Owens v. Fitzgerald

1

MARVIN E. OWENS, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN FITZGERALD, Defendant.

No. 3:17cv657(MPS)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

August 29, 2023

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.

The Plaintiff, Marvin Owens, proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various Bridgeport police officers. On May 30, 2023, the case was transferred to me. ECF No. 157. The sole remaining claim is Plaintiff's claim that Captain Brian Fitzgerald unlawfully seized the Plaintiff's motorcycle after he was arrested.^[1] Pending before the Court is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.^[2] ECF No. 152. The Plaintiff has filed an opposition. ECF No. 154. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's motion is granted.

I. FACTS

The following facts are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56(a) Statements and exhibits.^[3] The facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

Prior to his arrest on August 10, 2016, the police received information that the Plaintiff was at his brother's house on 1042 Iranistan Avenue in Bridgeport. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 5; ECF No. 154 at 3 ¶ 5.^[4] The police also had information that he would be operating a black Suzuki motorcycle. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 154 at 3 ¶ 6.^[5] On August 10, 2016, the defendant, who was the Commander of the Bridgeport Police Department Detective Bureau, and other police officers arrested the Plaintiff at his brother's residence on Iranistan Avenue. ECF No 152-2 at ¶¶ 2, 3; ECF No. 154 at 1-2 ¶¶ 2, 3.

At the time of the Plaintiff's arrest, his motorcycle, which was in "clean, mint condition," was parked on the street a block away. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 7; ECF No. 154 at 4 ¶ 7; ECF No. 1541, Owens Aff. ¶ 19. See also ECF No 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 19 (Plaintiff avers that motorcycle was left parked on the street at a different location from where he was taken into custody); ECF No. 152-3, Fitzgerald Aff. ¶ 7 ("At the time of [Plaintiff's] arrest, officers located the black Suzuki motorcycle which Mr. Owens was operating parked on the street near the intersection of Laurel Avenue and Iranistan Avenue."). The motorcycle was parked on the street "in front of [his] friend's home" and had been parked there 45 minutes to an hour. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 19. The Plaintiff was not operating the motorcycle at the time of his arrest. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 20.

The motorcycle was not titled to the Plaintiff. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 9; ECF No. 154 at 5 ¶ 9. The motorcycle was titled to an individual named Derryl Mizeo Fisher of Albrightsville, Pennsylvania. Id. The motorcycle was not registered to the Plaintiff or Mr. Fisher. Rather, it was registered to a different individual - Desmond Bolzer of Wingdale, New York. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 10; ECF No. 154 at 5 ¶ 10. The motorcycle was not insured in Connecticut. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 12; ECF No. 154 at 6 ¶ 12. According to the Plaintiff, he recently purchased the motorcycle and "had yet to register or transfer title." ECF No. 154 at 10 ¶ 21. He states that the license plate, which belonged to the previous owner, was not attached to the motorcycle, but was located "under [the] motorcycle seat in storage compartment." ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 21. The Plaintiff had not received any tickets or summons for motor vehicle infractions. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 21.

The Plaintiff was taken into police custody. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 4; ECF No. 154 at 2 ¶ 4. Before he was placed in the Defendant's cruiser, the Plaintiff asked if he could give the key to the motorcycle to his brother. ECF 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 9. The Defendant allowed the Plaintiff to do so. ECF 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 10. The Plaintiff told his brother to "go and retrieve plaintiff's Suzuki motorcycle from friend ...." Id. The Defendant then placed the Plaintiff into the cruiser and took him to the police station. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 11. The Plaintiff was detained until the next day when he "ma[de] bond." ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 15. He learned that the motorcycle had been seized. Id. At the time of his arrest, the motorcycle had been impounded and towed by Family Towing to their yard located on North Avenue. ECF No. 152-2 at ¶ 13; ECF No. 154 at 6 ¶ 13.

On August 17, 2016, the Plaintiff and his son went to the Bridgeport police station with the title and bill of sale for the motorcycle, but the police stated that the property was under investigation and refused to release it. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 22. On June 25, 2017, a state court judge issued an order for the return of the motorcycle but the "police refused." ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 23.

On March 22, 2018, a police officer contacted the Plaintiff and told him he could pick up the motorcycle with no tow or storage fees. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 24. The Plaintiff had the motorcycle serviced "due to [it] being [in] storage[] for two years" and learned from the mechanic that the engine was "blown." ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 25. The Plaintiff purchased the motorcycle for $6000. ECF No. 154-1, Owens Aff. ¶ 26. He paid $3500 for detailing and $700 for servicing after the motorcycle was returned. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reviewing the summary judgment record, a court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 2013). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in that party's favor.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013). If the moving party carries its burden, “the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Finally, where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party's papers liberally and interprets them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nonetheless, “unsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact” and cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant seized his motorcycle without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 7. The Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, he asserts that the motorcycle was impounded under the police's community caretaking function to safeguard the Plaintiff's property after he was taken into custody and because it was in violation of Connecticut's motor vehicle laws.

“It is well established that police have the authority, despite the absence of a warrant, to seize and remove from the streets automobiles in the interests of public safety and as part of their community caretaking functions - an authority that is beyond reasonable challenge.” United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 36869 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)). "[P]olice may impound vehicles that are parked legally, particularly where ... a vehicle will be inaccessible to its owner for an extended period - as a result of an arrest ... and at risk of theft, vandalism or other harm, so long as that step is reasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Antonio Fabian, 2019 WL 3578226, *6 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (emphasis added). See United States v. Mundy, 806 F.Supp. 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding police's caretaking responsibilities “particularly important where a car would be unattended, even if legally parked, and the police have reason to believe that a suspect will be separated from his vehicle for a long period of time”). "Officers have no obligation to contact an absent third party before impounding, or to grant a defendant's request to make arrangements to secure the vehicle." United States v. Zimmerman, 480 F.Supp.3d 446, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). “[W]hether a decision to impound is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is based on all the facts and circumstances of a given case.” Lyle, 919 F.3d at 731 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant could not legally impound the motorcycle because the Plaintiff was not operating it at the time of his arrest. See ECF No. 154 at 9 (characterizing defendant's argument as meritless because the plaintiff "wasn't operating nor in possession of property" at the time of his arrest). But the law does not restrict an officer's caretaking actions to that scenario. In other words, it is not necessary that a party be operating the vehicle in question to permit the police to take custody or control...