Panicacci v. W. Ada Sch. Dist. #2

ROBERT and AMIE PANICACCI, as legal guardians and parents of G.P., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. WEST ADA SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-00329-WBS

United States District Court, D. Idaho

May 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiffs brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, to seek review of a hearing officer's determination as to their child's eligibility for special education services. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) Before the court is their Motion to Amend Pleadings, through which plaintiffs seek leave to add claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 20 U.S.C § 1415. (Mot. (Docket No. 18).) Defendant West Ada School District #2 (the “District”) opposes plaintiffs' request, arguing that the proposed amendment is futile because plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies that are prerequisites to bringing ADA and RA claims. (Opp. (Docket No. 19).)

I. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend its pleading with the court's leave, which should be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “[R]equests for leave should be granted with ‘extreme liberality.'” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Leave “should be granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue delay.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992).

“An amendment is futile when ‘no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.'” Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies where required in order to assert a claim renders amendment to add such a claim futile. Patterson v. Kelso, 698 Fed.Appx. 393, 394 (9th Cir. 2017); Givens v. Cate, 362 Fed.Appx. 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2010). “A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a proposed amendment is futile . . . .” Nguyen v. Thermo Fisher Sci., Inc., 18-cv-6728 DMG (JCx), 2019 WL 13039947, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2019) (citation omitted).

The District does not contend that the requested amendment would cause it prejudice if granted, that plaintiffs have unduly delayed their request, or that the request is made in bad faith or with a dilatory motive. (See Opp.) Instead, it contends plaintiff failed to exhaust the required administrative process in two respects. The court will address each in turn.

II. Identification of Issues in Administrative Hearing

First, the District argues that plaintiffs did not identify during the IDEA administrative process the issues “concerning access to the school or programs or activities” upon which they seek to base their ADA and RA claims. (Id. at 6.) Although counsel for the District acknowledged at oral argument that plaintiffs were not required to specifically reference the ADA or RA during the administrative process, the District argues that plaintiffs were required to present facts pertaining to the programs from which they claim their child was excluded but failed to do so.

Although the relevant portions of the ADA and RA do not themselves include an exhaustion requirement, the IDEA provides:

Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], [the Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA's administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA].

D.D. ex rel. Ingram v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 10 F.4th 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)) (alterations in original). This requirement is “‘designed to channel requests for a FAPE^[1] (and its incidents) through IDEA- prescribed procedures' and prevents plaintiffs from using artful pleading to litigate IDEA issues without first utilizing the IDEA process.” Id. (quoting Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)) (other citations omitted).

Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement applies to the ADA and RA claims they seek to bring. (See Reply at 4-7 (Docket No. 20).) As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

[E]xhaustion is required in cases where a plaintiff is seeking to enforce rights that arise as a result of a denial of a free appropriate public education, whether pled as an IDEA claim or any other claim that relies on the denial of a FAPE to provide the basis for the cause of action (for instance, a claim for damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, premised on a denial of a FAPE).

Payne, 653 F.3d at 875 (citation omitted). Here, plaintiffs acknowledge that their proposed ADA and RA claims are premised on the District's alleged denial of a free appropriate public education to their child, G.P. (Reply at 4-7.) Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement applies. See D.D., 18 F.4th at 1048 (“[I]f the gravamen of [a plaintiff]'s complaint is the school's failure to provide a FAPE, he must first exhaust the IDEA process before seeking ADA relief.”); see also Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.”).

The parties do dispute, however, whether the exhaustion requirement was satisfied by virtue of plaintiffs' participation in an administrative Due Process Hearing. (Opp. at 6-8; Reply at 4-7.) The court concludes that it was.

As a threshold matter, defendant has not established that, if a plaintiff challenges an alleged denial of a FAPE through the IDEA administrative process, he must make any additional showing or argument during that process to be able to bring a subsequent ADA or RA claim in court. The Ninth Circuit has “indicate[d] that asserting IDEA violations at the administrative level is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement with respect to claims under § 504 [of the RA], ” Wiles v. Dept. of Educ., 555 F.Supp.2d 1143, 1161 (D. Haw. 2008) (citing Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 935 n.11 (9th Cir. 2008)), and the District does not dispute that plaintiffs here have asserted IDEA violations at the administrative level. See id. at 1162 (“Plaintiffs have unquestionably availed themselves of the administrative procedures in the IDEA. Indeed, § 1415(1) simply states that plaintiffs who are seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA must first go through the IDEA administrative proceedings.”). It would make little sense to require an additional showing at the administrative level where, as the Supreme Court has explained, it will frequently be the case that “the hearing officer cannot provided the . . . relief” requested under ADA or RA claims, even where “the ADA or Rehabilitation Act might require the [requested] accommodation.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S.Ct. 743, 754 (2017).

The District cites two decisions from district courts in the Ninth Circuit “recogniz[ing] that if a claim is not contained with the Due Process hearing, it is not properly before the Court.” (Opp. at 6-7.) However, those cases only involved appeals of decisions by administrative hearings officers under the IDEA and did not involve ADA or RA claims. See B.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Dept. of Educ., 20-cv-350 HG WRP, 2021 WL 1886298, at *6 (D. Haw. May 11, 2021); Dept. of Educ. of Haw. v. Leo W. ex rel. Veronica W., 226 F.Supp.3d 1081, 1096 (D. Haw. 2016). Accordingly, those cases simply stand for the proposition that a district court cannot review decisions by a hearings officer as to issues that were not in fact before the officer. Unlike an administrative appeal under the IDEA, which seeks review of a hearings officer's decision, claims brought under the ADA and RA directly challenge decisions of an educational agency itself. The cases the District cites are therefore inapposite.^[2]

Further even assuming plaintiffs were required to present the bases for their proposed ADA and RA claims to the administrative officer, the information currently before the court suggests that they did. Notably, there is substantial (if not complete) overlap between the bases for plaintiffs' due process challenge, as presented to the hearing officer, and the ADA and RA claims they now seek to assert. Looking to the proposed amended complaint, it is clear that the gravamen of the ADA and RA claims is an alleged denial of a free appropriate public education. The proposed ADA claim, for example, alleges that (1) G.P. “required accommodations in order to meaningfully participate in Defendant's programs, services, and activities”; (2) the particular accommodations sought are “one-on-one speech and language therapy services” and “a full-time Autism-Behavioral-Analyst (ABA) therapist”; (3) the District has “refused” to “provide[ ] G.P. those accommodations”; and (4) as a result of such refusal, G.P. has experienced “public humiliation and denial of equal access.” (Mot., Ex. A, at ¶¶ 11, 39-41, 46 (Docket No. 18).) In D.D., the Ninth Circuit evaluated an ADA claim and concluded it constituted a challenge to a denial of a free appropriate public education based on very...