Pamela B. v. O'Malley

1

PAMELA B., Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 23 C 5221

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

January 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Sunil R. Harjani United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Pamela B.^[1]seeks to overturn the Commissioner of Social Security Administration's decision denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Pamela requests reversal and remand [12], and the Commissioner moves for summary judgment affirming the decision [18]. For the reasons discussed below, the Court affirms the ALJ's decision.

Background

Pamela filed a DIB and SSI application on August 29, 2019, and December 6, 2019, alleging an onset date of May 15, 2015. R 877. Pamela's claims were initially denied by the ALJ and the Appeals Counsel. Id. at 982-83. Pamela then appealed to this Court. Id. at 976-79. Upon review the Court granted Pamela's request for reversal and remand finding the ALJ had not properly considered, in either the Paragraph B analysis or the RFC assessment, the combined impact of Pamela's mental impairments with her other severe and non-severe RFC impairments. Id. at 981-92. Therefore, the Court ordered the ALJ to “reevaluate Pamela's RFC, considering the interaction of her many mental and physical problems on her ability to work, and explain the basis of her findings.” Id. at 992. Additionally “[w]ith the assistance of a VE, the ALJ shall determine whether Pamela can perform her past relevant work or any other jobs that exist in significant numbers.” Id. Upon remand, the state agency found Pamela to be disabled as of October 7, 2018, based on a subsequent application. Id. at 877. Thus, the Appeals Counsel instructed the ALJ to reevaluate the claim for the reviewable period of May 15, 2015, through October 6, 2018. Id.

Pamela completed high school in 1979. Id. at 213. She previously worked as a nurse assistant, claims clerk, and court clerk prior to the alleged onset of her disability. Id. at 213, 891. Pamela initially alleged disabilities due to: disorders of muscle, ligament and fascia; disorders of back - discogenic and degenerative; and affective disorders. Doc. [12] at 1; R. 68. Following remand, the ALJ held a second hearing on October 25, 2021, attended by Pamela, counsel and VE Glee Ann L. Kehr. Id. at 877, 908. On December 6, 2021, the ALJ found Pamela not disabled for the period of May 15, 2015 through October 6, 2018. Id. at 877-900. The opinion followed the required five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ found Pamela had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, with stenosis status post motor vehicle accident; degenerative joint disease of the bilateral shoulders status post rotator cuff tear; irritable bowel syndrome; Crohn's disease; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); and right hip trochanteric bursitis.^[2] R. 880-88. The ALJ noted Pamela had been diagnosed with hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and urinary frequency, although treatment was conservative, symptoms were controlled with medication, and hearing testimony did not allege functional limitations. Id. at 880-81. The ALJ also found Pamela had a history of gastritis, hemorrhoids, colon polyps, and colon cancer, though the record was void of evidence showing these conditions were severe. Id. at 881. The ALJ further reviewed that Pamela struggled with chewing due to dentures but found no evidence this imposed more than minimal vocationally functional limitations. Id. Additionally, the ALJ discussed Pamela's testimony regarding rotator cuff tears in 2013 and 2015 and considered this with the degenerative joint disease of the bilateral shoulders in reaching the RFC limitations. Id. at 881-82.

Regarding Pamela's mental impairments, the ALJ found record evidence of depression, bipolar, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a history of substance abuse. Id. at 882. However, as outlined in the ALJ's opinion, these conditions “did not cause more than minimal limitations in [Pamela's] ability to perform basic mental work activities.” Id. at 882. The ALJ concluded Pamela did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id. at 888-89. The ALJ specifically considered physical listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint), 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 3.02 (chronic respiratory disorders), and 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease). Id. Under the “Paragraph B” analysis, the ALJ found Pamela had a mild limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. Id. at 884. The ALJ found no limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with others, and adapting or managing oneself. Id. at 883-85.

The ALJ determined Pamela had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) with the following limitations: (1) never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) never crawl; (3) occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch; (4) could frequently reach in all directions bilaterally, except only occasionally reach overhead bilaterally; (5) needed to avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and work on flat even surfaces; (6) needed to avoid exposure to unprotected heights, not work around hazardous machinery, avoid concentrated exposure to temperature extremes of heat and cold, humidity, wetness, and pulmonary irritants; (7) could do no commercial driving; and (8) occasionally operate foot controls bilaterally. Id. at 889-98. For the mental aspects of the RFC, the ALJ found Pamela's mild assessment of concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace did “not warrant further mental work-related limitation assessment” as the treatment and medication management supported that Pamela could perform past semi-skilled work. Id. at 895. After posing hypotheticals to the VE, the ALJ concluded Pamela could perform past relevant work as a claims examiner/claims clerk, and identification clerk. Id. at 898-900. As a result, the ALJ found Pamela not disabled. Id. at 900. The Appeals Council denied Pamela's request for review. Id. at 874-76.

Discussion

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals any of the listings found in the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (2004); (4) whether the claimant is unable to perform their former occupation; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any other available work in light of their age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). These steps are to be performed sequentially. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled.

A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868 (quotation marks omitted).

Judicial review of the ALJ's decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence or based upon a legal error. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing an ALJ's decision, the Court “will not reweigh the evidence, resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ's determination.” Reynolds v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, where the ALJ's decision “lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded.” Steele, 290 F.3d at 940.

In support of her request for reversal and remand, Pamela argues the ALJ: (1) did not properly evaluate her mental impairments; and (2) failed to properly evaluate the impact of her mild limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. See generally Doc. [12]; Doc. [21]. Having considered these arguments and the record, the Court finds the ALJ did not commit reversible error as the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

I. Mental Impairment Assessment

For her first contention, Pamela argues the ALJ did not account for her mental impairments by: (1) finding no limitations in interacting with others, understanding, remembering, and applying information, and adapting and managing oneself; (2) relying on the ALJ's own opinions and attributing the State agency psychological consultants “less weight;” (3) failing to cite and explain how new evidence of mental impairments, including ADHD, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, were considered. Doc. [12] at 2-6; Doc. [21] at 1-8. The Court disagrees.

By way of background, this Court previously reversed and remanded to the...