840 F.Supp.2d 791

Brenda J. OWENS, Plaintiff,

v.CONNECTIONS COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAMS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 11–123–SLR.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

Jan. 6, 2012.

Brenda J. Owens, Wilmington, DE, pro se.

James H. McMackin, III, Esquire, Morris James LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brenda J. Owens (“plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit alleging wrongful termination in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 through § 2654. She also raises supplemental state claims. (D.I. 2, 22) Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has paid the filing fee. Presently before the court are defendants' motions to dismiss as well as numerous discovery motions filed by plaintiff. (D.I. 13, 27, 38, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59) For the reasons discussed, the court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss in part the amended complaint, will deny as moot the motion to dismiss the original complaint, will deny the motions to compel, and will deny the motions for sanctions.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her original complaint February 9, 2011. (D.I. 2) On May 11, 2011, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in part. (D.I. 13) Thereafter, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for leave to amend, the motion was granted, and an amended complaint was filed on June 22, 2011.¹ (D.I. 19, 22) Defendants' motion to dismiss became moot upon the filing of the amended complaint. However, on July 8, 2011 defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint in part. (D.I. 27) Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Plaintiff began her employment with defendant Connections Community Support Programs, Inc. (“Connections”) as an employment specialist on June 12, 2007. She was assigned to the main office in Wilmington, Delaware. On January 12, 2009, she took leave pursuant to the FMLA and returned to work on March 3, 2009. The next day, plaintiff was advised that she was reassigned to the Cornerstone Alcohol and Drug Residential Program (“Cornerstone Program”) in Delaware City, Delaware and that her caseload would be different from the one she had prior to her leave. Plaintiff had difficulties meeting her performance quotas in the Cornerstone Program due to different clientele, expressed her concerns, and was told not to worry. (D.I. 22, ¶ 28)

In August 2009, plaintiff applied for a position with the Ministry of Caring, advised defendants of her interest in the position, received a letter of reference, but later advised defendants that she desired to continue her employment with Connections. Defendants advised plaintiff of an upcoming project that would interest her whereupon plaintiff called the Ministry of Caring and declined the position.

On September 17, 2009, defendants announced that employment specialists who did not meet their quotas would first receive a verbal warning, followed by a writtenwarning, and then terminated. A week later the focus turned to training programs, Plaintiff voiced concerns regarding her quotas, but was again advised not to worry because training was a priority. (D.I. 22, ¶ 38) On October 2, 2009, plaintiff presented the office training program in a closed meeting. On October 22, 2010, defendants requested that plaintiff attend “an impromptu meeting” and advised her that she was terminated for not meeting monthly quotas. (D.I. 22)

The amended complaint contains nine counts: ² (1) count 1 alleges a violation of the FMLA for failure to restore plaintiff to the position she held prior to leave; (2) count 2 alleges a violation of the FMLA for interference of plaintiffs rights to be restored to her previous, or an equivalent, position upon return from leave; (3) count 4 alleges breach of implied contract; (4) count 5 alleges breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) count 6 alleges retaliation; (6) count 7 alleges intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) count 8 seeks punitive damages; (8) and count 9 alleges wrongful discharge.

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the following grounds; (1) there can be no action against employees of a non-public entity in their “official capacity”; (2) count 4 fails as a matter of law for failure to plead the elements of the implied contract claim; (3) count 5 fails to plead the elements of the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) count 7 alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the workers' compensation statute; (5) count 9 is duplicative of other claims; and (6) the damages sought are not available as a matter of law.

III. MOTION TO DISMISSA. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir.2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (citations omitted).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id. The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210–11. Second, the court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 211;see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949;Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must “show” such an entitlement with its facts. A claim is faciallyplausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

B. Discussion

1. Official capacity claims

The amended complaint raises claims against defendants Cathy McKay (“McKay”), Chris Devaney (“Devaney”), Chennita Crawford (“Crawford”), and Kenny Watson (“Watson”) in their individual and official capacities. Defendants argue that there is no authority for filing an “official capacity suit” against employees of a private employer such as Connections. Therefore, they move to dismiss the official capacity claims.

The FMLA defines an “employer” as “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). The language indicates an intent to provide for individual liability. Spagnoli v. Brown & Brown Metro, Inc., 2007 WL 2362602, at *16 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2007); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.Supp.2d 403, 412 (M.D.Pa.1999). This court has held that liability attaches under the FMLA when an employee has “exercised control” over a plaintiffs FMLA leave or otherwise acts on behalf of the employer. See Gude v. Rockford Ctr. Inc., 699 F.Supp.2d 671, 684 n. 25 (D.Del.2010) (citing Spagnoli, 2007 WL 2362602);Hewett v. Willingboro Bd. of Educ., 421 F.Supp.2d 814, 817–18 n. 4 (D.N.J.2006).

Here, plaintiff names McKay, Devaney, Watson, and Crawford as defendants in their individual and official capacities. Generally, a suit against an public officer in his or her official capacity is used to compel that officer to take some official action. See Beck v. FedEx Ground, 2007 WL 2028581, at *2 (E.D.Cal.2007). The concept, however, is inapplicable to suits against private parties where the entity is also susceptible to suit. Id. Indeed, a suit naming an individual in his official capacity is considered a suit against the employer. See Sampson v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 2009 WL 1675083, at *5 n. 5 (E.D.Pa. June 12, 2009); Manns v. The Leather Shop Inc., 960 F.Supp. 925, 928 (D.Vi.1997) (“finding an individual employee of a private corporation liable in his official capacity is tantamount to finding a corporation liable.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Thus, if the employer is named as a defendant, the same discrimination claim against an employee in his official capacity is redundant. Sampson, 2009 WL 1675083, at *5, n. 5;Foxworth v. Pennsylvania State Police, 2005 WL 840374, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 11, 2005); Wheeles v. Nelson's Elec. Motor Services, 559 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1267 (M.D.Ala.2008) (claims against supervisor in his official capacity “redundant” of claims against employer). See also DeRay v. Larson, 283 F.Supp.2d 706, 709–710 (D.Conn.2003) (...