Padilla v. Torres

1

2024-NMSC-007

ROY PADILLA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAY TORRES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. S-1-SC-35619

Supreme Court of New Mexico

February 5, 2024

Released for Publication May 21, 2024.

CERTIFICATION FROM THE NEW MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS Denise Barela-Shepherd, District Judge

New Mexico Legal Aid Thomas Prettyman Albuquerque, NM for Appellant

Holland & Hart LLP Larry J. Montaño Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

OPINION

C. SHANNON BACON, CHIEF JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

{¶1} In this opinion, we consider whether the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court is required to create a record of all civil proceedings for which the court serves as a court of record. Rule 3-708(A) NMRA of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts provides, "Every civil proceeding in the metropolitan court shall be tape recorded if requested by a party" (emphasis added). Defendant-Appellant Ray Torres's appeal from the metropolitan court was dismissed because the parties did not request a tape recording of the trial and the district court concluded that it could not conduct the appeal in the absence of a recording. Torres challenges the metropolitan court's practice of not recording civil proceedings except on party request, asserting that this practice contravenes NMSA 1978, Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993, amended 2019) and violates his statutory and constitutional rights. Torres seeks a new trial and asks this Court to direct that civil proceedings in the metropolitan court be recorded irrespective of a party's request.

{¶2} We conclude that the failure to record the trial in this matter is contrary to Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993). At the time relevant to this appeal, Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) designated the "metropolitan court [a]s a court of record for civil actions" and granted aggrieved parties a right to appeal. We hold that the statute imposes a duty on the metropolitan court to create a record of its proceedings that will be sufficient to permit appellate review in this case. We further hold as we discuss hereinafter that Rule 3-708(A) and other similar rules impermissibly conflict with Section 34-8A-6(B) to the extent that the rules condition the creation of this record on a party's request. We direct our committee for the Rules of Civil Procedure for the State Courts to correct the rules in conformance with our opinion. Finally, we reverse and remand this matter to the metropolitan court for a new trial.

II. BACKGROUND

{¶3} The record in this appeal is limited due to the lack of a record of the proceedings held in the metropolitan court. Documents in the record reveal the following.

{¶4} On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff-Appellee Roy Padilla filed a petition in the metropolitan court under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 47-8-1 to -52 (1975, as amended through 2007), requesting restitution of a single-family home in Southwest Albuquerque. Padilla alleged that Torres, his tenant, had not paid the rent due for part of June and all of July 2014. A civil summons form was served on Torres advising him that trial would be held on July 30, 2014. The summons also advised Torres: "If you want a recording of any proceeding, you must request it before the beginning of the proceeding. If you do not ask for a recording, you will not have a record of the proceedings to take to the district court." Both Torres and Padilla appeared pro se at trial. Neither party requested a recording of the proceedings in advance of the trial. Consequently, there is no record of the arguments, testimony, or nondocumentary evidence presented at trial.

{¶5} Shortly after this trial, the metropolitan court entered a judgment restoring the home to Padilla and evicting Torres. The metropolitan court also ordered that Torres pay Padilla past-due rent and costs in the amount of $927. Torres timely appealed the metropolitan court's judgment to the Second Judicial District Court.

{¶6} The district court dismissed the appeal because Torres had failed to request a recording of the metropolitan court's trial. The district court noted that the metropolitan court was a court of record for the matter, and thus the district court's role on appeal was to review the metropolitan court's judgment for error. The district court explained, "Without a record of the trial, the Court is unable to discern whether a particular question or issue was preserved for review . . . . Equally, without a record of the trial, the Court cannot review the testimony, arguments, evidence or any other proceedings." The district court thus determined that it could not effectively review Torres's "on-record appeal" without a recording of the trial. The district court also rejected Torres's assertion that he had a right to a recording. The court explained that Torres, as appellant, was required to provide an adequate record on appeal and that the court's rules and summons clearly notified Torres that he "must request the recording to preserve the record."

