Page v. Cruz

1

SEAN PAGE, Appellant v. GUADALUPE DE LA CRUZ, Appellee

No. 05-22-00020-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

August 10, 2023

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court Collin County Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-05249-2020

Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN, JUSTICE

Pro se appellant Sean Page appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Guadalupe De La Cruz on her claim for partition of the parties' jointly owned residence. In four issues, Page contends that (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order partition because De La Cruz's petition was not served in compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21, 21a and 106; (2) the parol evidence rule deprived De La Cruz of jurisdictional standing to bring the partition suit; (3) the parties purportedly signed two agreements not to partition thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the parties' dispute; and (4) De La Cruz's failure to list the mortgage lender as a party of interest in her petition deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.^[1] We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a).

BACKGROUND

In 2007, the parties jointly purchased a residence in McKinney Texas, holding the property as joint tenants. The purchase was funded by a loan from EquiFirst Corporation, whose interest in the property was secured by a deed of trust listing both Page and De La Cruz as borrowers. In 2015, Page went to federal prison for a crime the details of which are not included in our record. Page was apparently released from prison at some point in or before 2020.^[2]

On October 9, 2020, De La Cruz filed her original petition for partition of real property. De La Cruz alleged that Page abandoned the property during his incarceration and that she moved into and became the sole caretaker of the property, "including but not limited to, paying the mortgage, taxes, utilities, and expenses associated with [it]." De La Cruz requested that the court order a partition by sale and divide the proceeds equally between the parties. Page, proceeding pro se, answered the lawsuit on October 20, 2020, alleging among other things that he and De La Cruz previously signed an agreement entitling him to purchase her interest in the property. He asserted that he did not want the property to be partitioned and instead requested that the trial court "enforce the signed Contract Agreement between" the parties. Page also alleged that De La Cruz had restricted his access to the property since his release from prison and had disposed of his personal effects inside the property without his consent. He requested $5,100 as a fair-market rental value for each month that he was denied access to the property and an additional $5,000 in total for his personal property.^[3] On October 23, Page filed a second answer containing substantially the same allegations and requests as the October 20 answer.^[4]

On July 28, 2021, De La Cruz filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on her claim for partition. Page responded and also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on grounds that De La Cruz's original petition and motion for summary judgment were not served in accordance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21, 21a, and 106. The trial court denied De La Cruz's motion for summary judgment because she failed to attach any evidence to her motion. The trial court also denied Page's motion to dismiss, explaining that Page "filed two answers to the lawsuit on October 20, 2020 and October 23, 2020, thereby waiving any issues he might have regarding personal service of process."

On November 15, 2021, De La Cruz filed a second motion for summary judgment. In support, De La Cruz attached her own unsworn declaration, in which she testified in relevant part that (1) the parties agreed to and secured a mortgage to purchase the property in 2007; (2) Page was incarcerated in 2015, at which time Page "abandoned the property and corresponding financial obligations"; (3) during Page's incarceration, De La Cruz made multiple attempts to acquire his consent to sell the property or secure financing to purchase her share of the interest, neither of which Page did; (4) Page refuses to participate in an equitable sale of the property, and (5) the property is a single family residence that cannot be subdivided into parts. De La Cruz requested that the trial court grant the motion and order a partition by sale. De La Cruz scheduled her motion to be heard by submission on December 10, 2021.

On November 19, Page filed a document titled "Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Dismissal of Plaintiff's Summary Judgment" supported by Page's unsworn declaration and several exhibits, including the purported agreement signed by the parties in 2014 (2014 Agreement). The 2014 Agreement states, in full:

CONTRACT AGREEMENT

2/11/2014

This contract agreement is made between Sean Page (buyer) and Guadalupe De La Cruz (seller) owners of the Real Property located at [McKinney, Texas address]. Guadalupe (seller) shall voluntarily relinquish her rights, and transfer deed trust (quick claim deed) for sole ownership and transfer the title to Sean Page. The terms of this contract agreement will commence once a final payment is delivered to the seller in the amount of $5,000.00. Seller wishes to move forward with her life, after leaving the keys and garage door openers on the kitchen counter.

Furthermore, any modifications to the contract agreement must be in writing and signed by each owner. This will alleviate and prevent any party from later claiming that the contract agreement does not contain what the parties agreed to.

The aforesaid contract agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of Texas. Thus, both Sean and Guadalupe accept the offer by signing this agreement that were mutually agreed to the terms listed above. Sean and Guadalupe are over the age of 18 and have not taken any mind altering drugs, or not under duress.

Page requested that the trial court deny De La Cruz's motion for summary judgment and enforce the 2014 Agreement by ordering De La Cruz to sell her interest in the property to Page for $5,000. On December 8, 2021, De La Cruz filed a reply arguing that the 2014 Agreement (1) is inadmissible because Page failed to authenticate it, (2) was not signed by De La Cruz, and (3) cannot be enforced because the statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract claim had expired.

On December 9, Page filed a "Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 91a," arguing that, pursuant to the parol evidence rule, De La Cruz's motion for summary judgment "should be dismissed in part and granted only to the extent that she be compelled to perform the financial terms of her now breached contract in which she agreed to sell [Page] all her interest, rights, and title to the property at issue for $5,000." On December 10, Page filed his "Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment." In this document, Page reiterated his prior arguments that De La Cruz's motion for summary judgment should be denied due to the parties' prior agreement, the parol evidence rule, and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21, 21a, and 106. Page also argued in the December 10 filing that De La Cruz's limitations argument fails because she was in continuous breach of the 2014 Agreement by refusing to sell her interest in the property to him for $5,000.

On December 31, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting De La Cruz's second motion for summary judgment. On the same day, the trial court entered its Interlocutory Judgment of Partition, in which it found that: (1) the parties each held a fifty-percent ownership interest in the property, (2) the property was encumbered by a mortgage lien in favor of Community Loan Servicing (Community), and (3) sale of the property and division of the net proceeds was more equitable than division of the property in kind. The trial court ordered that the property be listed for sale and all proceeds from the sale be placed in the registry of the court, the equitable division of which the court reserved for a future determination. This appeal followed.^[5]

DISCUSSION

Page raises four issues on appeal, contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) De La Cruz violated Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21 21a, and 106; (2) De La Cruz violated the parol evidence rule; (3) the 2014 Agreement estops De La Cruz from seeking partition; and (4) De La Cruz failed to join Community as a party.^[6] Although Page's issues are couched in terms of subject-matter jurisdiction, Page's brief also asserts various reasons why the trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous. The crux of Page's arguments relates to the impact, if any, of the 2014 purported partition agreement. We will therefore address Page's jurisdictional arguments and, where necessary, also address his merits-based arguments as to the trial court's grant of summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 38.1(f) ("The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included."); see also Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) ("Appellate briefs are to be construed reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver[, and] appellate courts should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.").

I. Standard of Review

A. Jurisdiction

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to decide a case. City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013). A court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case when the...