Parikh v. Frosh

NAMISH PARIKH, Plaintiff, v. HON. BRIAN FROSH, Defendant.

Case No.: GJH-17-0332

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division

September 15, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Namish Parikh brings this action pro se against Defendant Hon. Brian Frosh, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Maryland, challenging the constitutionality of the Maryland prejudgment attachment statute, Md. Rule 2-115, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment. Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 4, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 7, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Surreply, ECF No. 12. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Surreply is denied, and Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the financial assets of Plaintiff's late father, Dinesh O. Parikh, and a legal dispute that resulted over those funds. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10; ECF No. 5-2 at 2.¹ Plaintiff's fatherdied on June 18, 2016. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. The father's Last Will and Testament was docketed in the Register of Wills Office for Montgomery County, Maryland (Estate #W87973). Id. ¶ 11. The terms of the Last Will named Plaintiff's ex-wife, Oxana Parikh, as the Executor and sole beneficiary of Plaintiff's father's property and assets. Id. ¶ 12. On June 22, 2016, the Register of Wills appointed Oxana Parikh as the Personal Representative, or Executor, of the Estate. Plaintiff's sister, who had been apparently disinherited in the will, filed a Petition to Remove the Personal Representative and a Petition to Caveat the Last Will on July 11, 2016 in the Orphans' Court for Montgomery County. Id. ¶ 14. The Orphans' Court held a hearing on September 9, 2016. Id. ¶ 17. The Orphans' Court removed Oxana Parikh as Personal Representative and appointed Lynn Claude Boynton, also known as Lynn C. Pendleton, ("Boynton"), as Special Administrator of the Estate. Id.

On October 6, 2016, Boynton filed a verified complaint under oath against Plaintiff and his ex-wife in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. ECF No. 1 ¶ 21; ECF No. 5-2 at 2-23; see Boynton v. Parikh, Case No. 425847 V (Cir. Ct. Prince George's Cty. 2016). That same day, Boynton also petitioned the duty judge, ex parte, for an Order of Attachment. Id. ¶ 24; ECF No. 5-3 at 2-10. Boynton moved pursuant to Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-303(e), which prescribes that an attachment before judgment may issue "[i]f the debtor is about to assign, dispose of, conceal, or remove his property or a portion of it from the State with intent to defraud his creditors . . ." § 3-303(e)(1). See ECF No. 5-3 at 5.² The judge granted the Order of Attachment, freezing and seizing the Ally Bank accounts of Plaintiff and his ex-wife. ECF No. 1 ¶ 24; ECF No. 5-4 at 2-4. Allegedly, Boynton was not required to post a bond to obtain the Attachment, as it was waived by the court, and no hearing was held before the Attachmentissued. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24, 28. Plaintiff claims that he was not notified about the Attachment. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 52; ECF No. 10 at 25. He further complains that no post-deprivation hearing was scheduled. ECF No. 1 ¶ 57. Pursuant to a joint consent motion filed by Boynton and the Parikhs, the $1,140,000 in seized funds were held by the Registry of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. ECF No. 5-5 at 2-4.³

Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in this Court against Brian Frosh, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Maryland, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 1.⁴ Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court "[i]ssue a declaratory judgment finding that the seizure/attachment by the State unconstitutionally injured Plaintiff and is unlawful," "[p]ermanently enjoin the Defendant from seizing, freezing or holding, any assets belonging to Plaintiff under the State's prejudgment attachment program," and "[o]rder the State authorities to adopt a new prejudgment attachment program without the constitutionally offensive features of the current program." ECF No. 1 at 18. Defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 7. Defendant contends that the case is subject to dismissal based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, and because the Maryland prejudgment attachment statute is not unconstitutional. The Court will address each issue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"It is well established that before a federal court can decide the merits of a claim, the claim must invoke the jurisdiction of the court." Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 85 F.App'x 960 (4th Cir. 2004). Once a challenge is made to subject matter jurisdiction, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children's Guild, 742 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (D. Md. 2010) (citing Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Cty. Comm'rs of Carroll Cty., Md., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008)). The Court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "test[s] the adequacy of a complaint." Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 654, 660 (D. Md. 2011) (citing German v. Fox, 267 F. App'x 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2008)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do "not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Prelich, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The facts "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). The Court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." GE Inv. PrivatePlacement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Rooker-Feldman

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine springs from the principle that "[j]urisdiction to review such state court decisions lies exclusively with superior state courts, and ultimately, the United States Supreme Court." Plyer v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). Rooker-Feldman stops "lower federal courts from considering not only issues raised and decided in the state courts, but also issues that are 'inextricably intertwined' with the issues that were before the state court." Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)). An issue is "inextricably intertwined" when it "was not actually decided by the state court but where success on the . . . claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000). The doctrine is jurisdictional; thus, the Court is "obliged to address it before proceeding" to the merits of a given case. Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 2002).

However, Rooker-Feldman is "narrow and focused," and stands only for the proposition that "lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments." Thana v. Bd. of License Commissioners for Charles Cty., Maryland, 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016). To emphasize the narrow role of Rooker-Feldman, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that it has not applied the doctrine since the decisions in Rooker and Feldman. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531 (2011); Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006); Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287 (2005). Since Exxon, the Fourth Circuit also has not, in a published opinion, held that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. See Thana, 827 F.3d at 319.

Indeed, the doctrine does not apply "if a plaintiff in federal court does not seek review of the state court judgment itself but instead presents an independent claim that is related to a matter decided by a state court." Torkornoo v. Helwig, No. 16-1650, 2016 WL 7156586, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2016). In Thana,...