A.P. ex rel. Pursley v. Bd. of Educ. for Tullahoma

160 F.Supp.3d 1024

A.P., by next friend, Steven Pursley, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Board of Education for City of Tullahoma, Tennessee, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:14–cv–65

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.

Signed September 21, 2015

Iska Hoole, Legal Aid Society of Middle TN and The Cumberlands, Tullahoma, TN, Norman B. Feaster, II, Legal Aid Society of Middle TN and The Cumberlands, Cookeville, TN, Lenny L. Croce, Legal Aid Society of Middle Tennessee and The Cumberlands, Oak Ridge, TN, for Plaintiffs.

John D. Kitch, Cornelius & Collins, LLP, Michael K Markham, Office of The Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER

HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motions for Attorney Fees (Docs.36, 37) and Defendant Board of Education for Tullahoma City Schools' Motion to Dismiss Request for Attorney Fees (Doc. 42). Plaintiffs move for attorney's fees pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).¹ (Docs.36, 37). This Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the sole issue raised in this action: whether Plaintiff A.P. was entitled to a “stay put” order keeping him in his then-current education placement pending resolution of the underlying due process hearing requested by his father, Steven Pursley. (Doc. 34) For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are “prevailing parties” pursuant to IDEA's attorney's fees provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and are thus entitled to attorney's fees incurred in obtaining relief under the stay put provision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motions (Docs.36, 37) will be GRANTED, Defendant Board of Education for Tullahoma City Schools' Motion (Doc. 42) will be DENIED , and Plaintiffs will be awarded fees in the amount of $23,582.00 from Defendants in this action.

I. FACTS

Most of the facts relevant to this motion are recited in the Court's October 10, 2014 Order granting Plaintiffs the stay put order allowing A.P. to remain in his then-current educational placement:

A.P. and his parent, Steven Pursley, filed their Complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the denial of procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Doc. 1). The Court will summarize the facts relevant to the narrow determination currently before it.

In September 2011, a TCS [Tullahoma City Schools] individualized education program (IEP) team determined that A.P. had a disability that adversely affected his educational performance at his educational placement, East Middle School. (Doc. 1–1). The IEP team identified A.P.'s disabilities as “other health impairment” and “specific learning disability.” (Id. ).

A.P. began the 2013–2014 school year at the Behavior Adjustment Class (“BAC”), which is separate from the school district's middle school. (Doc. 1 at 5). On April 28, 2014, the IEP team met and decided that although A.P. has a disability, it did not adversely affect his educational performance. (Doc. 1–15). Steven Pursley and his attorney were present at this meeting and disagreed with the determination. On May 9, 2014, A.P. brought home a notice dated May 6, 2014, which stated that TCS planned to change A.P.'s placement back to high school as a regular education student. (Doc. 1–16). On May 16, 2014, Steven Pursley filed a request for a due process hearing in which he invoked A.P.'s stay-put rights. (Doc. 1–17). A.P. finished the remainder of the year at the BAC. (Doc. 1 at 7). At the beginning of the 2014–2015 school year, when Steven Pursley attempted to enroll A.P. at the BAC, TCS informed him that A.P. needed to be enrolled at the high school as a regular education student. (Id. ).

On July 31, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) presiding over A.P.'s case refused to issue a stay-put order because he determined that Steven Pursley was not timely in requesting a hearing. The ALJ based this ruling on the fact that Steven Pursley had “actual notice” of the change in placement because he was present at the eligibility determination on April 28, 2014. (Doc. 1–19 at 3). On September 4, 2014, Pursley moved for reconsideration, but his request was denied.

(Doc. 34 at 1–2). The sole issue before the Court was whether Plaintiffs had timely requested the due process hearing and were therefore entitled to a stay put order keeping A.P. in special education classes pending the due process hearing and a determination by the state Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of his proper permanent placement. While Plaintiffs characterized their request for relief in the form of the stay-put order as a preliminary injunction, the Court found Plaintiffs were requesting a permanent injunction “given the narrow determination before the Court.” (Id. at 5). The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief concluding, based on the construction of two Tennessee regulations, that Plaintiffs had timely requested a due process hearing under the IDEA and therefore were entitled to a stay put order. (Id. at 4–8). The Court then entered judgment remanding the action to the ALJ for a determination on the merits of A.P.'s due process proceedings. (Doc. 35).

Plaintiffs subsequently moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $23,582.00. (Doc. 37). While this motion was pending, Plaintiffs' due process proceedings continued at the state administrative level where the ALJ determined on April 10, 2015, that A.P., while disabled, “no longer requires special education services in order to access his education.” (See Doc 42–1 at 2).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Prevailing Party Status

In the United States, under “the American Rule,” parties are required generally to bear their own attorney's fees regardless of the outcome of a claim absent a fee shifting statute. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 602, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ; McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 596–97 (6th Cir.2010). Congress has passed numerous fee shifting statutes permitting an award of attorney's fees to a “prevailing party,” and the Supreme Court has interpreted these statutes consistently with one another. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602–03, 603 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ).

Section 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA provides that the court may, in its discretion, award attorney's fees in any action brought under the IDEA “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” Plaintiffs assert they are the prevailing party in this action because they obtained complete relief on the only claim they brought before this Court: whether they were entitled to a stay put order requiring that A.P. remain in special education classes pending the resolution of due process proceedings to determine his permanent placement. Defendants assert Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties because they obtained only interim relief which was not based on the merits of A.P.'s case. Rather, the argument continues, Plaintiffs cannot be prevailing parties because the state ALJ actually determined after a due process hearing that A.P. was not entitled to special education classes. While there is no binding precedent directly on point regarding the award of attorney's fees as a prevailing party for obtaining a stay put order, both sides cite persuasive authority in their favor. Before addressing these cases, however, the Court will discuss some leading United States Supreme Court cases on “prevailing party” status.

1. Supreme Court Precedent

Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Resources , 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) considered whether a party who has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court ordered consent decree is nonetheless entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party because the opposing party voluntarily changed its conduct as a result of the lawsuit. The Supreme Court held it did not. Id. at 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835. In Buckhannon, the state of West Virginia (State) issued a cease and desist order requiring closure of a residential facility because some of the residents were not capable of moving themselves in the event of imminent danger, a violation of state law. The owners of the facility filed suit asserting the state law requiring “self-preservation” violated the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988 (“FHA”). While the action was pending, the West Virginia legislature amended state law repealing the self-preservation requirement. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the pending action as moot. The residential facility, however, sought attorney's fees under the FHA's fee shifting provision as a “prevailing party” on the ground that its lawsuit was the catalyst for the legislature's repeal of the self-preservation requirement. The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory for attorney's fees holding that in order to be a “prevailing party,” that party must have received at least some relief on the merits of his claim and a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 603–05, 121 S.Ct. 1835.

In Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007), the Supreme Court considered whether a party was a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by obtaining a preliminary injunction where the party ultimately was denied a permanent injunction in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Sole, the plaintiff wanted to create an artistic peace symbol with nude persons on a Florida beach in violation of Florida's state bathing suit law. Plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction from the district court to permit the nude demonstration provided plaintiff placed a screen around the demonstration in order to protect those who did not want...