P.G. v. Jefferson Cnty.

1

P.G., Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, NEW YORK; COLLEEN M. O'NEILL, as the Sheriff of Jefferson County, New York; BRIAN R. MCDERMOTT, as the Undersheriff of Jefferson County, New York; and MARK WILSON, as the Facility Administrator of the Jefferson County Correctional Facility, Defendants.

No. 5:21-cv-388

United States District Court, N.D. New York

May 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION Attorneys for Plaintiff

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT Attorneys for Plaintiff

BARCLAY DAMON LLP Attorneys for Defendants

OF COUNSEL:

ANTONY P.F. GEMMELL, ESQ. TERRY T. DING, ESQ. GABRIELLA M. LARIOS ESQ. MOLLY K. BIKLEN, ESQ.

TAMMIE GREGG, ESQ.

TERESA M. BENNETT, ESQ. KAYLA A. ARIAS, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 7, 2021, this Court entered an order (the “PI Order”), Dkt. No. 47, granting plaintiff P.G.'s motion for a preliminary injunction against defendants Jefferson County, New York (the “County”), County Sheriff Colleen M. O'Neill, County Undersheriff Brian R. McDermott, and County Correctional Facility Administrator Mark Wilson (together “defendants”).

In short, P.G. sought to preliminarily enjoin defendants from interrupting or otherwise denying him access to his prescribed methadone treatment (“MOUD”) while he was incarcerated at Jefferson County Correctional Facility (the “Jail”). Defendants opposed, asserting that the Jail does not maintain a ban on methadone treatment for non-pregnant people. The Court held oral argument and ultimately entered the PI Order.

Now, P.G. seeks to recover his fees and costs arising from this litigation. Specifically, plaintiff seeks $153,783.45 in attorney's fees for the work done by his two public interest legal organizations, as well as $7,786.68 in costs. Defendants oppose and also move for summary judgment. The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court considers them on the basis of the parties' submissions without oral argument.

II. DISCUSSION

As noted, P.G. seeks to recover attorney's fees and costs associated with his preliminary injunction. Defendants oppose and also move for summary judgment. The Court addresses each motion in turn.

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Fees

1. Legal Standard

Both the ADA and Section 1983 authorize courts to award a “prevailing party” reasonable attorney's fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Section 1983). “[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim.” Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992)). A party who “receives a ... preliminary injunction but never obtains a final judgment” is the prevailing party “if the court's action in granting the preliminary injunction is governed by its assessment of the merits.” Id.

Fees are not warranted, however, if the court did not base its determination to award interim relief on the merits. Haley, 106 F.3d at 483. “A determination of whether a court's action is governed by its assessment of the merits ‘requires close analysis of the decisional circumstances and reasoning underlying the grant of preliminary relief.'” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, if an injunction “is not clearly based on the merits, a court should not resolve the uncertainty in favor of a finding that plaintiff prevailed.” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, a request for attorney's fees may be properly denied if a party's success is “de minimis or technical.” LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

“The burden rests on the party seeking attorney's fees to submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed.” Krause v. Kelahan, 2022 WL 306365, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (citation omitted). Still, “the determination of fees should not result in a second major litigation,” and in evaluating an application, “trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 589 (2d Cir. 2017).

2. Discussion

P.G. requests fees in the amount of $153,783.45 and $7,786.68 in costs. Defendants oppose, claiming that these fees are unreasonable, that plaintiff does not qualify as a prevailing party, and that the relief this Court granted plaintiff was de minimis.

“In awarding attorney's fees, the district court is to determine the ‘presumptively reasonable fee, reached by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of reasonably expended hours.'” Osterweil v. Bartlett, 92 F.Supp.3d 14, 25 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 289 (2d Cir. 2011)).

The first component of the reasonable-fee calculation is determining a reasonable hourly rate, or “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assn v. Cnty. of Albany & Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2008). In determining a reasonable hourly rate, district courts “consider[] all pertinent factors, including the Johnson factors.” Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Brooks v. Roberts, 501 F.Supp.3d 103, 112 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).^[1]And the Second Circuit's “‘forum rule' generally requires use of ‘the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee.'” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 290 (2d Cir. 2011).

Upon review, P.G. has submitted sufficient evidence supporting his attorneys' requested rates. The rates, which range from $165 to $300 per hour, are consistent with those that courts in this district have awarded in other civil rights litigations for attorneys with comparable experience levels. See, e.g. Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Krolak, 2019 WL 3304556, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2019) (awarding hourly rate of $325 for attorney with 18 years' experience and $275 for attorney with 10 years' experience, and noting these were “rates in the middle end of the hourly rate range”); Moore v. Keller, 2021 WL 5493022, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021) (hourly rate of $200 for attorneys with between five and ten years' experience and $150 for attorneys with less than two years' experience); Perez v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 2021 WL 3022115, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021) (hourly rate of $165 for recently admitted attorney).^[2]

The Johnson factors also support P.G.'s requested rates. Among other things: (i) plaintiff's counsel obtained a substantial degree of success; (ii) this litigation involved novel and complex legal issues that no court in this district has previously addressed; (iii) plaintiffs counsel is highly experienced; and (iv) this case involved significant time and labor.

P.G. has also submitted sufficient evidence supporting the hours his attorneys worked. In evaluating the reasonableness of the hours expended on a case, “[t]he relevant inquiry for the court ‘is not whether hindsight vindicates an attorney's time expenditures, but whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.'” Osterweil, 92 F.Supp.3d at 28 (quoting Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)).

The number of hours for which P.G.'s attorneys seek compensation is reasonable. This case has involved considerable motion practice over the past year and a half. Specifically, this case has required plaintiff's counsel to brief a motion for a preliminary injunction, a motion to seal, and a motion to supplement the complaint, each of which faced opposition from defendants. Most notably, plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion required substantial evidentiary showings, including declarations from several experts.

Additionally, plaintiffs attorneys have exercised their own billing judgment by voluntarily imposing across-the-board billing reductions of 10%, see Dkt. No. 97-2 ¶ 8; excluding hours expended on this case by senior attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals, id. 14-15; and excluding 58.9 billable hours for time spent litigating discovery disputes-even though he is entitled to seek recovery for those hours, id. 14 & n.8.

Finally, as defendants concede, Dkt. 102-4 at 19, the Court determined P.G.'s preliminary injunction motion on the merits. Indeed, in the PI Order, the Court considered plaintiffs claims, evaluated his likelihood of success on the merits, and concluded that he was likely to succeed. See P.G. v. Jefferson Cnty., New York, 2021 WL 4059409, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2021).

Defendants' attempts to reduce P.G.'s fee award by 75 percent are unpersuasive. Beyond claiming in conclusory fashion that the fee request is “excessive” and “well beyond what is reasonable,” defendants do little to explain why such a substantial reduction would be necessary.^[3]Defendants do not contest plaintiff's counsel's billing rates, billing records, or, for the most part, the hours they worked. Failure to challenge these aspects of the fee application counsels against defendants' requested fee reduction. See Doe v. E Lyme Bd. of Educ., 2020 WL 1274774, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2020) (refusing to apply general reductions to fee award “in the absence of any argument by Defendant regarding specific billing entries or practices”); LV v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 700 F.Supp.2d 510, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (declining to reduce fee award based on defendants' “objection] to unspecified ‘excessive billing'”); Todaro v. Siegel Fenchel & Peddy, P.C., 697 F.Supp.2d 395, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (refusing to “scour” attorney's billing records to “uncover . . . supposed...