Paige v. Case

1

IVIVA PAIGE, Petitioner v. WARDEN JEAN CASE Respondent

No. 23 CV 5113

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

July 17, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jeremy C. Daniel Judge

Petitioner Iviva Paige, a prisoner at Logan Correctional Center, brings this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging her 2008 murder conviction from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. (R. 1.) In her petition, Paige asserts that she was deprived of her right to testify at trial as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) The respondent now moves to dismiss Paige's petition as time-barred. (R. 6.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss. Paige's habeas corpus petition is therefore denied, and the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND^[1]

I Paige's Trial

Following a bench trial, Paige was convicted of the first-degree murder of Katrina Adams. People v. Paige, 2022 IL App (1st) 200746-U, ¶ 2. Her conviction stemmed from events that occurred on October 11, 2006. Id. ¶ 6. That night, Paige and three friends visited a nightclub in Chicago, Illinois. Id. There, they encountered Adams, as well as Paige's ex-boyfriend, Devon Heath, and his then-girlfriend, Roshanda Wallace. Id. ¶ 7. When Heath and Paige noticed each other, an argument ensued, resulting in a physical altercation. Id.

Paige and her friends then exited the nightclub and drove to a second club. Id. ¶ 8. While en route, Paige expressed concerns to her friends about Heath following them and asked whether they had anything “for protection.” Id. Despite her friends encouraging her not to, Paige grabbed a steak knife out of the car's console and placed it in her purse. Id.

Sometime after Paige arrived at the second club, Heath and his group arrived. Id. ¶ 9. There, another altercation broke out between multiple people, including Heath and Paige. Id. ¶ 10. Although Heath and his group were eventually removed from the club, Wallace and Adams remained in the vicinity of the club. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.

When Paige and her friends exited shortly thereafter, Wallace and Adams sprayed mace on them, causing another, more violent fight outside. Id. During this fight, witnesses saw Paige stab Adams in the chest multiple times with a knife. Id. ¶ 11. Adams died as a result of stab wounds to the chest. Id.

Paige was arrested and charged with first degree murder. Id. ¶ 13. Her case proceeded to a bench trial during which she asserted the affirmative defenses of selfdefense and mutual combat. Id. ¶ 14. At the close of the State's case, the trial court admonished Paige that she had a right to testify. Id. Paige informed the court that she did not wish to testify, and the defense then rested. Id. The trial court found Paige guilty of murder, citing insufficient provocation to support her self-defense claim. Id. ¶ 15. She was sentenced to twenty-three years' imprisonment. Id. ¶ 2.

II. Direct Appeal

Paige appealed her conviction, arguing that: (1) her conviction should be reduced from first to second degree murder, (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of her prior bad acts, and (3) her sentence was excessive. (See R. 1-8 at 4.) The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed her conviction, (id. at 20), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied her petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”). People v. Paige, No. 11-1583, 949 N.E.2d 663 (Ill. Mar. 30, 2011) (Table). Paige did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. (See R. 1 at 3.)

III. Post-conviction Proceedings

On September 27, 2011, Paige mailed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief to the state trial court. (R. 1-1; R. 1-2 at 2.) Paige was later appointed counsel, who filed a supplemental post-conviction petition in March 2018. (R. 1-2.) Her supplemental petition raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing that her trial counsel was constitutionally defective because he failed to properly advise her about exercising her right to testify. (Id. at 3-8.) This claim proceeded to the third stage of Illinois' post-conviction proceedings, which allows for an evidentiary hearing. Paige, 2022 IL App (1st) 200746-U, ¶ 18.^[2]

Both Paige and her trial attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing. Id. ¶¶ 18-24. Based on their testimony, the court found that Paige had established ineffective assistance of trial counsel, granted Paige's post-conviction petition, and ordered a new trial. Id. ¶ 26. The State appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the circuit court's judgment, holding that Paige's ineffective assistance claim was positively rebutted by the record. Id. ¶¶ 42, 45. Thereafter, Paige, through counsel, raised her ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in a PLA to the Illinois Supreme Court. (R. 1-7.) The Illinois Supreme Court denied her PLA on September 28, 2022. People v. Paige, 197 N.E.3d 1093 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2022) (Table).

Paige now brings her ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim before this Court in a habeas corpus petition under § 2254. (See R. 1.) The respondent argues that the Court cannot reach the merits of Paige's ineffective assistance claim because her habeas corpus petition is untimely. (R. 6.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees.

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Limitations

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), “a [one]-year period of limitation” applies to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Ordinarily, this one-year clock begins to run “from ‘the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.'” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005) (quoting § 2244(d)(1)(A)). The AEDPA provides only three circumstances under which a later start date may be used: (1) where the state creates an unconstitutional impediment that prevented the filing of the habeas petition; (2) where the Supreme Court recognizes a new, retroactive constitutional right; and (3) where newly discovered evidence forms the factual predicate of a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Paige does not argue that any one of these circumstances is applicable here, however. The Court thus addresses timeliness only under § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Under 2244(d)(1)(A), Paige's conviction became final on June 28, 2011, i.e., the date the ninety-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court expired. Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 137 (2012) (“[F]or a state prisoner who does not seek review in a State's highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final' on the date that the time for seeking such review expires.”); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (providing that certiorari petition must be filed within 90 days after entry of state court judgment).

The limitations period ran for ninety-one days until September 27, 2011, the date Paige placed her pro se state post-conviction petition in the prison mail system. (R. 1-2 at 2); see Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1004 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding prison mailbox rule applies to petitions for state postconviction relief unless state law clearly rejects it); People v. Shines, 33 N.E.3d 169, 175 (Ill.App.Ct. 2015) (“Under the mailbox rule, pleadings, including posttrial motions . . ., are considered . . . filed on the day they are placed in the prison mail system by an incarcerated defendant.”).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the filing of Paige's post-conviction petition tolled the running of the limitations period. See Perry v. Brown, 950 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing § 2244(d)(2)) (“The time during which a properly filed state collateral attack is pending is excluded from the one year available to file in federal court.”). Her post-conviction petition remained pending until September 28, 2022, when the Illinois Supreme Court denied her post-conviction PLA. See Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2008). Excluding the time during which the limitations period was tolled, Paige had 274 days, or until June 29, 2023, to timely file a habeas corpus petition. Paige, however, filed her petition on August 3, 2023, thirty-five days too late.

Paige challenges the calculation of the limitations period on several grounds, but none are availing. First, she argues that her conviction did not become final, and the one-year clock did not begin to run, until September 28, 2022, the date upon which the Illinois Supreme Court denied her post-conviction PLA. (R. 9 at 4.) This is not correct. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking habeas relief begins to run from the latest of “the conclusion of direct review or the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “Accordingly, the statute of limitations imposed by section 2244(d)(1)(A) begins to run (i) when all direct criminal appeals in the state system are concluded, followed by either completion or denial of certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme Court; or (ii) when, if certiorari was not sought, all direct criminal appeals in the state system are concluded, followed by the expiration of the time allotted for filing a petition for writ.” Anderson, 281 F.3d at 675 (emphasis in original). While a properly filed state post-conviction petition tolls this one-year limitations period during the proceedings' pendency; it does not restart the clock. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 331-36 (2007) (explaining how § 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision...