Pagan v. United States

568 F.Supp.3d 156

Ronald PAGAN, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00601 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed October 25, 2021

Charles F. Willson, Terence S. Ward, Federal Public Defender's Office, Hartford, CT, for Petitioner.

Anthony E. Kaplan, John H. Durham, John B. Hughes, William J. Nardini, U.S. Attorney's Office, New Haven, CT, for Respondent.

RULING ON AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE

Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this five-year-old habeas case, the Second Circuit has twice authorized the petitioner, Ronald Pagan, to file a successive habeas petition pursuant to section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code. See Mandate of the USCA (Doc. No. 8); Mandate of the USCA (Doc. No. 29). The court granted Pagan's request to consolidate the briefing schedule for both his Petitions, see Order (Doc. No. 32), and on June 16, 2021, he filed his Amended Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. See Am. Mot. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence ("Pet. to Vacate") (Doc. No. 40); Mem. in Supp. of Am. Mot. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence ("Pet.’s Mem.") (Doc. No. 40-1).

In his Petition, Pagan first relies on the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), to argue that his conviction in Count Three charging him with using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence "is unconstitutional because it is predicated on conspiracy, which is not a crime of violence." Pet. to Vacate at 1. Second, he argues that his life sentence on Count Two is also unconstitutional in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), "because [Pagan] was 19 years old at the time of his offense." Id.

The respondent, the United States ("the Government"), opposes Pagan's Petition. See Gov't’s Mem. in Opp'n to Pagan's Am. Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Gov't’s Mem.") (Doc. No. 44). Pagan, in turn, has filed a Reply Memorandum responding to the Government's objections. See Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence ("Pet.’s Reply") (Doc. No. 45).

For the reasons set forth below, Pagan's Petition is denied.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are well documented. See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 107-110 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 943, 121 S.Ct. 1405, 149 L.Ed.2d 348 (2001). In brief, Pagan joined the Meriden chapter of the Los Solidos gang when he was just 15. See United States v. Pagan, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Ltr. from Ronald Pagan to Court at 4 (Doc. No. 512-1). He had a traumatic childhood and "became lost" in Los Solidos, "[choosing] the streets over [his] household" and coming to see the "gang life [that] was presented [as a] positive." Id.

By age 19, Pagan was "a lost traumatized teenager." Id. at 7. He was also the "warlord" of Los Solidos’ Meriden chapter. Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 109. In that capacity, he was responsible for controlling the gang's stash of firearms and weapons, which were bought with proceeds from drug sales. Id. at 114. Pagan served as warlord under Nelson Gonzalez, the president of the Meriden chapter. Id. at 109. As President, Gonzalez had the "authority to order violent ‘missions,’ including murder, against non-members and to terminate members found to be in violation of the gang's rules." Id. at 114.

In 1997, Gonzalez and other members of Los Solidos became upset with Edwin Ramos, a 16-year-old fellow member who had purportedly sold a gun provided to him by Gonzalez to the rival Latin Kings. Id. at 109, 124. Based on this allegation, Gonzalez told Pagan that Ramos should be "terminated", which other Los Solidos members understood as an instruction that he should be killed. Id. at 109. Gonzalez entrusted Pagan, along with Ruben Feliciano, who was at that time a probationary member of the gang, with the task of terminating Ramos. Id.

On the evening of March 24, 1997, Pagan and Feliciano drove to an acquaintance's apartment in Meriden, where they picked up Ramos. Id. They then drove to the home of another Los Solidos member, Alex Rivera, and picked him up as well. Id. Following a stop at a store, the four drove to a cemetery in Meriden and exited the car. Id. Feliciano twice asked Ramos what had happened to the gun. Id. Ramos responded that he had lost it. Id. "Feliciano laughed and then shot Ramos once in the head, killing him." Id.

On September 1, 1998, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Pagan with conspiring to commit murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of section 1959(a)(5) of title 18 of the United States Code (Count One); committing murder in aid of racketeering, and aiding and abetting, in violation of section 1959(a)(1) and (2) (Count Two); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting, in violation of section 924(c)(1) and (2) of title 18 of the United States Code (Count Three). Id. at 107. On February 8, 1999, following a trial by jury, Pagan was found guilty on all three counts. United States v. Pagan, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Verdict Form (Doc. No. 305). On April 29, 1999, the court (Dorsey, J.) sentenced Pagan principally to a term of ten years in prison on Count One, life imprisonment on Count Two, and five years in prison on Count Three, with Counts 1 and 2 running concurrently and Count Three running consecutively to those counts. United States v. Pagan, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Judgment (Doc. No. 307). After Pagan appealed, the Second Circuit affirmed both his conviction and his sentence. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following the Second Circuit's decision, Pagan filed four separate motions between 2002 and 2014 seeking to collaterally attack his sentence in various ways, all of which were denied. See Order (Doc. No. 6) (describing all four motions in turn). On April 18, 2016, Pagan again petitioned this court pro se to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under § 2255(f) (Doc. No. 1). The Second Circuit granted his request to file a successive section 2255 motion to raise a claim under Miller. Mandate of the USCA (Doc. No. 8). In doing so, the Second Circuit determined that Pagan had "made a prima facie showing that his claim satisfies § 2255(h) and warrants fuller exploration by the district court." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

This court subsequently ordered counsel to be appointed for Pagan. Order Appointing Counsel (Doc. No. 11). Pagan, through counsel, proceeded to move for a stay of these proceeding pending the Second Circuit's resolution of a case that would come to be known as United States v. Sierra, 933 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019), where the court would address Miller's application to defendants between the ages of 18 and 22. Pet.’s Mot. to Stay Proceedings and Extend Deadline for Filing Am. Habeas Pet. (Doc. No. 17). The court granted the stay on December 26, 2018, see Order (Doc. No. 18), and extended it upon Pagan's request on September 23, 2019. Order (Doc. No. 24).

In the meantime, following the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, Pagan filed another, separate habeas petition pro se. See Habeas Corpus Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (Doc. No. 26). In it, he argued that Davis "seriously undermined the continued validity of [the] judgment in [his] case" because the Supreme Court had struck down the residual clause of section 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1. The Second Circuit again granted Pagan leave to file a successive section 2255 motion, though it "acknowledge[d] that [Pagan's] § 924(c) conviction might still be supported by a valid predicate, even if the other predicate [was] no longer valid" after Davis. Mandate of the USCA (Doc. No. 29). The Mandate issued on June 19, 2020, and also lifted the stay that had been in place for the year and a half prior. Id. This court then consolidated the briefing schedule for both of Pagan's Petitions. See Order (Doc. No. 32). After being granted several extensions of time,¹ Pagan filed his Amended Motion on June 16, 2021, addressing both the Miller and the Davis issues. Pet. to Vacate.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code permits a federal prisoner to move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Therefore, relief is available "under § 2255 only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) ). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).

V. DISCUSSION

Pagan argues that Davis and Miller have rendered his conviction on Count Three and his life sentence on Count Two unconstitutional. Pet. to Vacate at 1. The court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

A. Davis

1. Background

Pagan's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Davis invalidated his conviction on Count Three presents a question of law that "neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has [squarely] addressed in a binding precedential decision." United States v. Riley, No. 20-CV-2201, 2021 WL 2186229, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 28,...