Papin v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr.

673 F.Supp.3d 829

Joseph PAPIN, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-763-KHJ-FKB

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division, Northern Division

Signed May 18, 2023

C. Ryan Morgan, Pro Hac Vice, Gregory Ronald Schmitz, Pro Hac Vice, Jolie Noelle Pavlos, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Orlando, FL, Charles (Chad) Randall Flores, Pro Hac Vice, Flores Law PLLC, Houston, TX, Russell Stanley Post, Pro Hac Vice, Beck Redden, LLP, Houston, TX, John A. Waits, Morgan & Morgan, PLLC, Jackson, MS, Martin R. Jelliffe, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff.

J. Cal Mayo, Jr., John Andrew Mauldin, Paul B. Watkins, Jr., Mayo Mallette PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Defendant.

ORDER

Kristi H. Johnson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center's ("UMMC") [258] Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,¹ or in the Alternative, for a New Trial. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff Dr. Joseph Papin sued UMMC for wrongful termination from its medical-residency program. The below summarizes the events leading to this lawsuit.

A. Dr. Papin's Residency

Dr. Papin graduated from the University of Michigan Medical School in 2015. See Trial Tr. vol. 3 [263] at 25, 156. After applying to surgical-residency programs across the country, he "matched" at UMMC. Id. at 157-64. Before beginning his surgical residency in July 2016, he signed a House Officer Contract. Id. at 173-74; Joint Trial Ex. 2.

The House Officer Contract outlined the terms of Dr. Papin's employment. It provided him with a one-year term of employment, subject to renewal before each new year of the residency program. Trial Tr. vol. 2 [262] at 145; Joint Trial Ex. 2 at 1. It also stated Dr. Papin could be terminated at any time for "malfeasance, inefficiency, or contumacious conduct." Joint Trial Ex. 2 at 2. Dr. Papin, the Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs, and the Associate Dean for Graduate Medical Education signed the contract. Id.

But Dr. Papin did not finish his first year of residency. During the first six months of the program, UMMC physicians and staff documented examples of Dr. Papin's performance falling below UMMC's expectations. For example, the jury heard testimony from witnesses alleging Dr. Papin's poor care of a patient suffering from a decubitus ulcer, [263] at 35-37; his impermissibly leaving shifts, [262] at 31-33, Def.'s Trial Ex. 25; his subpar rapport with colleagues, [262] at 24-25; and his failure to improve his performance after receiving negative feedback from superiors, Trial Tr. vol. 4 [264] at 32-33.

Dr. Meghan Mahoney—a senior resident—formally reported Dr. Papin in January 2017 for failing to properly treat the decubitus ulcer patient. [263] at 35; Def.'s Trial Ex. 25. Dr. Truman Earl—the director of Dr. Papin's residency program—later scheduled a meeting with Dr. Papin on January 10, 2017. [264] at 42-43; Trial Tr. vol. 5 [265] at 28, 101. He presented Dr. Papin with a "Remediation Agreement" at that meeting. Id. at 101-03; Pl.'s Trial Ex. 2. The Agreement gave Dr. Papin 60 days "to show significant improvement" as a surgical resident or face termination. [265] at 103; Pl.'s Trial Ex. 2 at 1. Only Dr. Earl and Dr. Papin signed the Agreement. Pl.'s Trial Ex. 2 at 2.

Dr. Papin never returned to work after his meeting with Dr. Earl, however. [264] at 47-48. Instead, UMMC terminated his employment on February 22, 2017, well before the Remediation Agreement's 60-day period expired. Id. at 52.

B. The Lawsuit

Dr. Papin sued UMMC, among others, on September 20, 2017. Compl. [1]. His Second Amended Complaint brought claims against UMMC and other defendants for breach-of-contract; violation of Section 213-A of the Mississippi Constitution; state due-process violations; federal due-process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and violations of Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Am. Compl. [50]. The Court dismissed all of Dr. Papin's claims except the breach-of-contract claim against UMMC. Summ. J. Order [170] at 54-55. The Court also entered an Order on September 22, 2021, limiting Dr. Papin's recoverable damages to the House Officer Contract's one-year term. Order [192] at 12-13.

