Owens v. Scheutte

1

MARVIN OWENS, Plaintiff, v. GARY SCHUETTE et al., Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-10787

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

October 10, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. #19]

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Marvin Owens (“Plaintiff”), a former inmate at Jackson County Jail, sued Jackson County Sheriff Gary Schuette, Captain Anthony Stewart, Lieutenant Mike Coburn, and Tiggs Canteen Services, Inc.^[1] (together, “Defendants”) for alleged Constitutional violations arising out of the meals Plaintiff was provided at the jail during Ramadan. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claims violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), violation of Plaintiff's right to free exercise of religion (First and Fourteenth Amendments), violation of Plaintiff's right to equal protection (First and Fourteenth Amendments), and violation of Plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Id. at PageID.18-29. For these violations, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, along with damages. Id. at 30-32.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 19. Plaintiff responded in opposition. ECF No. 25. In addition, the parties' supplemental briefs regarding the availability of damages in this action are before the Court, and the Court's rulings on this issue are incorporated into this Opinion. See ECF No. 18; ECF No. 23. Upon review of Plaintiff's motion, the Court finds that oral argument will not aid in its disposition. Accordingly, the Court will resolve the present motion on Plaintiff's and Defendants' briefs. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons that follow, the motion shall be GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

a. Overview

Plaintiff Marvin Owens was arrested and booked in the Jackson County Jail on July 28, 2023, for various charges that occurred while he was a parolee under the control of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). ECF No. 14, PageID.115. Owens pled no contest to his charges on December 1, 2023. Id. Once Plaintiff was sentenced for these crimes in May 2024, he was transferred from Jackson County Jail back to an MDOC facility. ECF No. 19, PageID.310; ECF No. 25, PageID.668, 670.

Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim. ECF No. 1, PageID.8. During his stay at Jackson County Jail, he observed the Islamic holy month of Ramadan which began on or about March 10th or 11th, 2024, and ended on or about April 9th or 10th, 2024. Id. at PageID.8-9.^[2] During Ramadan, practicing Muslims eat a morning meal (called suhoor) before dawn; they then fast during the entirety of daylight hours. Id. at PageID.2. At sunset, they eat an evening meal (called iftar) to break their fast. Id. Jackson County Jail has a policy that accommodates fasting Muslim inmates by providing them meals before dawn and at sunset. ECF No. 1-1, PageID.35.

Plaintiff alleges, however, that the Jail did not provide him with a predawn or sunset meal for the first three days of Ramadan. ECF No. 1, PageID.9. As a result, he was forced to rely on commissary purchases for sustenance. Id. Following the three days that Plaintiff was not given any meals, the Jail did begin providing him with predawn and sunset meals. But Plaintiff alleges that for several days between March 13 and March 26, 2024, his sunset meals were served two or more hours after sunset which conflicts with Islam's teaching to break one's fast as soon as possible after sunset. Id. at PageID.9-10. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the meals he was served were, on average, between 1,300 and 1,900 calories per day, which is less than a healthy adult male requires and less than the Jail's Ramadan diet prescribes.^[3]Id. at PageID.11; ECF No. 1-1.

As a result, Plaintiff filed the instant action in federal court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. ECF No. 1, PageID.30-32. Plaintiff sues Defendant Schuette in his official capacity only, and Defendants Stewart and Coburn in their individual and official capacities. Id. at PageID.5-7. Because Ramadan was still ongoing at the time, Plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction, seeking to compel Defendants to supply timely and adequate nutrition to Plaintiff. ECF No. 2, PageID.40. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion for a TRO, finding that based on the Complaint's allegations, Plaintiff exhausted the Jail's grievance procedure in conformance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and that a TRO was appropriate. ECF No. 3. The Court reserved ruling on the request for a preliminary injunction. Id. Thereafter, Defendants responded to Plaintiff's motion in opposition. ECF No. 14.

After a hearing on the merits, the Court declined to award a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 17. In addition, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing whether damages were an available remedy in this action, which Plaintiff submitted on April 25, 2024, ECF No. 18, and Defendants submitted on May 2, 2024. ECF No. 23. The Court has not yet ruled on the issue of whether damages are available.

a. The Present Motion

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in lieu of filing an answer. See ECF No. 19. Defendants raise several arguments in support of dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They argue that Plaintiff lacks standing for declaratory or injunctive relief, that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the PLRA, that Plaintiff is not entitled to damages under RLUIPA, and that Plaintiff's claim under RLUIPA is deficient. ECF No. 19, PageID.310, 312313; ECF No. 14, PageID.130; ECF No. 23. Furthermore, Defendants allege several reasons why Plaintiff's official and individual capacity claims under § 1983 must fail. ECF No. 19, PageID.313, 320-26. Plaintiff opposes each of these arguments in turn. See ECF No. 25.

Despite framing their motion to dismiss under Rule 12, Defendants frequently reference extrinsic evidence in their argument.^[4] Plaintiff objected to the use of extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., ECF No. 25, PageID.664, 668, 672. The Court will not consider the extrinsic evidence in its decision on the present Motion and construes the Motion as a motion to dismiss rather than a motion for summary judgment.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

a. Legal Standard for Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Forest City Residential Mgmt., Inc. ex rel. Plymouth Square Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. Beasley, 71 F.Supp.3d 715, 72223 (E.D. Mich. 2014). Rule 12(b)(1) motions can be categorized as facial attacks or factual attacks. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). “A facial attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself.” Id. (emphasis in original). In such an instance, the court takes the material allegations of the petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. In contrast, “[a] factual attack... is not a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations, but a challenge to the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis in original). There is no presumption of truthfulness to the factual allegation, and the court is free to weigh evidence to determine its power to adjudicate the case. Id. “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” the elements of jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and tests the sufficiency of the pleadings by asking whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Bassett v. Nat'l College Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff's complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While this standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff's pleadings must raise “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, the factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Bassett, 528 F.3d at 430 (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)) (alterations added).

b. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Summary Judgment under Rule 56

Generally, assessment of the sufficiency of the pleadings under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “must be undertaken without resort to matters outside the pleadings.” Rondigo, LLC v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2011).

If a court considers extrinsic evidence when analyzing the motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, “and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” Fed R. Civ. P. 12(d); Rice v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 06-cv-15312, 2007 WL 4126525, at *5 (E.D Mich. Nov. 19, 2007). The Sixth...