Panarese v. Claudio

2023 NY Slip Op 02324

Anthony Panarese, etc., et al., respondents, v. Eileen Claudio, etc., appellant.

No. 2020-09277, Index No. 501969/20

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

May 3, 2023

Albert Goodwin, New York, NY, for appellant.

Charles G. Fiore, New York, NY, for respondents.

BETSY BARROS, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, DEBORAH A DOWLING, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to quiet title to certain real property, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bruce M. Balter, J.), dated November 10, 2020. The order denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In 1954, the defendant's decedent, Catherine Panarese Bonfandio (hereinafter Catherine), executed a deed (hereinafter the 1954 deed) transferring certain real property in Brooklyn (hereinafter the subject property) to "ANTHONY PANARESE and MARIA PANARESE, his wife." In 1956, Catherine executed a second deed (hereinafter the 1956 deed), which purported to correct the names of the grantees in the 1954 deed to "LUIGI PANARESE and ANGELINA PANARESE, his wife." In 1975, Catherine's father died, and purported to devise the subject property to Catherine by his will.

The present quiet title action, commenced by Catherine's sister, Marie Gatti, and the estate of her brother, Anthony Panarese, arises from these transactions. The plaintiffs assert that the 1954 deed transferred the subject property to them, albeit with a scrivener's error describing them as husband and wife rather than as siblings. The defendant, the preliminary executor of Catherine's estate to whom Catherine purportedly devised the subject property in 2017 via her will, moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (5), and (7) to dismiss the complaint. In support of her motion, the defendant contended that the 1954 deed was intended to transfer the subject property to Catherine's parents, but erroneously referred to them by their middle names (or, in the father's case, a variation on his middle name), and that correcting this error was the purpose of the 1956 deed. Accordingly, she contended, Catherine's father could pass good title to Catherine via his will and Catherine could pass good title to the defendant. In an order dated November 10 2020, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The defendant appeals.

The construction of deeds is a matter of law (see Deckoff v W. Manning Family L.P., 193 A.D.3d 812, 813-814; Blangiardo v Horstmann, 32 A.D.3d 876, 879), and a deed is a proper basis for a motion to dismiss based upon documentary evidence (see CPLR 3211[a][1]). Here however, the language of the 1954 deed is "ambiguous such that it is susceptible of more than one interpretation" (Deckoff v W. Manning Family L.P., 193 A.D.3d at 814 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hartmann v Harris, 136 A.D.3d 977, 979), thus precluding dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1). Although the names of Catherine's parents, as recorded on their birth certificates, were "Panarese Luigi Antonio" and "Torre Angela Maria," the 1954 deed conveyed the subject property to "ANTHONY PANARESE and MARIA PANARESE, his wife." The face of the document does not conclusively establish that the deed was intended to refer to Catherine's mother, using her middle name, and to Catherine's father, using the name Anthony. The 1954 deed therefore does not, standing alone, establish as a matter of law that title passed from Catherine to her father, then back to Catherine by will.

The 1956 deed, which purports to correct the names of the grantees (albeit referring to "Angelina," rather than Catherine's mother's actual name, Angela), also fails to establish as a matter of law that title passed to Catherine's father and then to Catherine. A corrective deed may be valid and enforceable, where it is delivered to and accepted by the grantee (see Garson v Tarmy, 187 A.D.3d 1149, 1151). Here, where the identity of the grantees in the 1954 deed is the matter in dispute, the corrective deed, even if delivered to and accepted by Catherine's parents, does not resolve title, since, if the 1954 deed actually transferred the property to the plaintiffs, then the 1956 deed was a nullity in the absence of acceptance by the plaintiffs (see Bouffard v Befese, LLC, 111 A.D.3d 866, 870; ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v Stephens, 91 A.D.3d 801, 803).

The defendant further contends that title to the subject property was determined in either a 1976 action brought by Catherine to quiet title to the...