{¶7} Torres timely appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Torres argued that the metropolitan court's practice of not recording civil proceedings except on a party's request was inconsistent with Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) and violated his state and federal constitutional rights. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals to review the questions presented. See Rule 12-606 NMRA; NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (1972).

{¶8} While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Section 34-8A-6. See N.M. Laws. 2019, ch. 281, § 1. As of June 14, 2019, Section 34-8A-6(B), (C) specifies that the metropolitan court is a court of record for civil actions other than those under UORRA. Thus, the metropolitan court is no longer a court of record for petitions for restitution similar to the petition filed in this case. However, the matter here was adjudicated under the 1993 enactment. Thus, this matter remains unresolved, and we note that the $927 judgment against Torres remains outstanding. We therefore proceed to consider the questions as presented. Unless otherwise stated, our analysis pertains to Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993), which was in effect at the time of the judgment in this matter. Nevertheless, our analysis with respect to the metropolitan court's record-keeping duties as a court of record remains relevant to the current version of the statute.

{¶9} Shortly after hearing oral argument, we issued an administrative order directing the metropolitan court to record all civil proceedings for which the court serves as a court of record, notwithstanding language to the contrary in Rule 3-708. N.M. Sup. Ct. Ord. No. 23-8500-003 (Jan. 30, 2023). In this opinion, we address the issues presented and illuminate this administrative change.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶10} Torres contends that the metropolitan court's failure to record the trial in this matter violates Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993), which, at the relevant time, designated the metropolitan court a court of record for civil actions. Torres further argues that the metropolitan court's failure to record the trial violated his constitutional and statutory rights to appeal.

{¶11} However, we decline to reach the constitutional issues raised because we agree that Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) required the metropolitan court to create a record of the trial in this matter. "It is an enduring principle of constitutional jurisprudence that courts will avoid deciding constitutional questions unless required to do so. We have repeatedly declined to decide constitutional questions unless necessary to the disposition of the case." Schlieter v. Carlos, 1989-NMSC-037, ¶ 13, 108 N.M. 507, 775 P.2d 709. We therefore limit our discussion to Torres's arguments under Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Context of the Metropolitan Court as a Court of Record

{¶12} In 1979, our Legislature added metropolitan courts to our system of courts, NMSA 1978, § 34-8A-1 (1979, amended 2010), establishing the metropolitan court as "a specialized magistrate court to perform the functions of magistrate, municipal, and small claims courts for New Mexico's most populous counties." State v. Armijo, 2016-NMSC-021, ¶ 14, 375 P.3d 415. Although metropolitan court functions are similar to those of other courts of limited jurisdiction, a metropolitan court is, in some ways, distinct. Id. ¶ 15.

{¶13} For example, the Legislature has made the metropolitan court "a court of record" for certain types of actions, including, at the time relevant to this appeal, for civil actions. Section 34-8A-6(B), (C) (1993); see also Section 34-8A-6(B), (C) (providing currently that the metropolitan court is a court of record for civil actions except for those brought under UORRA). In contrast, "[t]he magistrate court is not a court of record." NMSA 1978, § 35-1-1 (1968).

{¶14} Whether the metropolitan court serves as a court of record for an action determines the standard of review on appeal. Armijo, 2016-NMSC-021, ¶ 15. When the metropolitan court is not a court of record, an aggrieved party may appeal the metropolitan court's judgment to the district court for a trial de novo. See NMSA 1978 § 39-3-1 (1955) ("All appeals from inferior tribunals to the district courts shall be tried anew in said courts on their merits, as if no trial had been had below, except as otherwise provided by law."); see also State v. Ball, 1986-NMSC-030, ¶ 15, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686 (describing the appeal from an inferior court provided for by Article VI, Section 27 of the New Mexico Constitution "as the removal of a cause from the inferior to a superior court"). The district court reviews these not-of-record actions by "trial 'anew,' as if no trial whatever had been had in the" lower court. City of Farmington v. Sandoval, 1977-NMCA-022,...