Padco Contracting, Inc. v. Hernandez

360 Ga.App. 765

861 S.E.2d 459

PADCO CONTRACTING, INC.

v.HERNANDEZ.

A21A0902

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 19, 2021

Cipriani & Werner, Benjamin Allen Leonard, Matthew Allen Pittman, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Cruz & Associates, Ruben Jose Cruz, Atlanta, Bao Quynh Phuc Truong-Johnson, for Appellee.

Mercier, Judge.

Padco Contracting, Inc., appeals from a superior court order reversing, in part, a judgment of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation. For reasons that follow, we reverse the portion of the superior court's order from which Padco appeals, and we affirm the remainder of the decision, which has not been challenged on appeal.

The record shows that Lorenzo Hernandez sustained compensable workers’ compensation injuries on August 13, 2008, when he fell from a scaffolding while working for Padco at a construction site.

Hernandez began receiving temporary total disability benefits, and his condition was ultimately accepted as catastrophic. Over the years following the accident, he saw multiple doctors and was treated for injuries to his left lower extremity, his right lower extremity, and his lumbar spine. But when Hernandez sought treatment for separate thoracic and cervical spine conditions, Padco denied the requests, asserting that those conditions were not related to the 2008 work accident.

An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held an evidentiary hearing to determine the compensability of the thoracic and cervical spine injuries, as well as to resolve Padco's pending request for a change in Hernandez's authorized treating physician. After the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Hernandez's "cervical and thoracic spine conditions [were] compensable, either as original injuries from the August 13, 2008 accident, or as superadded injuries, resulting from the compensable injuries to [Hernandez's] lumbar spine, and bilateral lower extremities." The ALJ also denied Padco's request for a change in physician.

Padco appealed the ALJ's ruling to the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation ("the Board"). The Board affirmed the compensability of Hernandez's thoracic spine condition. It reached the opposite conclusion, however, with respect to his cervical spine issues. Noting that "evidence of a pronounced cervical condition did not appear in the medical record until early 2016, nearly eight years after the ... compensable injury date," the Board found insufficient evidence of a causal relationship between the cervical injury and Hernandez's work accident. It thus denied Hernandez's request for authorized medical treatment of the cervical spine condition. Unlike the ALJ, the Board also determined that a change in physician was appropriate, and it granted Padco's request for a new physician.

Hernandez appealed to the Superior Court of Rockdale County, challenging the Board's decisions regarding his cervical spine condition and the physician change request. The superior court affirmed the decision granting Padco's request for a change of physician. After reviewing the evidence, however, the court reversed the Board's ruling to the extent it deemed Hernandez's cervical condition non-compensable. Asserting that the Board "failed to consider the fact that there was major objective testing that showed a pronounced cervical condition prior to 2016," the superior court concluded that "[t]he facts found by the [Board] did not support [its] finding that there was no evidence of a cervical injury prior to 2016." We granted Padco's application for discretionary review, and this appeal followed.

We must analyze Padco's appeal within the legal framework governing workers’ compensation claims. Specifically, the Board has broad authority to review an ALJ's decision granting or denying workers’ compensation benefits. The Board may "assess witness credibility, weigh conflicting evidence, and draw different factual conclusions from those reached by the ALJ who initially heard the dispute." Emory Univ. v. Duval , 330 Ga. App. 663, 666, 768 S.E.2d 832 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). It may also "disregard factual inferences drawn by the ALJ and substitute its own in place of those inferences." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). And if, after reviewing the record, the Board determines that the preponderance of competent and credible evidence does not support the ALJ's award, "the Board may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ, and enter an award accordingly." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

In contrast, "neither this Court nor the superior court has any authority to substitute itself as a factfinding body in lieu of the Board." Emory Univ. , supra (citation and punctuation omitted). Our role is not to consider whether the evidence supported the ALJ's findings, but to "review the Board's award for the sole purpose of determining whether its findings are supported by any record evidence." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). If we answer that question affirmatively, "the Board's findings are conclusive and binding, regardless of whether we would have reached the same result if given the opportunity to weigh the evidence in the first instance." Id. at 666-667, 768 S.E.2d 832 (citation and punctuation omitted).

On appeal, Padco argues that the superior court erred in reversing the Board's cervical spine determination. We agree. The superior court conducted a de novo evidentiary review, ultimately concluding that the evidence supported the ALJ's findings with respect to the cervical injury, rather than the Board's contrary findings. Nothing, however, authorized the superior court to reweigh the evidence in this manner. As a reviewing court, it was required to...