C. Trial

Trial began on October 11, 2022. Trial Tr. vol. 1 [257] at 107. Dr. Papin was present, along with Dr. Earl, who served as UMMC's representative. Id. at 11. Dr. Papin contended UMMC breached both the House Officer Contract and the Remediation Agreement. Id. at 17.

Over seven days, the jury heard from 13 witnesses, including Dr. Papin and Dr. Earl. After Dr. Papin rested his case-in-chief on October 19, UMMC moved for a directed verdict.² Trial Tr. vol. 7 [267] at 72; [265] at 3. It argued:

1) Dr. Papin failed to prove the Remediation Agreement was a legally enforceable contract; 2) Dr. Papin failed to prove UMMC breached the House Officer Contract when it terminated Dr. Papin's employment;

3) Dr. Papin failed to prove punitive damages were warranted;

4) Even if punitive damages were warranted, UMMC has not waived its immunity as to punitive damages; and

5) Dr. Papin failed to prove he suffered a separate, intentional tort to warrant the imposition of emotional damages.

[265] at 3-10. The Court denied the motion. Id. at 24.

UMMC also rested its case-in-chief on October 19. [267] at 73.³ It renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the Court denied again. Id. at 53-54. The Court instructed the jury on the law after considering the parties' objections to the Court's proposed jury instructions. Id. at 74-85. The parties then presented closing arguments. Id. at 85-157.

After closing arguments, the Court explained the verdict form to the jury. Id. at 157-60. The verdict form asked the jury these questions:

1) Do you find that Dr. Joseph Papin has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center breached the House Officer Contract?

2) Do you find that the January 10, 2017, remediation document is a contract?

3) Do you find that Dr. Joseph Papin has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center breached the January 10, 2017, remediation document?

4) If you answered "YES" to Question #1 or Question #3, provide the amount of damages that would compensate Dr. Joseph Papin for harm caused by Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center's breach of contract.

A. Past lost earnings

B. Past physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, or emotional distress

C. Future physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, or emotional distress

[245]. The jury then began deliberations. [267] at 160.

The jury found Dr. Papin failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that UMMC breached the House Officer Contract. [245]. But it concluded the Remediation Agreement was a contract and that UMMC breached it. Id. The jury awarded Dr. Papin $14,651 in lost earnings; $600,000 for past physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, or emotional distress; and $886,000 for future physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, or emotional distress. Id. The Court polled the jury, and each member confirmed that was their verdict. Trial Tr. vol. 8 [268] at 4.

After the jury retired, the Court heard arguments about whether it should present punitive damages to the jury. Id. at 6. UMMC reasserted its argument that it had not waived its immunity from liability for punitive damages, and Dr. Papin disagreed. Id. at 6-21. The Court was "not completely satisfied" that punitive damages were allowed in the case. Id. at 17-18. Still, the Court decided it was better to give a punitive damages instruction to the jury and reconsider the issue on post-trial motions if necessary. See id. at 17-21. It accordingly instructed the jurors on punitive damages, allowed the parties to present their arguments, and sent the jurors to deliberate. Id. at 21-30. The jury returned a punitive damages award of $5,000,000 for Dr. Papin. [247]. The Court polled the jury, and each member confirmed that was their award. [268] at 32-33.

UMMC now contends it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial. [258].

II. Standard

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). "[S]uch a motion is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict." Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 287 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2002). Consequently, "judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion." Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). To survive a Rule 50 motion, the nonmoving party "must at least establish a conflict in substantial evidence on each essential element of their claim." N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 461, 473 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., 650 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 2011)).

In reviewing the motion, the Court should consider all evidence in the record, but it should disregard "all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Additionally, it must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. It may not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence because those are jury functions. Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097.

III. Analysis

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

UMMC argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for three reasons: (1) the Remediation Agreement was not a...