Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Elhajj

1

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, on behalf of Tia Hixon, Plaintiff v. Joseph W. Elhajj d/b/a Apex Valuation Services, Defendant

No. 338 M.D. 2023

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

July 26, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Argued: June 4, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H WOJCIK, Judge, (P.) HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, JUDGE

Before this Court is Joseph W. Elhajj d/b/a Apex Valuation Services' (Landlord) preliminary objection (PO) to the Complaint filed by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission) on behalf of Tia Hixon (Tenant) asserting lack of jurisdiction based on the Commission's failure to timely file the Complaint pursuant to its regulations. We overrule the PO.

I. Background

Tenant filed a complaint with the Commission against Landlord, which owns, operates, and manages an apartment complex in Fayetteville, Pennsylvania, where she resided, alleging unlawful housing discrimination in violation of Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).^[1] The matter was placed on the Commission's public hearing docket on May 16, 2023. On June 26, 2023, Landlord received an election notice letter pursuant to Section 9(d.1) of the PHRA, 43 P.S. §959(d.1), and Section 42.101(c)(1) of the Commission's regulations, 16 Pa. Code §42.101(c)(1). The election notice permits "either party [to] elect to have the claim asserted in the complaint decided in a civil action brought under the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court." 43 P.S. §959(d.1). On June 30, 2023, Landlord elected to proceed in this Court's original jurisdiction and notified all parties.

Based on this election, on July 31, 2023, the Commission filed the Complaint on behalf of Tenant in this Court's original jurisdiction. In the Complaint, the Commission alleged that Landlord violated the PHRA when it discriminated against Tenant, an individual with a disability, by refusing to permit Tenant to maintain an emotional support animal in her housing as a reasonable accommodation to Landlord's "no pets policy." In addition, the Commission alleged that Landlord made housing unavailable to Tenant because of this denial and in retaliation for her having engaged in protected activity in violation of the law. In response to the Complaint, Landlord filed a PO asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028 (a)(1) and (2) based on the Commission's failure to timely file the Complaint pursuant to its regulations.^[2] Alternatively, Landlord asserts that the Complaint should be dismissed as untimely. The parties filed briefs in support of and in opposition to the PO.

II. PO

A. Contentions

Landlord contends that this Court does not have jurisdiction based on the Commission's failure to file a timely Complaint in accordance with its regulations. Pursuant to the Commission's regulations, the Commission was required to commence its Complaint "within 20 days from receipt" of an election to proceed in Commonwealth Court. 16 Pa. Code §42.101(c)(2). The undisputed facts, as laid out in the Complaint, establish that the Commission did not file the Complaint within 20 days of Landlord's June 30, 2023 election in contravention of its regulations. The Commission's untimely filing operates to deprive this Court of jurisdiction over the Complaint. Alternatively, even if not jurisdictional, the Complaint should still be dismissed as untimely.

The Commission responds that the Complaint was timely filed in accordance with the PHRA, which properly confers jurisdiction on this Court. There is a conflict between the PHRA and the regulation regarding the limitations period. Under the PHRA, after a party elects to have the claim decided in the Commonwealth Court, the Commission shall within 30 days commence and maintain the civil action on behalf of the complainant, whereas the regulation provides that the Commission shall commence and maintain the civil action within 20 days from receipt of the election. Compare 43 P.S. §959(d.1) with 16 Pa. Code §42.101(c)(2). Because Section 42.101(c)(2) of the regulations is inconsistent with Section 9(d.1) of the PHRA, the regulation must give way to the statute. Although the Complaint was not filed within 20 days as set forth in the regulation, it was timely filed within the statutory period, which prevails over the conflicting regulation.

In reply, Landlord responds that the regulation does not categorically conflict with the PHRA. The 30-day filing requirement under Section 9(d.1) begins to run "from the date of election," 43 P.S. §959(d.1), whereas the regulation's 20-day filing requirement begins to run "from receipt of the election." 16 Pa. Code §42.101(c)(2) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 20-day time period advances the PHRA's directive that the Commission promulgate rules and regulations that "expedite" the complaint procedure. 43 P.S. §959(g).

B. Analysis

"[T]he Commission, like all administrative agencies, can only exercise those powers which have been conferred upon it by the Legislature." Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Zamantakis, 387 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. 1978). "'[T]he power of an administrative agency to prescribe rules and regulations under a statute is not the power to make law, but only the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of the Legislature as expressed by the statute.'" Hommrich v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, 231 A.3d 1027, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), aff'd, 245 A.3d 637 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Volunteer Firemen's Relief Association of the City of Reading v. Minehart, 227 A.2d 632, 635-36 (Pa. 1967)). As a general matter, "when an agency adopts a regulation pursuant to its legislative rulemaking power . . . it is valid and binding upon courts as a statute so long as it is (a) adopted within the agency's granted power, (b) issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable." Tire Jockey Service, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 915 A.2d 1165, 1186 (Pa. 2007).

"A regulation cannot be upheld if it is contrary to the statute under which it was promulgated." Consulting Engineers Council of Pennsylvania v. State Architects Licensure Board, 560 A.2d 1375, 1376 (Pa. 1989). "When an agency adopts regulations at variance with the statute, the regulations, and not the statute, fall by the wayside." Hommrich, 231 A.3d at 1035 (citation and quotation omitted); accord Victory Bank v. Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 1236, 1239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), aff'd, 240 A.3d 95 (Pa. 2020) (citation and quotation omitted); Commonwealth v. Colonial Nissan, Inc., 691 A.2d 1005, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). "It is axiomatic that a statute is the law and trumps an administrative agency's regulations." Commonwealth v. Kerstetter, 62 A.3d 1065, 1069 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), aff'd, 94 A.3d 991 (Pa. 2014).

Regulations cannot enlarge the statutorily-established filing period. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. School District of Philadelphia, 562 A.2d 313, 315 (Pa. 1989). In the same way, regulations cannot reduce a statutorily-established filing period. Colonial Nissan, 691 A.2d at 1009 (20-day statutory provision governed over conflicting 10-day regulatory provision that purported to implement statute); Heaton v. Department of Public Welfare, 506 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (statute's 60-day sanction period governed over conflicting regulation's 30-day sanction period).

As this Court has explained:

To determine whether a regulation is adopted within an agency's granted power, we look for statutory language authorizing the agency to promulgate the legislative rule and examine that language to determine whether the rule falls within the grant of authority. The legislature's delegation must be clear and unmistakable. In performing this analysis, our Supreme Court has recognized the importance of substantive rulemaking as a practice widely used in administrative law, which we should uphold whenever the statutory delegation can reasonably be construed to authorize it. When considering, then, whether the agency has the authority to enact a particular substantive rule, we must consider both the letter of the statutory delegation to create that rule as well as the purpose of the statute and its reasonable effect. We also consider as part of this analysis whether the regulation is consistent with the enabling statute, for [c]learly, the legislature would not authorize agencies to adopt . . . regulations inconsistent with the . . . enabling statutes. When, therefore, a regulation presents an actual conflict with the statute, we cannot reasonably understand the regulation to be within the agency's ambit of authority, and the statute must prevail.

Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Department of Environmental Protection, 216 A.3d 448, 459-60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

For example, in Colonial Nissan, an automobile dealer challenged an agency decision, which imposed fines and a license suspension due to the dealer's failure to timely forward registration information, based on a conflict between the regulatory and statutory provisions regarding the number of days for the delivery of registration documents. 691 A.2d at 1006. The regulation directed automobile dealers to forward vehicle registration documents within 10 days of purchase, whereas the statute provided within 20 days of purchase. Id. at 1008. This Court held that the regulation's 10-day registration period presented an actual conflict with the statute's 20-day registration period and must give way. Id. at 1009. Thus, we concluded that the 20-day statutory period governed. Id.

Section 9(d.1) of the PHRA provides:

When notice of hearing is given as set forth in subsection (d) and an election procedure

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