Palmer v. Maryland

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JAMIEN PALMER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF MARYLAND, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 1:22-0899-CDA

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Charles D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge

This case arises from allegations that the State of Maryland (the “State”) adheres to a longstanding practice of unconstitutionally holding arrestees at the Baltimore City Booking and Intake Center (“Central Booking”) for unreasonable periods of time after a court orders their release. The plaintiffs assert several causes of action under federal and state law. Now pending is Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV, both of which allege violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ECFs 49 49-1. The parties fully briefed the issues, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly Count III is dismissed to the extent it seeks relief pursuant to Articles 16, 19, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Plaintiffs' claim under Article 24 in Count III remains because Defendants did not seek to dismiss it. The Court DENIES the Partial Motion as to Count IV.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ^[1]

On March 14, 2022, Plaintiffs Jamien Palmer, Deshawn Wilson, Clayton Rogers, and Beatrice Elmore (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this suit against the State, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”), the Maryland Division of Pretrial Detention and Services (“DPDS”), and Frederick T. Abello, the former Warden of Central Booking (“Warden Abello”), (collectively, “Defendants”).

The thrust of Plaintiffs' grievance is the State's alleged long-standing practice of unconstitutionally holding arrestees at Central Booking for unreasonable periods of time after a court orders their release. Compl., ECF 45-1, at 2. According to documents produced by the State, pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act, the entire process of preparing an arrestee for release can be completed in fifteen (15) minutes. Id. at 5. Baltimore City Detention Center representatives have testified that such process should not take longer than 1 hour and 45 minutes. Id. at 4. However, Plaintiffs contend that “[b]ased on a representative sample of 2019 data, people presumed innocent and ordered released are held, on average, more than 14 hours after their release is ordered.” Id. at 2. In 2020, the alleged average time between a release order and the release of a detainee exceeded 19 hours. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs claim that “all other years from 2019 to present involved an even longer period of overdetention.” Id. Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate that many detainees have been released in less than 1 hour, indicating that releases of such length are possible. In contrast, however, Plaintiffs maintain that in 2020 alone, more than 2,000 people were detained longer than 4 hours after a court ordered their respective releases. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs present examples of “severe” overdetention at Central Booking, including detentions lasting 6, 8, and 216 days, respectively, after court-ordered release. Id.

The allegations recite Plaintiffs' own experiences to support their claim that “Black people are disproportionately over detained the longest and have been for at least every year since 2019[.]” Id. at 7. First, Mr. Palmer alleges that he was arrested on a warrant and unreasonably detained for almost 22 hours. Id. at 8. A court ordered Mr. Palmer's release on March 15, 2019, at 3:33 p.m., but he remained detained until 1:30 p.m. on March 16, 2019-21 hours and 57 minutes after he was to be freed. Id. at 11-12. Second, Mr. Wilson alleges that he was detained for almost 18 hours: a court ordered his release on or about November 29, 2021, at 9:00 a.m., yet he was not released until 6:00 a.m. the next day. Id. at 13. Third, Mr. Rogers alleges that he was arrested on a false allegation of rape and detained for almost 90 hours after he should have been released. Id. at 14-15. A court ordered Mr. Rogers' release on December 20, 2019, at 8:00 a.m., but he was not released until around 4:00 a.m. on December 24, 2019. Id. at 15. Last, Ms. Elmore alleges that she was unlawfully detained for almost 12 hours: the court having ordered her release on June 7, 2019 at 8:07 p.m., Ms. Elmore was not released until around 8:00 a.m. the following day-11 hours and 53 minutes later. Id. at 16.

According to Plaintiffs, the unreasonable, post-order detention periods at Central Booking cost them time, money, jobs, housing, repossession of their cars, and even custody of their children. Id. at 6. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that such patterns and practices put arrestees' health, physical safety, and life at risk. Id. Plaintiffs attribute such risk to the nature of Central Booking: on average, according to Plaintiffs, there are two serious incidents of detainee-on-detainee violence each day, to say nothing of incidents between officers and detainees. Id. Plaintiffs also highlight that arrestees who post bond are “preferentially released” more than twice as fast as those whose charges are dismissed. Id. at 6-7.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to five causes of action:

• Count I, Unconstitutional Overdetention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or, in the alternative, under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution;

• Count II, Pattern and Practice of Unconstitutional Overdetention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or, in the alternative, under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution;

• Count III, Violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights or, in the alternative, Articles 16, 19, 24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights;

• Count IV, Pattern and Practice of Unconstitutional Conduct under the Maryland Declaration of Rights or, in the alternative, Articles 16, 19, 24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and

• Count V, Common Law False Imprisonment.

ECF 45-1, at 23-32. Plaintiffs assert class action allegations as well, seeking relief not only on their own behalf but on behalf of all others similarly situated. See id. at 17-23. Plaintiffs seek certification of at least four classes, all of which they claim they adequately and fairly represent. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate where the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When deciding on a motion to dismiss, courts “accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Washington v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425, 437 (4th Cir. 2018)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (noting that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief”). “The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]'” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 Fed.Appx. 745, 747 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). At the same time, a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiff's] claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014). Courts may consider “documents attached to the complaint, ‘as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.'” Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)).

III. ANALYSIS

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Count III is dismissed to the extent it seeks relief pursuant to Articles 16, 19, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Plaintiffs' claim under Article 24 in Count III remains because Defendants did not seek to dismiss it. The Court DENIES the Partial Motion as to Count IV.

A. Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss is Grantedas to Plaintiffs' Claims under Articles 16, 19, 25, and 26 in Count III.

At the outset, Plaintiffs cite a barrage of Maryland state cases to support their contention that Maryland courts do not draw “bright line” distinctions between the Articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (the “Articles”) and United States Constitution, and that Count III is a single claim that may be framed properly under Articles 16, 19, 24, 25, and 26. ECF 53, at 9-10. The only federal case Plaintiffs cite is Krell v. Queen Anne's Cnty., No. JKB-18-637, 2019 WL 4888634 (D Md. Oct. 3, 2019), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. on other grounds, Krell v. Braightmeyer, 828 Fed.Appx. 155 (4th Cir. 2020). Krell stands for the proposition that “in the context of excessive force claims brought under Articles 24 and 26, courts do not strictly observe the distinction between arrestees and pretrial detainees.” 2019 WL 4888634, at *9. Although Plaintiffs are correct that Maryland's standard for analyzing claims under excessive force by police officers is the same under Articles 24 and 26, Smith v. Bortner, 998 A.2d 369, 375 (M...